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I argue that Augustine can inform contemporary republicanism in a way that has not yet been considered: by means of the utility of "overlapping consensus." I first unpack Philip Pettit's theory of republicanism and demonstrate that his work contains a significant "blind-spot," namely, more deliberation is required than Pettit allows to establish "arbitrary" interference in the lives of citizens for the sake of maximizing non-domination. But the deliberative settings leave an opening for domination through rhetoric. It is here that Augustine enters: although both the Confessions and City of God contain multiple striking examples of the use of rhetoric, they also provide evidence of a distrust of rhetoric given its potential for domination. It is only in Book IV of De Doctrina Christiana that Augustine lays out explicitly and theoretically a positive use of rhetoric. I then argue that, to minimize domination in the deliberative settings required to better understand the changing definition of "arbitrary" interference, Pettit may profitably look to Augustine's explicit theoretical conceptualization of rhetoric. I end by pointing out that this does not require accepting Augustine's ontology and metaphysics. Indeed, through an overlapping consensus, agreement may be reached on rhetorical practices that do not contribute to domination.

Most comparisons of Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza focus on the difference in understanding of natural right. We argue that Hobbes also places more weight on a rudimentary and exclusive education of the public by the state. We show that the difference is related to deeper disagreements over the prospect of Enlightenment. Hobbes is more sanguine than Spinoza about using the state to make people rational. Spinoza considers misguided an overemphasis on publicly educating everyone out of superstition—public education is important, but modes of superstition may remain and must be offset by institutions and a civil religion. The differences are confirmed by Spinoza's interest in the philosopher who stands apart and whose flourishing may be protected, but not simply brought about, by rudimentary public education. Spinoza's openness to a wisdom-loving elite in a democracy also sets up an interesting parallel with Thomas Jefferson's own commitment to the natural aristocracy needed to sustain republicanism. In demonstrating the 17th century philosopher's skepticism toward using the state exclusively to promote rationality, even as he recognizes the importance of a sovereign pedagogical role and the protection of philosophy, we move to suggest that Spinoza is relevant to contemporary debates about public education and may reinvigorate moral and political discourse in a liberal democracy.

Debates about judicial review and departmentalism have continued to rage, and in the wake of the last three Supreme Court appointments and current Presidential Commission on the Court, only look to intensify. Should the US adopt a notwithstanding or override provision, of the kind that exits in Canada and Israel? These countries take a departmentalist approach to allow the legislature to override the Court, "notwithstanding" its ruling. Although America is a presidential framework, a paradox emerges: evidence exists that its system already makes possible the equivalent of a notwithstanding clause. This consists of Congress and the President together "overruling" the Supreme Court. In another sense, however, this is not an accepted practice—large parts of the legal community hold that the US Constitution establishes judicial supremacy. To better understand this dynamic, we consider two kinds of power: formal and authorized (potestas) as well as direct and concrete (potentia). The contrast between the positions on both power and sovereignty of Thomas Hobbes (associated with potestas) and Baruch Spinoza (linked to potentia) helps clarify these issues in a contemporary context. It turns out that a robust departmentalist equivalent of the notwithstanding clause already exists in the US, as a matter of Hobbesian potestas but not of Spinozist potentia. Another term for the latter is pouvoir constituant. Spinoza's perspective on political activity further clarifies the in-between nature of the American override capacity: the active or passive character of a multitude is not binary, but is a matter of degree. Without making an institutional recommendation, we note that Spinoza's understanding of power also allows for dynamic interaction between potentia and potestas: formal authorization can contribute to the expression of direct power. It is, therefore, conceivable that additional codification of the existing American override capacity, either through a joint declaration of Congress and the Presidency or a Constitutional Amendment, can strengthen the effective sovereignty of the American people in relation to the courts.

Abstract
Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza's solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.

Abstract
Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza's solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.

1. Introduction -- 2. Ashleen Menchaca-Bagnulo, Rome and the Education of Mercy in Augustine's City of God -- 3. Michelle Kundmueller and Jeremy Castle, When a Law is No Law At All: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Use of Augustine and Aquinas in the Battle Against Segregation -- 4. Jonathan Price and Bede Mullens, O.P., Augustine's "Inner Self" and Identity Politics -- 5. Veronica Roberts Ogle, Cultus Hominum: Political Reflections on Augustine's Theological Anthropology -- 6. Greg Forster, In Rome but Not of It: Augustine between Eusebius and Donatus -- 7. Wei Hua, Augustine, Political Obedience and Chinese House Churches -- 8. Gladden Pappin, Augustine and Gallicanism -- 9. Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist, Spiritual Ends and Temporal Power: An Integralist Reading of The City of God -- 10. Paul Miller, Augustinian Liberalism -- 11. Kody Cooper, Existential Humility and the Critique of Civil Religion in Augustine's Political Theology -- 12. Peter Busch, Augustine's Call to Citizenship -- 13. Mary Keys, Elitism and Secularism, Old and New: Augustine on Humility, Pride, and Philosophy in The City of God VIII-X -- 14. Paul Weithman, Pride in a Time of Crisis -- 15. Michael Lamb, Augustine and Contemporary Political Theory: Toward an Augustinian Republicanism -- 16. Boleslaw Z. Kabala and Caleb Morefield, Speech and Silence: Republican Toleration in Augustine -- 17. Elżbieta Ciżewska-Martyńska, Augustine and Polish Republicans on the Fragility of Liberty: Questions for Today -- 18. Matthew Hallgarth, Augustine's Principled Realism -- 19. Douglas Kries, Augustine and the Flexibility of True Justice -- 20. Eric Gregory, Beyond Critique: Just War as Theological Political Theology -- 21. Nathan Pinkoski, "Love, but Be Careful What You Love": Arendt's Augustinian Fragments on Thinking -- 22. Daniel Strand, Augustine's Privation, Arendt's Banality -- 23. Conclusions.

Africans face double jeopardy on life expectancy due to poverty and constrained vaccine access. The COVID-19 pandemic caused the 2021 crude death rate in South Africa to rise from 8.7 deaths per 1000 people in 2020 to 11.6 deaths per 1000 people in 2021. Vaccination access is critical and depends on international solidarity and collaboration for sustainable programs. History points to the critical need for African countries to safeguard national sovereignty and prioritise donations with broader development objectives. Donor assistance should focus on assisting countries to rise and thrive beyond the pandemic challenges. Reducing benefactor dependency requires countries to be intentional about raising and securing financial resources to sustain vaccine access for the current and future generations. The assistance should focus on facilitating development, meaning investing in countries to thrive beyond the pandemic turbulence. For the sake of Africa's people and her future generations, current barriers to equitable vaccine access must be scrutinised. We do not know how many vaccine booster shots will be required in the future and the impact on Africa's health and socioeconomic standing. Global collaboration grounded on bolstering local manufacturing capacity is essential for Africa's sustainable access and distribution.