Strategy and equity: an ERC-analysis of the Güth-van Damme game
In: Preprint 1998,7
14 Ergebnisse
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In: Preprint 1998,7
In: International journal of forecasting, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 353-358
ISSN: 0169-2070
In: American economic review, Band 100, Heft 1, S. 628-633
ISSN: 1944-7981
In a series of binary choice problems, we investigate how a chooser's risk taking changes when others share in their personal risk, either equally or unequally. We find that when the safe option yields inequality, the risky option is taken significantly more often. On the other hand, the inequality resulting from the risky choice does not affect risk taking. We also find that choosers tend to be less risk-averse in a one-person context compared to when the risk also affects the payoff of another. (C72, D81, Z13)
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2241
SSRN
In: American economic review, Band 96, Heft 5, S. 1906-1911
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 479-495
ISSN: 1467-9221
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 479-496
ISSN: 0162-895X
In: American economic review, Band 90, Heft 1, S. 166-193
ISSN: 1944-7981
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets. (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 130, Heft 629, S. 1248-1261
ISSN: 1468-0297
AbstractThe provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a common group identity, and the effect is more pronounced for social identity than for home market identity. Both kinds of group identity promote rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2270
SSRN
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 115, Heft 506, S. 1054-1076
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 185-202
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller's morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers' intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the interaction of social preferences and cleverly designed reputation mechanisms that solves to a large extent the trust problem on Internet market platforms. However, economic theory and social preference models tend to underestimate the difficulties of promoting trust in anonymous online trading communities.
In: Economic Journal, Band 115, Heft 506, S. 1054-1076
SSRN