Suchergebnisse

What explains presidential choices of management structures for economic policy making? The literature on the organization of the presidency has proposed two main answers: personality traits or institutional constraints. But management structures change less than expected from variation in presidential personalities, more than expected from institutional stability, and not necessarily triggered by crises. This paper offers an alternative, cognitive‐based theory of presidential management choices. When economic crises are rare, presidents usually institutionalize collegial management structures; when crises are more frequent, they generally switch to hierarchical structures. The theory is tested by comparing management structures in Argentina and the United States.

This paper investigates the political economy of fiscal reform activism in Argentina since the late 1980s. Between 1988 and 2008, tax legislation was changed 83 times, fiscal federal rules 14 times, and budgetary institutions sixteen times. Tax and budgetary reforms moved from centralizing revenue sources and spending authority in the federal government to mild decentralization lately. Fiscal federal rules combined centralization of revenues and management in the federal government with short-term compensations for the provinces. This paper contends that reform activism can be explained by the recurrence of economic and policy shocks while reform patterns may be accounted for as consequences of the decreasing political integration of national parties in a polity whose decisionmaking rules encourage the formation of oversized coalitions. The decrease in political integration weakened the national party leaderships' ability to coordinate intergovernmental bargaining, and strengthened the local bosses and factions needed to form oversized coalitions.

Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor stages in multiparty presidential systems? The literature on the US Congress has argued that switches are conditional on cross‐cutting pressures by competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. This article argues that unlike in the US two‐party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitiveness increases the likelihood of switching. Additionally, the practice of switching is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflicting electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between committee reports and roll‐call votes in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multiparty than in a two‐party presidential system.

Who decides the formulation of social policy? What resources do actors bring to decision-making processes? How do those resources position them within decision making networks? This book addresses these questions by combining an institutional political economy approach to policy making with social network analysis of social policy formulation processes in Latin American and the Caribbean. Based on extensive field interviews with governmental and nongovernmental actors, the case studies of social policy formulation in Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that while in the South American cases societal actors—such as unions and business associations in Argentina, and grassroots organizations in Bolivia—are central actors in the networks, government officials are the main participants in the Caribbean countries. The comparative analysis of the networks of ideas, information, economic resources, and political powers across these cases indicates that differences in the types of bureaucratic systems and governance structures may explain the differences between who decides and what resources underpin their influence in social policy formulation in the region.

The literature on the Argentine Congress has contended that its agenda and working dynamics depend on the instructions from provincial political leaders, who control the political careers of legislators, and from the President, who controls the fiscal resources with which provincial governments finance themselves. Accordingly, Congress has been characterized by low fragmentation, high party discipline, and a clear divide between government and opposition, which have resulted in sustained success rates for the Executive's legislation, and agenda control by the majority or plurality party. However, the working of Congress under the minority coalition government of Cambiemos suggests the opposite: more fragmentation, less discipline, less clarity in the government-opposition cleavage, a smaller agenda, and less legislative success for the Executive. Does this mean that the dynamics of Congress as we hitherto knew it has changed? This article argues that is not the case, because in other periods with minority presidents and relatively high legislative fragmentation there were similar problems for agenda setting, meeting, and passing bills. ; La literatura sobre el Congreso argentino ha sostenido que su agenda y dinámica de funcionamiento dependen de los dictados de los líderes políticos provinciales, que controlan las carreras políticas de los legisladores, y del Presidente, que controla los recursos fiscales con que se financian los gobiernos provinciales. Por ello, el Congreso se ha caracterizado por la baja fragmentación, la alta disciplina partidaria y una clara división gobierno-oposición, que han resultado en sostenidas tasas de éxito del Ejecutivo y control de la agenda por la mayoría o pluralidad. Sin embargo, el funcionamiento del Congreso bajo el gobierno de coalición minoritaria de Cambiemos sugiere lo contrario: hay más fragmentación, menos disciplina, menor claridad en la división gobierno-oposición, menor agenda y menos éxito del Ejecutivo. ¿Significa esto que la dinámica del Congreso tal como se conoció hasta ahora ha cambiado? Este artículo argumenta que ello no es el caso, pues en otros períodos con presidentes minoritarios y fragmentación relativamente más alta hubo similares problemas para agendar, sesionar y aprobar proyectos de ley.

The literature on the Argentine Congress has contended that its agenda and working dynamics depend on the instructions from provincial political leaders, who control the political careers of legislators, and from the President, who controls the fiscal resources with which provincial governments finance themselves. Accordingly, Congress has been characterized by low fragmentation, high party discipline, and a clear divide between government and opposition, which have resulted in sustained success rates for the Executive's legislation, and agenda control by the majority or plurality party. However, the working of Congress under the minority coalition government of Cambiemos suggests the opposite: more fragmentation, less discipline, less clarity in the government-opposition cleavage, a smaller agenda, and less legislative success for the Executive. Does this mean that the dynamics of Congress as we hitherto knew it has changed? This article argues that is not the case, because in other periods with minority presidents and relatively high legislative fragmentation there were similar problems for agenda setting, meeting, and passing bills. ; La literatura sobre el Congreso argentino ha sostenido que su agenda y dinámica de funcionamiento dependen de los dictados de los líderes políticos provinciales, que controlan las carreras políticas de los legisladores, y del Presidente, que controla los recursos fiscales con que se financian los gobiernos provinciales. Por ello, el Congreso se ha caracterizado por la baja fragmentación, la alta disciplina partidaria y una clara división gobierno-oposición, que han resultado en sostenidas tasas de éxito del Ejecutivo y control de la agenda por la mayoría o pluralidad. Sin embargo, el funcionamiento del Congreso bajo el gobierno de coalición minoritaria de Cambiemos sugiere lo contrario: hay más fragmentación, menos disciplina, menor claridad en la división gobierno-oposición, menor agenda y menos éxito del Ejecutivo. ¿Significa esto que la dinámica del Congreso tal como se ...