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This study advances the decline of Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) as a reconciling factor among radical right and radical left supporters. While self-employed workers, men and rural residents perceive socioeconomic decline relative to their parents and support the radical right, the well-educated, urbanites and low-income individuals are likely to feel similar decline given the rising levels of unemployment and social inequality. These structural changes may push the latter to support a party which stresses income inequality, a catchcry of the radical left. Using a 2017 Eurobarometer Survey, logistic regressions show positive associations between low PRSSS (versus equal or high PRSSS) and support for right- and left-wing radicalism in 28 European countries. The traditional attitudes of each group magnify the PRSSS effects on radical support: these are reinforced by anti-immigrant support for the radical right and by preference for redistribution for the radical left.

This study advances the decline of Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) as a reconciling factor among radical right and radical left supporters. While self-employed workers, men and rural residents perceive socioeconomic decline relative to their parents and support the radical right, the well-educated, urbanites and low-income individuals are likely to feel similar decline given the rising levels of unemployment and social inequality. These structural changes may push the latter to support a party which stresses income inequality, a catchcry of the radical left. Using a 2017 Eurobarometer Survey, logistic regressions show positive associations between low PRSSS (versus equal or high PRSSS) and support for right- and left-wing radicalism in 28 European countries. The traditional attitudes of each group magnify the PRSSS effects on radical support: it is reinforced by anti-immigrant support for the radical right and by preference for redistribution for the radical left.

Little is known about how local context influences radical right voting. This paper advances the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked to radical right support by contributing to loss of community and cultural identity. I examine this thesis by exploiting an original dataset on British community pub closures. I argue that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social isolation and signals the decline of the British working class condition, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-level data with UK panel data (2013–2016), I show that individuals living in districts that experience one additional community pub closure (relative to the total number of pubs per district) are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by 4.3 percentage points. The effect is magnified under conditions of material deprivation. This paper highlights the significance of local socio-cultural degradation as a mechanism to explain radical right support.

AbstractHow do the economic effects of immigration affect radical right support? The evidence in support of the labour market competition theory — which posits that the economic threat posed by immigration to jobs and wages leads to radical right voting — has been mixed. On the one hand, individual‐level surveys underreport economic drivers because of social desirability bias. On the other hand, contextual studies show contradictory findings due to an over‐reliance on units of analysis that are too aggregated to meaningfully capture the competitive threat posed by immigrants. This paper identifies the influence of labour market competition on radical right voting at a local level in contexts where native workers are directly affected by the arrival of immigrants who have similar or higher skillsets. Using an original longitudinal dataset of fine‐grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017 period, the paper provides empirical evidence of local contextual influences of economic competition between natives and immigrants of any skillset. Under local conditions of material deprivation, measured by the local unemployment rate, the effect of labour market competition on municipalities' radical right vote share is amplified. Moreover, higher radical right support is observed in municipalities with a higher share of any one of the following groups: low‐skilled natives, medium‐skilled immigrants or high‐skilled immigrants. This supports the hypothesis that immigrants with higher qualifications are compelled to accept lower‐skilled jobs, and are thus perceived as a competitive threat to low‐skilled natives. By reconciling radical right contextual studies and research on the political economy of immigration policies, this paper highlights the importance of a local analysis in detecting the effect of labour market competition on radical right support. This paper also explains why some local areas are more prone to radical right support than others over time.

How do the economic effects of immigration affect radical right support? The evidence in support of the labour market competition theory—which posits that the economic threat posed by immigration to jobs and wages leads to radical right voting—has been mixed. On the one hand, individual‐level surveys underreport economic drivers because of social desirability bias. On the other hand, contextual studies show contradictory findings due to an over‐reliance on units of analysis that are too aggregated to meaningfully capture the competitive threat posed by immigrants. This paper identifies the influence of labour market competition on radical right voting at a local level in contexts where native workers are directly affected by the arrival of immigrants who have similar or higher skillsets. Using an original longitudinal dataset of fine‐grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017 period, the paper provides empirical evidence of local contextual influences of economic competition between natives and immigrants of any skillset. Under local conditions of material deprivation, measured by the local unemployment rate, the effect of labour market competition on municipalities' radical right vote share is amplified. Moreover, higher radical right support is observed in municipalities with a higher share of any one of the following groups: low‐skilled natives; medium‐skilled immigrants; or high‐skilled immigrants. This supports the hypothesis that immigrants with higher qualifications are compelled to accept lower‐skilled jobs, and are thus perceived as a competitive threat to low‐skilled natives. By reconciling radical right contextual studies and research on the political economy of immigration policies, this paper highlights the importance of a local analysis in detecting the effect of labour market competition on radical right support. This paper also explains why some local areas are more prone to radical right support than others over time.

How do the economic effects of immigration affect radical right support? The evidence in support of the labour market competition theory — which posits that the economic threat posed by immigration to jobs and wages leads to radical right voting — has been mixed. On the one hand, individual‐level surveys underreport economic drivers because of social desirability bias. On the other hand, contextual studies show contradictory findings due to an over‐reliance on units of analysis that are too aggregated to meaningfully capture the competitive threat posed by immigrants. This paper identifies the influence of labour market competition on radical right voting at a local level in contexts where native workers are directly affected by the arrival of immigrants who have similar or higher skillsets. Using an original longitudinal dataset of fine‐grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017 period, the paper provides empirical evidence of local contextual influences of economic competition between natives and immigrants of any skillset. Under local conditions of material deprivation, measured by the local unemployment rate, the effect of labour market competition on municipalities' radical right vote share is amplified. Moreover, higher radical right support is observed in municipalities with a higher share of any one of the following groups: low‐skilled natives, medium‐skilled immigrants or high‐skilled immigrants. This supports the hypothesis that immigrants with higher qualifications are compelled to accept lower‐skilled jobs, and are thus perceived as a competitive threat to low‐skilled natives. By reconciling radical right contextual studies and research on the political economy of immigration policies, this paper highlights the importance of a local analysis in detecting the effect of labour market competition on radical right support. This paper also explains why some local areas are more prone to radical right support than others over time.

AbstractSystemic congruence between the whole legislature and the whole electorate ('many‐to‐many', or sociotropic congruence) should be the benchmark to evaluate a democratic system. Yet, most studies link shifts in democratic preferences to individual‐level representation ('many‐to‐one', or egocentric incongruence), since individual‐level representation failures should be more salient and visible for individual citizens. We argue that the sociotropic incongruence hypothesis has not been appropriately tested to date, because the measure does not vary at individual level in observational data. Using an experiment conducted in France, we manipulate various sociotropic (in)congruence scenarios at the individual level. In addition to the incongruence hypotheses, our original experiment tests whether offering expertise‐based justifications to incongruence attenuates the backlash against representatives. We find that, even when giving sociotropic incongruence a fair test, egocentric incongruence still consistently shapes democratic preferences, while the effect of sociotropic incongruence remains negligible. Furthermore, we find that narratives rooted in expertise claims do not attenuate the effect of representation failure on backlash against representative democracy: they exacerbate it.

Abstract
Does an MP's localness affect their behaviour towards constituents? Existing research has shown biases in MPs' responsiveness to citizens based on citizens' sociodemographic and political traits and voters' tendency to prefer 'local' MPs. Yet, we know little about whether MPs' localness affects their responsiveness to constituents. MPs' localness may influence their behaviour for strategic reasons and/or because of homophily. To explore this relationship, we conducted a field experiment in the United Kingdom where we asked legislators about their policy priorities regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that local MPs do not differentiate in their responsiveness to constituents. However, non-local MPs are motivated by party affiliation and gender in their responsiveness to constituents, with ethnicity and class playing insignificant roles. Non-local MPs respond more to co-partisans than non-partisans and women non-local MPs are more responsive to women constituents. This experiment underscores the impact of (non-)localness on MPs' interactions with constituents.

This article reviews the issues raised by the reaction to an audit experiment, studying the responsiveness of British MPs to their constituents, in November and December 2020. The experiment was part of a wider comparative project investigating the linkage between legislators and their constituents. We sent two short emails to all MPs asking how they and their party were going to respond to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. We were required by our ethics committee to debrief the subjects, providing the opportunity to withdraw from the analysis. The scale of the reaction to the debriefing email was neither desired nor anticipated ( https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-56196967 ). We explain how we got ourselves into such difficulty, how we might have stayed out of it and the wider implications of our experience for experimental research on politicians. We reflect on the ethical issues raised by the reaction to our research, alongside the role that communications with legislators, the wider parliamentary community and the media should play in research design when conducting experiments with politicians as subjects.

Enacting stringent climate policy has proven politically challenging, not least because of concentrated losses in fossil fuel-producing communities. "Just transition" strategies have been proposed to mitigate this distributional challenge. Yet, little is known about how such strategies affect voting behavior. Using a mixed-methods approach, we exploit a local climate policy in Spain—a "Just Transition Agreement" (JTA) to phase out coalmining, support affected workers, and invest in affected municipalities—which was negotiated by the incumbent Socialist Party (PSOE) government with affected unions and businesses shortly before a national election. A difference-in-differences study shows that PSOE's vote share in coalmining municipalities increased at the 2019 election relative to similar municipalities, implying that the JTA was electorally successful. Further statistical tests and elite interviews suggest that this electoral boost was driven by unions' support of the JTA. Our findings have implications for how parties can craft popular climate policy.

AbstractA growing body of literature investigates whether legislators show biases in their constituency communication contingent upon constituent traits. However, we know little about whether and how findings of unequal responsiveness generalize across countries (beyond the United States) and across different traits. We address both issues using a pre‐registered comparative field experiment conducted in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in which fictitious citizens (varied by ethnicity, social class and partisan affiliation) inquired about legislators' policy priorities regarding the COVID‐19 pandemic. Our pooled analysis reveals that co‐partisanship and class both increase the responsiveness of legislators while we find no effect for ethnicity. The effect sizes we find are small, but comparable to earlier studies and also noteworthy in view of our hard test design. Our exploratory analyses further corroborate the lack of discrimination against ethnic minority constituents in showing no intersectionality effects, that is, interactions between ethnic‐minority and low‐class identities. This exploratory step also addresses the country specific differences that we find. We speculate about plausible underlying party system effects that we, however, cannot substantiate due to statistical limitations. This important issue requires further attention in future research.