Suchergebnisse

AbstractAdequately preparing for and containing global shocks, such as COVID‐19, is a key challenge facing health systems globally. COVID‐19 highlights that health systems are multilevel systems, a continuum from local to global. Goals and monitoring indicators have been key to strengthening national health systems but are missing at the supranational level. A framework to strengthen the global system—the global health actors and the governance, finance, and delivery arrangements within which they operate—is urgently needed. In this article, we illustrate how the World Health Organization Building Blocks framework, which has been used to monitor the performance of national health systems, can be applied to describe and appraise the global health system and its response to COVID‐19, and identify potential reforms. Key weaknesses in the global response included: fragmented and voluntary financing; non‐transparent pricing of medicines and supplies, poor quality standards, and inequities in procurement and distribution; and weak leadership and governance. We also identify positive achievements and identify potential reforms of the global health system for greater resilience to future shocks. We discuss the limitations of the Building Blocks framework and future research directions and reflect on political economy challenges to reform.

Adequately preparing for and containing global shocks, such as COVID‐19, is a key challenge facing health systems globally. COVID‐19 highlights that health systems are multilevel systems, a continuum from local to global. Goals and monitoring indicators have been key to strengthening national health systems but are missing at the supranational level. A framework to strengthen the global system—the global health actors and the governance, finance, and delivery arrangements within which they operate—is urgently needed. In this article, we illustrate how the World Health Organization Building Blocks framework, which has been used to monitor the performance of national health systems, can be applied to describe and appraise the global health system and its response to COVID‐19, and identify potential reforms. Key weaknesses in the global response included: fragmented and voluntary financing; non‐transparent pricing of medicines and supplies, poor quality standards, and inequities in procurement and distribution; and weak leadership and governance. We also identify positive achievements and identify potential reforms of the global health system for greater resilience to future shocks. We discuss the limitations of the Building Blocks framework and future research directions and reflect on political economy challenges to reform.

Theories of change (ToCs) describe how interventions can bring about long-term outcomes through a logical sequence of intermediate outcomes and have been used to design and measure the impact of public health programmes in several countries. In recognition of their capacity to provide a framework for monitoring and evaluation, they are being increasingly employed in the development sector. The construction of a ToC typically occurs through a consultative process, requiring stakeholders to reflect on how their programmes can bring about change. ToCs help make explicit any underlying assumptions, acknowledge the role of context and provide evidence to justify the chain of causal pathways. However, while much literature exists on how to develop a ToC with respect to interventions in theory, there is comparatively little reflection on applying it in practice to complex interventions in the health sector. This paper describes the initial process of developing a ToC to inform the design of an evaluation of a complex intervention aiming to improve government payments to health workers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Lessons learnt include: the need for the ToC to understand how the intervention produces effects on the wider system and having broad stakeholder engagement at the outset to maximise chances of the intervention's success and ensure ownership. Power relationships between stakeholders may also affect the ToC discourse but can be minimised by having an independent facilitator. We hope these insights are of use to other global public health practitioners using this approach to evaluate complex interventions.

BACKGROUND: In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the state system to remunerate health workers is poorly functional, encouraging diversification of income sources and corruption. Given the central role that health workers play in health systems, policy-makers need to ensure health workers are remunerated in a way which best incentivises them to provide effective and good quality services. This study describes the different sources and quantities of income paid to primary care health workers in Equateur, Maniema, Kasai Occidental, Province Orientale and Kasai Oriental provinces. It also explores characteristics associated with the receipt of different sources of income. METHODS: Quantitative data on the income received by health workers were collected through baseline surveys. Descriptive statistics explored the demographic characteristics of health workers surveyed, and types and amounts of incomes received. A series of regression models were estimated to examine the health worker and facility-level determinants of receiving each income source and of levels received. Qualitative data collection was carried out in Kasai Occidental province to explore perceptions of each income source and reasons for receiving each. RESULTS: Nurses made up the majority of workers in primary care. Only 31% received a government salary, while 75% reported compensation from user fees. Almost half of all nurses engaged in supplemental non-clinical activities. Receipt of government payments was associated with income from private practice and non-clinical activities. Male nurses were more likely to receive per diems, performance payments, and higher total remuneration compared to females. Contextual factors such as provincial location, presence of externally financed health programmes and local user fee policy also influenced the extent to which nurses received many income sources. CONCLUSIONS: The receipt of government payments was unreliable and had implications for receipt of other income sources. A mixture of individual, facility and geographical factors were associated with the receipt of various income sources. Greater co-ordination is needed between partners involved in health worker remuneration to design more effective financial incentive packages, reduce the fragmentation of incomes and improve transparency in the payment of workers in the DRC.

BACKGROUND: Performance-based financing (PBF) has attracted considerable attention in recent years in low and middle-income countries. Afghanistan's Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) implemented a PBF programme between 2010 and 2015 to strengthen the utilisation of maternal and child health services in primary health facilities. This study aimed to examine the political economy factors influencing the adoption, design and implementation of the PBF programme in Afghanistan. METHODS: Retrospective qualitative research methods were employed using semi structured interviews as well as a desk review of programme and policy documents. Key informants were selected purposively from the national level (n = 9), from the province level (n = 6) and the facility level (n = 15). Data analysis was inductive as well as deductive and guided by a political economy analysis framework to explore the factors that influenced the adoption and design of the PBF programme. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse the data. RESULTS: The global policy context, and implementation experience in other LMIC, shaped PBF and its introduction in Afghanistan. The MoPH saw PBF as a promise of additional resources needed to rebuild the country's health system after a period of conflict. The MoPH support for PBF was also linked to their past positive experience of performance-based contracting. Power dynamics and interactions between PBF programme actors also shaped the policy process. The PBF programme established a centralised management structure which strengthened MoPH and donor ability to manage the programme, but overlooked key stakeholders, such as provincial health offices and non-state providers. However, MoPH had limited input in policy design, resulting in a design which was not well tailored to the national setting. CONCLUSIONS: This study shows that PBF programmes need to be designed and adapted according to the local context, involving all relevant actors in the policy cycle. Future studies should focus on conducting empirical research to not only understand the multiple effects of PBF programmes on the performance of health systems but also the main political economy dynamics that influence the PBF programmes in different stages of the policy process.

BACKGROUND: Performance-based financing (PBF) has attracted considerable attention in recent years in low and middle-income countries. Afghanistan's Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) implemented a PBF programme between 2010 and 2015 to strengthen the utilisation of maternal and child health services in primary health facilities. This study aimed to examine the political economy factors influencing the adoption, design and implementation of the PBF programme in Afghanistan. METHODS: Retrospective qualitative research methods were employed using semi structured interviews as well as a desk review of programme and policy documents. Key informants were selected purposively from the national level (n = 9), from the province level (n = 6) and the facility level (n = 15). Data analysis was inductive as well as deductive and guided by a political economy analysis framework to explore the factors that influenced the adoption and design of the PBF programme. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse the data. RESULTS: The global policy context, and implementation experience in other LMIC, shaped PBF and its introduction in Afghanistan. The MoPH saw PBF as a promise of additional resources needed to rebuild the country's health system after a period of conflict. The MoPH support for PBF was also linked to their past positive experience of performance-based contracting. Power dynamics and interactions between PBF programme actors also shaped the policy process. The PBF programme established a centralised management structure which strengthened MoPH and donor ability to manage the programme, but overlooked key stakeholders, such as provincial health offices and non-state providers. However, MoPH had limited input in policy design, resulting in a design which was not well tailored to the national setting. CONCLUSIONS: This study shows that PBF programmes need to be designed and adapted according to the local context, involving all relevant actors in the policy cycle. Future studies should focus on conducting empirical ...

The amount of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) available to low- and middle-income countries has increased exponentially over the past decade. However, there are concerns that DAH increases have not resulted in increased spending on health at the country level. This is because DAH may be fungible, resulting from the recipient government decreasing its contribution to the health sector as a result of external funding. The aim of this research is to assess whether DAH funds in Tanzania are fungible, by exploring government substitution of its own resources across sectors and within the health sector. A database containing 28140 projects of DAH expenditure between 2000 and 2010 was compiled from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Creditor Reporting System (OECD-CRS) and AidData databases. Government health expenditure data for the same period were obtained from the Government of Tanzania, World Bank, public expenditure reviews and budget speeches and analysed to assess the degree of government substitution. 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Development Partners (DPs), government and non-government stakeholders between April and June 2012 to explore stakeholder perceptions of fungibility. We found some evidence of substitution of government funds at the health sector and sub-sector levels and two mechanisms through which it takes place: the resource allocation process and macro-economic factors. We found fungibility of external funds may not necessarily be detrimental to Tanzania's development (as evidence suggests the funds displaced may be reallocated to education) and the mechanisms used by DPs to prevent substitution were largely ineffective. We recommend DPs engage more effectively in the priority-setting process, not just with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), but also with the Ministry of Finance, to agree on priorities and mutual funding responsibilities at a macroeconomic level. We also call for more qualitative research on fungibility.

There is growing attention to tracking country level resource flows to health, but limited evidence on the sub-national allocation of funds. We examined district health financing in Malawi in 2006 and 2011, and equity in the allocation of funding, together with the association between financing and under five and neonatal mortality. We explored the process for receiving and allocating different funding sources at district level. We obtained domestic and external financing data from the Integrated Financial Management Information System (2006-11) and AidData (2000-12) databases. Out-of-pocket payment data came from two rounds of integrated household budget surveys (2005; 2010). Mortality data came from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (2006) and Demographic and Health Survey (2010). We described district level health funding by source, ran correlations between funding and outcomes and generated concentration curves and indices. 41 semi-structured interviews were conducted at the national level and in 10 districts with finance and health managers. Per capita spending from all sources varied substantially across districts and doubled between 2006 and 2011 from 7181 Kwacha to 15 312 Kwacha. In 2011, external funding accounted for 74% of funds, with domestic funding accounting for 19% of expenditure, and out of pocket (OOP) funding accounting for 7%. All funding sources were concentrated among wealthier districts, with OOP being the most pro-rich, followed by domestic expenditure and external funding. Districts with higher levels of domestic and external funding had lower levels of post-neonatal mortality, and those with higher levels of out-of-pocket payments had higher levels of 1-59 month mortality in 2006. There was no association between changes in financing and outcomes. Districts reported delayed receipt of lower-than-budgeted funds, forcing them to scale-down activities and rely on external funding. Governments need to track how resources are allocated sub-nationally to maximize equity and ensure allocations are commensurate to health need.

BACKGROUND: Health system performance is one of the important components of the health care delivery; its achievement depends on the quality of services rendered and the health system responsiveness of its beneficiaries. Health system responsiveness is a multi-dimensional concept and is usually measured through several domains. Health system responsiveness (HSR) remains to be a key indicator for evaluation of health system performance in any settings. This study aimed at assessing the situation of health system responsiveness in primary health facilities in Tanzania prior to introduction of the Direct Health Facility Financing (DHFF) program. METHODS: This was a cross sectional study conducted between January and February in 2018. We collected data from 42 primary health facilities (14 health centers and 28 dispensaries) where a questionnaire was administered to a total of 422 participants. The questionnaire collected information on attention, respect to dignity, clear communication, autonomy, access to care, respect to confidentiality and basic amenities. Descriptive analysis was done to determine the distribution of the variables whereas ANOVA and linear regression analysis was employed to discern the association between variables. RESULTS: More than 67% of participants had visited the same health facility more than 5 times. Sixty seven percent of the patients were residing within 5kms from the public primary health care facilities. The geographical access to health care scored the lowest (43.5% for Dispensaries and 36% for Health center) mean as compared to other domains of health system responsiveness. The highest score was in respect to confidentiality (86.7%) followed by respect to dignity (81.4%). Linear regression analysis revealed no statistical association between any of the social demographic features with the overall HSR performances. However, in post hoc analysis, Pwani and Shinyanga regions didn't differ significantly in terms of their performances whereas those two regions differ from all other regions. CONCLUSION: Based on the study findings health system responsiveness domains has performed relatively poor in many regions except for respect of dignity and confidentiality scored high of all the domains. Shinyanga and Pwani regions scored relatively well in all domains this could have been due to the effect of Results Based financing (RBF) in the respective regions. All in all the Government and other stakeholders in the health sector they should deliberately invest on the access to care domain as seem to be a challenge as compared to others.

BACKGROUND: A motivated workforce is necessary to ensure the delivery of high quality health services. In developing countries, performance-based financing (PBF) is often employed to increase motivation by providing financial incentives linked to performance. However, given PBF schemes are usually funded by donors, their long-term financing is not always assured, and the effects of withdrawing PBF on motivation are largely unknown. This cross-sectional study aimed to identify differences in motivation between workers who recently had donor-funded PBF withdrawn, with workers who had not received PBF. METHODS: Quantitative data were collected from 485 health workers in 5 provinces using a structured survey containing questions on motivation which were based on an established motivation framework. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to verify dimensions of motivation, and multiple regression to assess differences in motivation scores between workers who had previously received PBF and those who never had. Qualitative interviews were also carried out in Kasai Occidental province with 16 nurses who had previously or never received PBF. RESULTS: The results indicated that workers in facilities where PBF had been removed scored significantly lower on most dimensions of motivation compared to workers who had never received PBF. The removal of the PBF scheme was blamed for an exodus of staff due to the dramatic reduction in income, and negatively impacted on relationships between staff and the local community. CONCLUSION: Donors and governments unable to sustain PBF or other donor-payments should have clear exit strategies and institute measures to mitigate any adverse effects on motivation following withdrawal.

BACKGROUND: Despite widespread implementation across Africa, there is limited evidence of the effect of payment for performance (P4P) schemes in low income countries on the coverage of quality services and affordability, consistent with universal health coverage objectives. We examined the effect of a government P4P scheme on utilisation, quality, and user costs of health services in Tanzania. METHODS: We evaluated the effects of a P4P scheme on utilisation of all maternal and child immunization services targeted by the scheme, and non-targeted general outpatient service use. We also evaluated effects on patient satisfaction with care and clinical content of antenatal care, and user costs. The evaluation was done in 150 facilities across all 7 intervention districts and 4 comparison districts with two rounds of data collection over 13-months in January 2012 and February 2013. We sampled 3000 households of women who had delivered in the 12 months prior to interview; 1500 patients attending health facilities for targeted and non-targeted services at each round of data collection. Difference-in-difference regression analysis was employed. FINDINGS: We estimated a significant positive effect on two out of eight targeted indicators. There was an 8.2% (95% CI: 3.6% to 12.8%) increase in coverage of institutional deliveries among women in the intervention area, and a 10.3% (95% CI: 4.4% to 16.1%) increase in the provision of anti-malarials during pregnancy. Use of non-targeted services reduced at dispensaries by 57.5 visits per month among children under five (95% CI: -110.2 to -4.9) and by 90.8 visits per month for those aged over five (95% CI: -156.5 to -25.2). There was no evidence of an effect of P4P on patient experience of care for targeted services. There was a 0.05 (95% CI: 0.01 to 0.10) increase in the patient satisfaction score for non-targeted services. P4P was associated with a 5.0% reduction in those paying out of pocket for deliveries (95% CI: -9.3% to -0.7%) but there was no evidence of an effect on the ...

Donor financing to low- and middle-income countries for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health increased substantially from 2008 to 2013. However, increased spending by donors might not improve outcomes, if funds are delivered in ways that undermine countries' public financial management systems and incur high transaction costs for project implementation. We combined quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the quality of funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health globally and in Tanzania, based on two principles of aid effectiveness: the alignment of donor financing with the recipient country's public health financial management systems, and donor harmonization for coordinated, transparent, and collectively effective actions. We found that alignment of donor financing deteriorated throughout the period, with the proportion of funds channeled through governments decreasing from 47 percent to 39 percent. Tanzania-based donors attributed the change to the pressure donors were under to achieve and show results. Donor harmonization was low overall and remained relatively constant, although it increased in sub-Saharan Africa and decreased in South Asia. Bilateral funding agencies were the most harmonized donors. We recommend that future assessments of Sustainable Development Goals financing include measures of harmonization and alignment of funding.

Donor financing to low- and middle-income countries for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health increased substantially from 2008 to 2013. However, increased spending by donors might not improve outcomes, if funds are delivered in ways that undermine countries' public financial management systems and incur high transaction costs for project implementation. We combined quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the quality of funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health globally and in Tanzania, based on two principles of aid effectiveness: the alignment of donor financing with the recipient country's public health financial management systems, and donor harmonization for coordinated, transparent, and collectively effective actions. We found that alignment of donor financing deteriorated throughout the period, with the proportion of funds channeled through governments decreasing from 47 percent to 39 percent. Tanzania-based donors attributed the change to the pressure donors were under to achieve and show results. Donor harmonization was low overall and remained relatively constant, although it increased in sub-Saharan Africa and decreased in South Asia. Bilateral funding agencies were the most harmonized donors. We recommend that future assessments of Sustainable Development Goals financing include measures of harmonization and alignment of funding.

BACKGROUND: The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), a compulsory formal sector scheme took over the management of the Community Health Fund (CHF), a voluntary informal sector scheme, in 2009. This study assesses the origins of the reform, its effect on management and reporting structures, financial flow adequacy, reform communication and acceptability to key stakeholders, and initial progress towards universal coverage. METHODS: The study relied on national data sources and an in-depth collective case study of a rural and an urban district to assess awareness and acceptability of the reform, and fund availability and use relative to need in a sample of facilities. RESULTS: The reform was driven by a national desire to expand coverage and increase access to services. Despite initial delays, the CHF has been embedded within the NHIF organisational structure, bringing more intensive and qualified supervision closer to the district. National CHF membership has more than doubled. However, awareness of the reform was limited below the district level due to the reform's top-down nature. The reform was generally acceptable to key stakeholders, who expected that benefits between schemes would be harmonised.The reform was unable to institute changes to the CHF design or district management structures because it has so far been unable to change CHF legislation which also limits facility capacity to use CHF revenue. Further, revenue generated is currently insufficient to offset treatment and administration costs, and the reform did not improve the revenue to cost ratio. Administrative costs are also likely to have increased as a result of the reform. CONCLUSION: Informal sector schemes can benefit from merger with formal sector schemes through improved data systems, supervision, and management support. However, effects will be maximised if legal frameworks can be harmonised early on and a reduction in administrative costs is not guaranteed.