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Objective. What factors affect the ability of candidates for state supreme courts to raise money? In this article, I test (and expand) existing theories of political fundraising (taken largely from legislative studies) in the context of judicial elections.Methods. I examine the determinants of campaign contributions to all candidates running for the state supreme court from 1990–2000 in states that have competitive judicial elections. Most basically, I hypothesize that a candidate's ability to raise money is dependent on characteristics of the candidate, the state electoral and supreme court context, and institutional arrangements.Results. The results suggest that candidates who have a greater probability of success than their opponents are better able to raise money. Yet, all is not within the control of the candidates, as the electoral context of the state and the court as well as the institutional arrangements of the election and the court are also relevant.Conclusions. Campaign fundraising by state supreme court candidates, much like fundraising by legislative candidates, can be understood in systematic and predictable ways. Candidates have some control over the amount of money that they are able to raise (and thus their electoral viability), although there is little they can do about the electoral and supreme court context. Additionally, institutional arrangements play a large role in raising campaign funds, suggesting that there is not much reformers can do to limit the amount of money involved in elections short of eradicating elections altogether.

Electoral competition has been an important subject of political science research over the past several decades. This article examines the effects of campaign spending on electoral competition in state supreme court elections. Specifically, the author addresses the question, How do campaign expenditures affect the performance of incumbents in supreme court elections? The author finds that, just like elections to Congress and state legislatures, electoral competition in state supreme court elections can be understood by looking at characteristics of the candidates, the state and electoral context, and institutional arrangements.

The election of judges has been an enduring, though controversial, institution. Although there have been many popular accounts of howthese elections are decided by factors irrelevant to a fair and impartial judiciary, recent scholarship has shown that electoral competition in races for the state high court bench can be understood in systematic ways. Yet, although we know the factors that can make races more or less competitive, we lack understanding of the factors that contribute to the electoral defeat of sitting justices. In this article, I examine the determinants of electoral defeat for all incumbent state supreme court justices who ran for reelection between 1990 and 2000. Contrary to the arguments of those who claim that judicial elections are decided in a random, nonsystematic manner, I find that the probability of an incumbent's being defeated is based on characteristics of the candidates, the state and electoral context, and institutional arrangements.

Among the least-researched American elections are those for seats on the states' supreme courts, arguably some of the most important political positions in the states. We know not only that campaign spending in these races has increased sharply in the past 20 years but also that there is great variation in spending among them. What factors cause campaign spending to vary among races for the states' highest courts? And what can an understanding of campaign spending in these races tell us about campaign spending for other offices? I use data from 281 state supreme court races in 21 states from 1990 to 2000 to answer these questions. I find that state supreme court campaign spending is driven by the characteristics of the race, institutional arrangements, & the electoral & state supreme court context. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 2 Appendixes, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractAmong the least-researched American elections are those for seats on the states' supreme courts, arguably some of the most important political positions in the states. We know not only that campaign spending in these races has increased sharply in the past 20 years but also that there is great variation in spending among them. What factors cause campaign spending to vary among races for the states' highest courts? And what can an understanding of campaign spending in these races tell us about campaign spending for other offices? I use data from 281 state supreme court races in 21 states from 1990 to 2000 to answer these questions. I find that state supreme court campaign spending is driven by the characteristics of the race, institutional arrangements, and the electoral and state supreme court context.