Uncertainty, Cleavages, and Ethnic Coalitions
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 81, Heft 2, S. 471-486
ISSN: 1468-2508
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 81, Heft 2, S. 471-486
ISSN: 1468-2508
How do coalition governments affect the risk of civil war onset in ethnically divided societies? Existing research argues that power-sharing coalitions decrease the risk of civil war because they redress grievances. Building on a formal model of coalition formation, we predict that ethnic elites are most likely to form oversized rather than minimum-winning coalitions in anticipation of future challenges to the regime. Put differently, we expect most power-sharing to occur where the risk of regime-threatening civil war is highest.
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In: EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 651
SSRN
Working paper
In: Electoral studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, Band 78, S. 102487
ISSN: 1873-6890
In: Journal of peace research, Band 55, Heft 5, S. 671-686
ISSN: 1460-3578
Barbara Walter's application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter's argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 587-598
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 589-608
ISSN: 1475-6765
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 589-608
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 587-598
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: Electoral Studies, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 360-369
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 360-369
ISSN: 0261-3794
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of peace research, Band 59, Heft 3, S. 425-435
ISSN: 1460-3578
Social scientists in general and conflict researchers in particular increasingly combine multiple datasets to study ethnic politics and conflict in Africa. We facilitate these efforts by systematically linking over 8,100 ethnic categories from 11 databases, including surveys, geographic data, and expert-coded lists. Exploiting the linguistic tree from the Ethnologue database, we propose a systematic solution to the grouping problem of ethnicity. An analysis of political exclusion, mistrust of state leaders, and ethnic grievances highlights different ways of linking ethnic categories from multiple datasets. The LEDA open-source software package allows researchers to link ethnic groups from any database with explicit rules and to add their own data on ethnic groups.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 4, S. 744-771
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online