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The addiction literature treats as a stylized fact that formal treatment programs have little long‐run efficacy. Treated addicts have no better prospects for long‐run abstinence than do addicts who do not enter treatment programs. A logical consequence of this is that if treatment enhances the prospects of long‐run abstinence for some treated addicts, then it diminishes the prospects for others. This paper offers a simple cost‐benefit argument explaining how treatment can interfere with certain natural processes conducive to permanently abandoning an addiction. The paper argues that a stable remission from addiction depends on the historic costs of the addiction relative to the historic benefits as perceived by the user. Because treatment intrinsically mitigates the cost of addiction but does not directly influence the benefits of addiction, treatment can make returning to an addiction more likely.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine an unexplored aspect of tax expenditures: the tax-price implications of tax exemptions, deductions and credits. Although this implication of tax expenditures has not been adequately examined, two separate lines of analysis have been suggested by the existing literature. Some authors have emphasized the welfare costs of tax expenditures. To the extent that tax expenditures narrow the tax base the introduction or extension of a tax expenditure undoubtedly makes the cost of raising revenue more than it would be otherwise. This kind of cost, denoted as a welfare cost, can be incorporated into a model of individual tax-price determination. On the other hand, other authors have emphasized another tax-price implication of tax expenditures: that the introduction or extension of a tax expenditure changes the cost-shares faced by each taxpayer, exclusive of any welfare cost. Since an individual's cost-share is nothing more than his personal tax base divided by the aggregate tax base, this result emerges because a tax expenditure usually changes the individual's tax base in a manner disproportionate to the change in the aggregate tax base. This dissertation will explore and combine each line of analysis, both theoretically and empirically. In the first portion of the dissertation a model of tax-price determination is developed that explicitly incorporates the welfare cost of taxation. Various tax expenditures are then introduced into the model and their effects on individual tax-price schedules discerned. In this way the influence a tax expenditure has on an individual's choice over public sector size can be surmised. The next portion develops within the confines of a simple median voter model some potential allocative implications of various tax expenditures. This portion traces out the expected change in the median voter's desired quantity of the collective good, given various tax expenditures, via an analysis of the cost-share impact of the various tax expenditures. Although in this section welfare costs are not explicitly considered or all possible political cases outlined, the analysis does look at a set of cases that are of general interest. The final portion of the dissertation considers the influence tax expenditures taken in toto have on both the cost-sharing arrangement among individual taxpayers and the welfare cost to individual taxpayers. The results are used to gauge both the distributive and allocative implications of tax expenditures. ; Ph. D.

Pride and Profit explores the ways in which Jane Austen's novels interact with the ideas of economist Adam Smith. Bohanon and Vachris show how Smithian perspectives on virtue are depicted in Austen's novels and how Smith's and Austen's perspectives reflect and define the bourgeois culture of the Enlightenment and industrial revolution.

A fresh view of the post-Civil War period in the US argues that characterizations of the era as protectionist fail to consider the impact of unrestricted immigration. Although immigration reached record proportions between 1865 & 1910, the values of the goods & services yet to be produced by these immigrants was unrecorded & untaxed. Brief summaries of post-Civil War tariff & immigration experiences are followed by analyzes of official tariff rates, as well as the earnings & total imports of foreign-born persons. A recalculation of measured tariff rates indicates that substantial immigration makes the protectionist label irrelevant since the impact of high tariffs was overwhelmed by free immigration. Adding immigrant earnings to the value of imports is said to produce a better measure of the overall degree of insulation for the economy. Consideration is also given to the flow of foreign capital into the US that occurred between 1865 & 1910. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 43 References. J. Lindroth

A reply is offered to Jac C. Heckelman's (2003) critique of the authors' (2002) contention that each individual vote in a democracy does not count, based on analysis of the 2002 US presidential election between George W. Bush & Al Gore. Heckelman's comments about the authors' error in stating that FL's electoral votes mattered more than those of other states in this election are supported, though it is stated that the role of the electoral college is basically "ceremonial." Heckelman's analysis of individual voter incentives & the probability of recounts is also supported, & a numerical extension is offered for clarification. An additional lesson drawn from this discussion is that "whatever the degree of their irrelevance," uninformed voters are the most likely to be irrelevant. It is argued that this "undeniable flaw in the democratic process justifies limitations on the scope of the public sector.". 1 Table. K. Hyatt Stewart

The US presidential election of 2000 raised issues dealing with institutionalized vote counting. Literature written on the importance of a single vote often diverges. An individual's vote only matters if it "triggers a recount for his preferred candidate" when the number of voters is even, or if it "eliminates a recount to the benefit of the preferred candidate" when the number of voters is odd. A single vote has no bearing on a tie. The election of 2000 made irregularities of vote counting apparent. 9 References. I. Sharp