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A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independent of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.

Introduction : how should we think about national security reform? / Heidi B. Demarest -- The durable national security act / Richard K. Betts -- Improving strategic assessment in the executive branch : lessons from the scholarly literature / Risa A. Brooks -- Bent but not broken? : inter-branch politics, checks and balances, and the contemporary national security state / Douglas L. Kriner -- Contradictions in U.S. security planning for a global environment and a process approach to solving them / Deborah Avant -- What have we learned about how presidents organize for national security decision making, 1947-2017 / Meena Bose -- Toward a smaller White House national security staff : a look at the present in historical perspective / I.M. (Mac) Destler -- How we decide what we need : planning the future force / David S.C. Chu, with the assistance of Allison F. Taylor -- Global challenges and American grand strategy for the 21st century / Walter Russell Mead -- Security challenges in the post-unipolar era / Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr -- Global challenges, U.S. national security strategy, and defense organization / Thomas G. Mahnken -- The diffusion of power and the organization of the U.S. national security establishment / Barry R. Posen -- Conclusion / Erica D. Borghard -- Afterword : national security reform for a new era : an agenda for policymakers

There are as many reasons for a nuclear-armed Tehran to become more circumspect with its proxies as there are for such groups to be emboldened. (Survival / SWP)