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This paper explores how executives' prior employment ties to interlocking directors, or those who hold additional board seats or executive positions at outside firms, influence individual executive interfirm mobility. As organizational boundary spanners, interlocking directors may be able to influence executive outcomes both within and outside of executives' current firms. But given natural constraints on internal promotion for executives, we suggest most executives will tend to leverage ties to interlocking directors to access external opportunities, as manifested by movement to outside firms. Analysis of interfirm mobility among a sample of Standard & Poor's 1500 executives between 2000 and 2014 offer support for this idea. We find a positive association between individual executives' prior employment ties to interlocking directors and their hazard of movement to outside firms, including to the other firms where these directors serve. At the same time, we argue and find that the strength of this latter relationship will further depend on directors' competing motivations owing to their specific positions in the focal and interlocking firms. Whereas holding a lead position on the focal firm's board (i.e., as chairperson or lead independent director) weakens this relationship, holding the position of chief executive officer in the interlocking firm strengthens it. Our theory and findings highlight the unique and important role of interlocking directors in executive interfirm mobility and, in doing so, contribute novel insights regarding how ties to boundary spanners can influence individual outcomes for those to whom they are linked.Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1638 .

In this paper we introduce a new antecedent to the strategic change literature by examining the effect of media coverage on the extent of strategic change. Specifically, we examine how negative media coverage may prompt firms to make changes to their resource allocations and then explore how the makeup of the board and firm performance can moderate this relationship. We develop a theoretical framework to explain why media coverage may affect strategic change and then test our theory with a longitudinal analysis of 250 firms over a four-year period. The empirical results lend support to our theory of media influence on strategic change and suggest that the evaluations of firms by outside constituents may influence the decision making of executives.

We investigate how the relationship between status and performance decouples over time by addressing two questions: (1) how performance affects the likelihood that an actor achieves high status and (2) how achieving high status affects the actor's subsequent performance. In doing so, we focus on the role repeated certification contests play, where evaluators assess actors' performance along particular dimensions and confer high status on the contest winners. Using the context of sell-side (brokerage) equity analysts and the "All-Star" list from Institutional Investor magazine, we first investigate whether analysts who make the All-Star list are more likely to produce accurate and/or independent forecasts. Then, we investigate analyst performance after recent and multiple wins. Our results demonstrate the decoupling of status and performance over time and the roles played by both the high-status actor and the social evaluators conferring their status. Whereas analyst performance increases the likelihood of being designated an All-Star, recent and multiple All-Star designations differentially affect both how subsequent performance is assessed, and how the All-Star analysts subsequently perform. In the short term, achieving high status can increase performance and solidify an analyst's status position; however, in the long term, it can lead to lower performance and eventually result in status loss, which further erodes performance.