On the Unification of Centralized and Decentralized Clearing Mechanisms in Financial Networks
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2021-015
33 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2021-015
SSRN
In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 37, Heft 1-2, S. 67-85
ISSN: 2366-6161
AbstractThis paper introduces a model to analyze individual externalities and the associated negotiation problem, which has been largely neglected in the game theoretic literature. Following an axiomatic perspective, we propose a solution, as a payoff sharing scheme, called the balanced threat agreement, for such problems. It highlights an agent's potential influences on all agents by threatening to enter or quit. We further study the solution by investigating its consistency. We also offer a discussion on the related stability issue.
In: CentER Discussion Paper No. 2019-035
SSRN
Working paper
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-011
SSRN
Working paper
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2017-023
SSRN
Working paper
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2016-025
SSRN
Working paper
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-032
SSRN
Working paper
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2013-069
SSRN
Working paper
In: CentER Discussion Paper No. 2011-029
SSRN
Working paper
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 229-242
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series Nr. 2021-023
SSRN
In: CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2021-009
SSRN
This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is then how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.
BASE