Le standard de qualité minimale est-il un instrument socialement optimal ?: Une revue de littérature
In: Revue économique, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 35
ISSN: 1950-6694
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In: Revue économique, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 35
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 97, Heft 1, S. 239-259
SSRN
Double marginalization causes inefficiencies in vertical markets. This paper argues that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to final consumers in markets producing vertically differentiated goods. The rationale behind this result is that enhancing efficiency in high-quality supply chains through vertical integration may drive out of the market low-quality ones, thus affecting market structure. As a consequence, restoring-efficiency vertical integration may reduce consumer surplus, even in the absence of foreclosure strategies by the newly integrated firms. From a policy standpoint, our paper suggests that input and/or customer foreclosure should not be considered as the only source of antitrust concern when assessing the effects of vertical integration.
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Double marginalization causes inefficiencies in vertical markets. This paper argues that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to final consumers in markets producing vertically differentiated goods. The rationale behind this result is that enhancing efficiency in high-quality supply chains through vertical integration may drive out of the market low-quality ones, thus affecting market structure. As a consequence, restoring-efficiency vertical integration may reduce consumer surplus, even in the absence of foreclosure strategies by the newly integrated firms. From a policy standpoint, our paper suggests that input and/or customer foreclosure should not be considered as the only source of antitrust concern when assessing the effects of vertical integration.
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In: Revue économique, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 527
ISSN: 1950-6694
In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bar- gaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally, in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.
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In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
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In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 1037-1062
ISSN: 1540-5982
AbstractFor‐profit certifier's eco‐labelling is common in industries where firms have some "countervailing power" on sharing gains from labelling. We show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong "power." A certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain. This switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard. This is consequential for evaluating policies. The dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used, and ultimately upon firms' countervailing power.
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 127-154
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract. Production and marketing lags in agri‐food supply chains often force agricultural producers and food processors to commit to output targets before prices and exchange rates are realized. A theoretical model illustrates how the processor's degree of risk aversion and domestic sales may cause the relationship between volatility of the exchange rate and exports to be non‐monotonic. The relationship between exchange rate volatility and Quebec pork exports to the United States and Japan is investigated using linear and non‐linear estimation methods. The results support the hypothesis that the relationship between exports and volatility is non‐monotonic.
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 101, Heft 1, S. 89-108
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