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AbstractI find a positive relation between underwriter reputation and the initial and long‐run aftermarket performance of closed‐end funds. This relation persists even after controlling for fund characteristics, types, and investment strategies. The positive relation between underwriter reputation and initial returns supports the notion that prestigious investment bankers tend to promote a price run‐up in the immediate aftermarket to enhance their reputation with the issuers and the investors. The better long‐run performance for funds underwritten by prestigious underwriters suggests that prestigious underwriters protect their reputation by underwriting only high‐quality issues that will perform well in the long run.

AbstractRecent literature focuses on liquidity provision as a unique service provided by financial intermediaries. In this paper, we address why commercial banks dominate the provision of these services. Liquidity provision in lending is reflected in offering loan commitments. We argue that commercial banks have a unique advantage in providing this form of liquidity. This unique advantage derives from their access to deposit insurance, and perhaps to a lesser degree, their access to the discount window of the Federal Reserve System. We empirically examine business loans offered by commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies. We show that commercial banks have a comparative advantage in offering loan commitments with fixed‐formula floating interest rates. Other major financial intermediaries such as investment banks favor bridge loans for corporate restructuring, and insurance companies favor longer term fixed interest rate spot loans. These results are consistent with commercial banks' unique corporate lending role (that of liquidity provision) deriving from their access to fixed‐price deposit insurance.

AbstractWe confirm previous findings that both large‐cap and small‐cap stock returns in the US exhibit a presidential cycle pattern, i.e. returns are significantly higher in the last 2 years than in the first 2 years of the presidential term. We attempt to examine if this presidential cycle pattern can be explained away by the traditional business cycle proxies, namely the term spread (TERM), dividend yield (D/P), and default spread (DEF). Our motivation arises from the political business cycle theory that monetary and fiscal measures undertaken by presidents are usually translated into the business cycle. We find that the presidential cycle has explanatory power beyond business conditions proxies shown to be important in explaining stock returns. Tests of slope parameters show that stock returns are less sensitive to only the D/P during the last 2 years of the presidential term. The presidential cycle effect prevails even after controlling for the party in power and the incumbent versus nonincumbent presidents.