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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART I: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS -- Chapter One. Why the Personal Is Not Always Political -- Chapter Two. Privation and Privilege -- Chapter Three. Arendt on Political Approaches to Intimate-Life Issues -- PART II: CONTEMPORARY DOMAINS OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE TENSION -- Chapter Four. Problems with the Right to Privacy -- Chapter Five. The Democratic Potential of Mothering -- Chapter Six. "The Personal Is Political": The Closet, Identity Politics, and Outing -- Conclusion: Privacy and Democratic Citizenship -- Notes -- Index

Insights into the causes of Japan's prolonged and sharp fall in total fertility rate come from comparing Japan with France. The two countries share dirigiste administrative approaches, family policy reform undertaken under the auspices of pragmatic right wing parties and justified on pronatalist grounds, and involvement of demographic experts in crafting and shepherding such policies. But the countries differ with respect to their total fertility rates (France 1.98, Japan 1.29) and the effectiveness of their family policies. Thus comparing them can help identify areas of divergence that might explain these differences and assist in the project of theory building. Several salient explanations are rooted in Japan's labor market: it exacts high opportunity costs from parents who interrupt their careers to raise children, keeps ideal workers from having much time for their families, assumes and reinforces a traditional gender ideology, and hires few young workers into good jobs.

This article explains why the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence has become deeply problematic for addressing emerging reproductive and sexual choice issues, focusing on abortion funding, minors seeking abortions, adults engaging in consenting homosexual sex, and pregnant women accused of abusing their fetuses. The article makes two arguments. First, it contends that what is private about the rights asserted in cases like Eisenstadt v. BairdandRoe v. Wade has never been fully articulated nor defended, leaving these central decisions conceptually unpersuasive. Second, the article shows that "privacy" is used in two very different senses in Supreme Court constitutional right‐to‐privacy decisions: one rooted in respect for marriage and the family, the other in notions of personal autonomy. Although both senses deserve to be protected, the court has tended to prefer the familial sense of privacy to the autonomy one, with serious consequences for privacy concerns that are not connected to family relationships or that are perceived as undercutting "family values."