Suchergebnisse

The text once more reconstructs the perennially fashionable ?figure? within public and international law, as well as a theologized construction: an evil-doer who must be destroyed in the conflict or war. The ?unjust enemy?, always mutually recognized and often indicated as the other side in every conflict (and particularly ambiguously and obscurely in the current war between Russia and Ukraine), should satisfy certain conditions for them to be linked to ?evil? and ?the alliance of all against evil?, in the production of world peace and infinite restraint from war. By classifying various forms of hostile protocols, my intention is to show the substantive incompleteness and weakness of the term ?enemy?, and thus the impossibility and myth of a symmetric use of force.

In this text, I analyze the most important topics of one of the most complex
portions of Rosenzweig?s Star of Redemption. The chapter ?The Fire or the
Eternal Life? deals with the community and communal life of the eternal
people, and it reconstructs the basic elements and conditions of communal
living. A presentation of all key protocols of life and work of a group of
people ought to show the plurality of heterogeneous practices that have
helped maintain a people scattered and always on the verge of extinction.

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of
some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction
and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or
transformation of the institution - is an entirely new institution possible?
How do institutions die? - lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to
change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions
really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can they be
changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for
the idea of the ?new??

In his poems, Paul Celan does not use words such as territory, border, border
crossing, and only very rarely the word space. I would like to reconstruct
the traces of ?Heimat? in Celan (in a number of poems from different periods
?Heimat? plays an important role), and perhaps try to describe what Heimat
might have meant for the young Paul Antschel (his real name). That is to
say, I would like to understand whether ?Heimat? is synonymous with what
Celan speaks about, many years after his name change, in the address given
on the occasion of the Georg-Buechner-Preis: ?Ich suche auch, denn ich bin
ja wieder da, wo ich begonnen habe, den Ort meiner eigenen Herkunft.? In the
poems written at the time when Antschel is learning Hebrew as well as
reading Martin Buber (Israel Chalfen) for the first time, I look for some
basic figures Celan ties to his life in Bukovina at the time, in the
environment of Czernowitzer Judentums. Aside from the works by Israel
Chalfen, Else Keren and Elke Guenzel, I would like to make use of a book
published some ten years ago, a detailed listing of Celan?s Paris library. I
would like to consult this archive in the coming period, since Celan
punctuated the margins of many of those books with evocations of his early
creative period.

The text examines different assumptions of Hegel?s understanding of the
corporation across various versions of his Lectures of the Philosophy of
Right, given recent contemporary reflections on ?the end of capitalism.? My
intention is to take Hegel?s thematization of the poor and poverty, as well
as the significance Hegel ascribes to common work and the constitution of a
working group as the foundation of civil society, and formulate these as
real conditions of a potential reconstruction of the corporative model and
new common action.

What interest me are the reasons why ?human? or ?human rights? could be
important or possibly most important in constituting a group (hence the
introduction of the complicated word ?group? and ?group right(s)? in the
subtitle). If I had to justify the existence of the latest debates on nature,
justification and universality of human rights, on their distinction from
other normative standards, on the philosophy and (legal) foundation of human
rights, on ?Human Rights without (or with) Foundations? (Raz, Tasioulas,
Besson), then I would immediately conclude that this ?process of grandiose
concretization? of a complete fabrication is far from over. Despite the
innumerable pacts and international conventions established after World War
II, the slew of obligations to which states have agreed in the last few
decades, the establishment of rights to secession or humanitarian
intervention it is as if the constitution of classification of basic human
rights and their universality is far from over.

Regardless of the fact that I am using certain texts by Searle, Ferraris,
Smith and De Soto, my intention is not at all to reiterate someone else?s
position in my own words, nor is it to question or modify some such position.
My intention for now is to, using Ferraris? theory of the document, affirm
the existence of a paradox - one rejected by Searle, but unconvincingly so, I
think - regarding the institution (or the institutionalization of the
institution). In order to do that, it seems to me that I am forced to
slightly disturb both Searle?s and Ferraris? conception, in attempting to
offer my own contribution to a new future theory of the institution.

This critique is focused on a small theory regarding the constituting of a
group through the simultaneous exclusion of some other group. Is it possible,
then, to produce social and non-social acts (negative social acts) at the
same time? Or is it possible to construct a group which acts ?genocidally?,
meaning that it destroys another group or ?the groupness? of a group, and at
the same time affirm its own unity and its ontological stability? (I have
used the word ?institution? in the title, since we are dealing with a group
that is lasting, and not temporary.) Finally, does this thematization of the
group through inter-group antagonism have anything to do with Lemkin?s word
?genocide??

The surprising thing about ?Das ?lteste Systemprogramm des deutschen
Idealismus. Ein handshriftliher Fund,? one of Rosenzweig?s best supported
and most carefully detailed texts, is that he almost completely ignores one
of the most stunning and mysterious fragments of this brief, two-page
manuscript that he discovers in 1914 at the Prussian State Library in
Berlin. Not only that: while discussing and justifying in detail every part
of this manuscript, attempting to prove that just because it is in Hegel?s
handwriting, does not necessarily mean that Hegel is its author, Rosenzweig
completely sidelines the famous, completely anarchistic, and radical
fragment about the state. My question then is, why does Rosenzweig leave out
any argument about Schelling?s understanding of the state? Or more
precisely, how have Schelling?s positions on the state been incorporated
and transformed in Rosenzweig?s texts? How does Rosenzweig use these
fragments? Why does he nowhere thematize Schelling?s thoughts on the state,
or what in eine revolution?re Staatslehre Rosenzweig calls Schelling?s
revolutionary teachings on the matter?

Der Autor stellt einige Interpretationen von Verrat und Hochverrat bei Thomas Hobbes vor, um zu zeigen, wie er diese beiden alten Satzungsgegenstände des Römischen Rechts seiner Zeit und seinem Kenntnisstand von Theologie und Philosophie anzupassen versuchte. Die Figur des Verrats und des Verräters kann im Kontext von Hobbes' Verständnis auch für die Figur des Souveräns und der Souveränität aufschlussreich sein. Die Ausführungen haben zum Ziel, im Rahmen der Theorie der Repräsentation, von der Hobbes im 16. Kapitel seines wichtigsten Buches, des "Leviathan" aus dem Jahre 1658, handelt, die Quelle und die unbedingte Bedingtheit von Verrat als solchem zu ermitteln. Der Akt oder die Darstellung, worin vielleicht eine verräterische Geste oder die Dynamik des Verrats zu erkennen wäre, kann im so genannten Paradox der Repräsentation gefunden werden. Der Verräter bricht die Kette der Übertragung von Macht und Ermächtigung, unterbindet die Repräsentation und hört auf, im Namen des Anderen zu sprechen. Die unterschiedlichen Formen direkter Rede and Handlung ("im Namen von jemandem") können somit Akte des Verrats darstellen. In diesem Kontext stellt sich die Frage, ob die Form des Verrats im Herzen der repräsentativen Demokratie zu finden ist und somit Verrat als solcher einen integrativen Teil einer demokratischen Ordnung oder Gesellschaft bildet. (ICI2)

I will attempt to explain the connection between violence (someone's violence) and my own or Levinas's or the State's violence as a response to the initial violence (Violence against Violence) and finally the violence which remains in the mouth, throat, aftertaste [gout] or in disgust [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' or 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [a sort of aftertaste of disgust].

(francuski) Avant de qualifier la th?orie du 'radical' de Rosenzweig de messianisme, il me semble important de localiser le 'registre du sacrifice' dans ce syst?me de connaissance. Du reste, c'est la premi?re innovation de Rosenzweig par rapport ? la tradition. Rosenzweig n'a ni essay? ni eu le temps de th?matiser en d?tail la figure du 'sacrifice' ou du korban comme le nom le plus g?n?rique d'une telle activit?. Tout ce que nous poss?dons se r?sume ? quelques fragments r?partis sur plusieurs ann?es de correspondance avec ses amis, auxquels Rosenzweig enseigne la pens?e du sacrifice et ses limites, et ? quelques-unes de ses notes sur la difficult? de traduire et d'effacer le mot allemand Opfer. Cependant, depuis le tout d?but, lorsqu'il 'traduit' et 'pense' le sacrifice comme 'don' ou 'offrande', son effort est tout ? fait transparent: Rosenzweig ne fait qu'interroger le rapprochement de Dieu ou d'Autrui.