Suchergebnisse

Major sales: who really does the buying / by Thomas V. Bonoma -- Ending the war between sales and marketing / by Philip Kotler, Neil Rackham, and Suj Krishnaswamy -- Match your sales force structure to your business life cycle / by Andris A. Zoltners, Prabhakant Sinha, and Sally E. Larimer -- The end of solution sales / by Brent Adamson, Matthew Dixon, and Nicholas Toman -- Sellng into micromarkets / by Manish Goyal, Maryanne Q. Hancock, and Homayoun Hatami -- Dismantling the sales machine / by Brent Adamson, Matthew Dixon, and Nicholas Toman -- Tiebreaker selling / by James C. Anderson, James A. Narus, and Marc Wouters -- Making the consensus sale / by Karl Schmidt, Brent Adamson, and Anna Bird -- The right way to use compensation / by Mark Roberge -- How to really motivate salespeople / by Doug J. Chung -- Bonus: Getting beyond "Show me the money" : interview with Andris Zoltners

Recent developments in the history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology of science raise serious challenges to our traditional notions about the decisive power of experiments in the development of scientific knowledge. These developments suggest that the power of an experiment is only as strong as the clarity af the basic assumptions which underlie it. Such assumptions not only underlie laboratory experimentation but social evaluation research as well. A dialectical methodology is proposedfor assessing the influence of key assumptions in both settings. Among other conclusions, analysis of the role and influence of key assumptions suggests an additional source of experimental error, termed the error of the third kind, or E III. E III is defined and discussed as the probability af conducting the "wrong" experiment when one should have conducted the "right" experiment.

A random sample of 123 social psychologists at all levels of professional distinction completed a mail questionnaire assessing their cognitive and affective judgments of 10 "role concepts" encountered as part of their professional environment. Clinical, educational, experimental, and social psychologists were all rated on the 17 scales, as were the rat, the college sophomore, the research subject, the graduate research assistant, the APA journal referee, and the externalfunding agency. The results showed strong differences between social psychologists' responses to each role concept. Factor and discriminant analyses were applied to the data in order to provide a preliminary cognitive and affective map of the social psychologist's "implicit psychology" concerning his colleagues, objects of study, and interactive mechanisms (e.g., journal referees) encountered in the study of social science. The results were compared and contrasted to a previous study of physical scientists working on the Apollo moon missions.

ABSTRACTA theoretical connection was proposed between certain social personality variables, namely locus of control (Internal or External) and trust (High and Low) and the formal decision‐making model of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). Rather than adopting the traditional definition of these variables as "generalized expectancies" for behavior of self and others, locus of control and trust were reconceptualized as intrapersonal tendencies to favor, prefer, or otherwise bias the subjective probabilities entering into a decision computation.S's high in external control orientation did not differ from internals overall, but external males were more risk averse under certain choice conditions (female‐sex‐role appropriate dilemma, probability‐estimate form). Low‐trust S's were also more risk averse than high‐trust S's, overall. Low‐trust males generated maximally risk‐averse choice solutions under the choice condition of feminine role problem appropriateness and probability estimation. In general, female S's made choices that were more consistent with SEU‐predicted solutions than males.

ABSTRACTSubjects were instructed on how to use simple subjective probability and utility scales, and they were asked to actively role‐play a decision maker in seven risk‐dilemma situations. Each scenario provided subjects with specific subjective expected utility (SEU) information for both a certain and uncertain decision alternative, but left out one critical SEU component. Subjects supplied either the lowest probability or the lowest utility for success that they found necessary before they would select the uncertain over the certain alternative in each dilemma. Three experiments examined: (a) the degree to which Ss' estimations deviated from a pattern predicted by SEU models; (b) differences in choice patterns induced by response format variations (e.g., probability vs. utility estimation); (c) the effects of sex of S; and (d) the effects of the sex‐role framing of the decision problems. Ss generally chose in accord with SEU maximization principles and did so with decreasing deviations from theoretical values as practice over situations increased (Experiments I, II and III). Decisions were initially more conservative on items requesting probability estimates (Experiment I), but this effect washed out over situations. Sex differences were revealed (Experiments I and III), but in limited fashion. Rather, a replicable (Experiments I, II and III) sex‐by‐sex role appropriateness by response format interaction was found, in which females responded "rationally" under both probability and utility estimation conditions and under both role sets (male and female). Males, however, responded extremely conservatively under female‐framed, probability estimate conditions. Ss' choices were stable over a three‐week interval (Experiment III).

The validity of gaming techniques has come under increasing attack in recent years The present article examines claims for and criticisms of the use of games in the study of conflict. Gaming proponents have cited four major functions of games: (a) an analogy, or model, of actual conflict situations, (b) a heuristic device to provide new ways of thinking, (c) a device to separate rational solutions to conflict from those affected by psychological and sociological factors, and (d) a simple experimental tool to test theoretically relevant hypotheses about conflict. Critics have attacked the use of games by pointing out (a) the triviality of game results, (b) a possible lack of reproducibility of the findings, (c) the difficulty of relating game choices to motivation, (d) the inappropriateness of many generalizations made from such studies, (e) the nondynamic nature of the game situation, and (f) the lack of isomorphism between game situations and naturally occurnng conflicts. Examination of these advantages and criticisms allowed their differentiation into questions of internal validity, external validity, and ecological (real world) validity The most potent criticisms of games are directed at the ecological validity issue. It is the contention of the present paper that ecological validity raises questions for the evaluation of theories of conflict, not for the evaluation of gaming paradigms that permit the study of conflict.