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Chapter 1: Preface -- Part 1: State, politics, social classes and historical change -- Chapter 2. Introduction -- Chapter 3. The capitalist state at the center: A Critique of Michel Foucault's concept of power -- Chapter 4. The place of State in the Marxist theory of history -- Chapter 5. State and transition to capitalism: Feudalism, Absolutism and Bourgeois political revolution -- Chapter 6. State and transition to socialism: Was the Paris Commune a workers' power? -- Chapter 7. The concept of revolutionary crisis: 1789: France in 1789 -- Chapter 8. The Political scene and class interests in capitalist society: Marx's analysis -- Part 2: Politics and economy in the formation of the working classes -- Chapter 9. Pre-capitalism, capitalism and worker resistance: Elements for a theory of union action -- Chapter 10. The (difficult) formation of the working class -- Chapter 11. The constitution of the proletariat into a class in the Manifesto of the Communist Party: Polemicizing with Some Classic Interpretations -- Chapter 12. The exhaustion of the 20th century revolutionary cycle -- Chapter 13. Middle class and unionism -- Chapter 14. Citizenship and social classes. .

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface to the English Edition -- Tables and Charts -- Part 1 Reform and Social Classes in the pt Governments -- Chapter 1 State, Bourgeoisie, and Neoliberalism in the Lula Government -- 1 The Bloc in Power in the Neoliberal Period -- 2 The Political Ascension of the Industrial Bourgeoisie and Agribusiness under the Lula Government -- 3 Political Rise, but No Hegemony Established -- 4 The Political Regime and the Hegemony of Financial Capital -- 5 Final Considerations -- Chapter 2 The Lula Governments: The New "National Bourgeoisie" in Power -- 1 fhc, Lula, and Disputes within the Bourgeoisie -- 2 The Political Relations of the Big Internal Bourgeoisie with the Lula Government -- 3 Contradictions within the Internal Bourgeoisie and the Neodevelopmentalist Front -- Chapter 3 The Political Bases of Neodevelopmentalism -- 1 The Neodevelopmentalist Political Front -- 2 The Neodevelopmentalist Program -- 3 The Classes and Class Fractions Integrating the Neodevelopmentalist Front -- 4 The Contradictions in the Core of the Front -- Chapter 4 Lulism, Populism, and Bonapartism -- 1 The Concepts -- 2 Varguism and Lulism -- 3 Bonapartism and Lulism -- Chapter 5 Neodevelopmentalism, Social Classes, and Foreign Policy in the pt Governments -- 1 The Bloc in Power and the Neodevelopmentalist Political Front2 -- 2 Foreign Policy and the Neodevelopmentalist Front -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 6 Neodevelopmentalism and the Recovery of the Brazilian Union Movement -- 1 Neodevelopmentalism and the Union Movement -- 2 The Union Movement's Political Moderation -- 3 The Growth of the Strike Struggle -- 4 Final Considerations -- Part 2 The Nature and Dynamics of the Crisis that Led to the Impeachment -- Chapter 7 The Political Crisis of Neodevelopmentalism and the Instability of Democracy.

Analysis of Brazil's Bolsonaro administration, its most active social support base, and the political crisis that gave rise to it shows that, operating with a concept of fascism embedded in the Marxist tradition, it can be characterized as (neo)fascist. The political crisis of 2015–2018 that led to it involved a crisis of hegemony of the bloc in power, the crisis of party representation of the dominant classes, political activism by the state bureaucracy, the political defensiveness of the workers' and lower-class movement, and the formation of a reactionary middle-class movement. The option for fascism was not without risks, as is reflected today by the demonstrations of dissatisfaction with its administration. Uma análise do governo Bolsonaro no Brasil, a sua base social a mais ativa e a crise política que lhe deve origem, mostra que, baseado num conceito de fascismo enquadrado na tradição marxista, este governo pode ser denominado como (neo)fascista. O governo (neo)fascista de Bolsonaro era decorrente de uma crise política nos anos 2015-2018 que implicou uma crise de hegemonia no bloco de poder, uma crise de representação partidária das classes dominantes, um ativismo político na burocrâcia estatal, uma atitude defensiva política do movimento dos trabalhadores e classes pobres e a formação de um movimento reacionário da classe média. A opçao fascista não é isento de riscos vis-à-vis a burguesia como se reflete hoje nas manifestações de insatisfação com a administração burguesa.

Lulism is one of the most important political phenomena of twenty-first-century Brazil. It can be compared to the Varguism that dominated Brazilian politics between 1930 and 1964 in its broad popular but politically unorganized base and its policy of state intervention in the economy to stimulate economic growth, increase the state's room for maneuver against the imperialist countries, and promote a moderate income distribution. These two variants of populism differ, however, in that Varguism was based on the working class while Lulism, which may be called "neopopulism," is based on the marginal mass of workers and has less potential to destabilize the political process. Bonapartism, to which Lulism has also been compared, is distinct from it in that what links its leadership to its base is the fetish of the state based on order rather than the fetish based on protection. O lulismo é um dos fenômenos políticos mais importantes do Brasil do século XXI. Pode ser comparado ao varguismo que dominou a política brasileira entre 1930 e 1964 em relação à sua ampla, mas politicamente desorganizada, base popular, e sua política de intervenção estatal na economia para estimular o crescimento econômico, aumentar a margem de manobra do Estado contra os países imperialistas e promover uma distribuição de renda moderada. Essas duas variantes do populismo diferem, no entanto, no sentido de que o varguismo era baseado na classe trabalhadora, enquanto o lulismo, que pode ser chamado de "neopopulismo", é baseado na massa marginal de trabalhadores e tem menos potencial para desestabilizar o processo político. O bonapartismo, ao qual o lulismo também foi comparado, é distinto dele, pois o que liga sua liderança à sua base é o fetiche do estado baseado na ordem, e não o fetiche baseado na proteção.

La crise de 2008 a changé la donne au Brésil, notamment lorsque son impact s'est aggravé à partir de 2011. Le ralentissement économique a facilité le coup d'État, d'un type nouveau, contre le gouvernement néodéveloppementaliste avec assise populaire pour le remplacer par un autre au programme néolibéral pur et dur. Ce tournant à droite a été provoqué par le développement du conflit entre les différentes fractions de la classe dominante et les classes populaires.

While maintaining the neoliberal capitalist model, the Lula administration has ushered it into a new phase. With respect to the bloc in power, national and international financial capital today shares its hegemony with the important domestic industrial and agrarian bourgeoisie. However, with respect to the working class, there have been two changes. First, the new unionist elite that has been moving toward a micro-corporativism since the mid-1990s has established an alliance with the domestic bourgeoisie against financial capital. Second, the poor and unorganized laborers, who have been serving as a support class for neoliberal politics since the Collor and Cardoso administrations, today are more linked to the government and are a passive base for the rise of "Lulismo," a political phenomenon separate from the Partido dos Trabalhadores.

State intervention in the organization of the Brazilian trade union movement dates from the 1930s. On March 19, 1931, the Ministry of Labor, Industry, and Commerce issued the first unionization law. In 1943 Getulio Vargas edited the Consolidation of Labor Laws, thus completing the organization of the Brazilian corporatist union structure. From 1943 to the present, the framework for trade unionism in Brazil has remained fundamentally unchanged. Although, in contrast to the situation in some of the Latin American military dictatorships of recent years, trade union activity is not prohibited, it can take place only within a state-controlled system that denies it freedom of organization and autonomy. (LA Persp.)

The transition from the FHC to the Lula administration produced an epochal change within the power bloc. Large-scale international financial capital lost power, while the internal grande bourgeoisie ascended politically because of a policy-oriented broad-front approach that included even the popular classes. The Lula and Dilma governments did not break with the neoliberal model for capitalism, but because they represented a particular fraction of the capitalist class and because they owed their support to particular classes they introduced major changes in the economic policy, the political orientation, and the international performance of the Brazilian state. Na passagem da era FHC para a era Lula, ocorreu uma mudança no interior do bloco no poder: o grande capital financeiro internacional perdeu força e a grande burguesia interna brasileira ascendeu politicamente, apoiando-se numa ampla frente política que abarca, inclusive, classes populares. Os governos Lula e Dilma não romperam com o modelo de capitalista neoliberal, mas introduziram, em decorrência da fração da classe capitalista que representam e em decorrência também das classes nas quais se apoiam, mudanças importantes na economia, na política e na atuação internacional do Estado brasileiro.

There was much discussion in the 1980s and 1990s about the crisis in the union movement in Brazil, and some writers even began to talk of its historic decline. An analysis of union activity in Brazil from 2000 to 2009—how many strikes took place, how many strikers were involved, whether their objectives were defensive or offensive, how such conflicts were conducted, the extent of each, and, perhaps most important, what the workers thought they were achieving—suggests that, on the contrary, we are witnessing a definite recovery in union effectiveness.