Suchergebnisse

More than 60 years after the dawn of the nuclear age, the discussions of the governance of nuclear weapons still focus on the governance of nuclear weapons at the international level and in particular in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In contrast, much less attention has been paid to the governance of nuclear weapons at the national level. However, the rather disappointing record of the NPT raises the question of whether the global governance of nuclear weapons can work without first ensuring their democratic governance at the national level. The issue of civilian control and oversight of nuclear weapon programmes has become more pertinent in the post-cold war period and particularly so following the events of 11 September 2001. Effective civilian control may be considered an important factor in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a vital concern as can be demonstrated by recent events such as the discovery of the activities of the A. Q. Khan network in 2004. It is no coincidence that much of the recent talk of nuclear weapons in the media focuses on countries like Iran, where the weak democratic system of checks and balances has led to a general belief that bad governance of nuclear affairs is inevitable. The international community, however, has not expressed anxiety about other, more democratic countries that may be at a turning point in their nuclear policies. The matter of democratic accountability regarding nuclear weapons should not be a concern only in transitional or authoritarian states, but also in consolidated democracies. Indeed, problems exist in all nuclear weapons states: there is ambiguity in the UK about the special relationship with the USA; in France, nuclear weapons are considered part of the domaine reserve of the president; Indian governments have used nuclear weapon tests to boost their domestic popularity; in Russia, the breakup of the Soviet Union has resulted in the near impossibility of civilian control; Pakistan poses concern in the eventuality that President Musharaf is no longer in power and the nuclear arsenal falls into the wrong hands; Israel's opaque nuclear posture leaves little grounds for transparency or control; the USA constitutes the best and yet imperfect standard, with a strong Congress but an even stronger president as commander-in-chief. It is therefore essential to explore how nuclear weapon states (both democratic and non-democratic) balance the need for the usability and security of nuclear weapon systems with the need for political control and oversight. It is also important to broaden the debate on the control of nuclear weapons beyond the prevalent 'command and control' approach. Adapted from the source document.

The persistent gap between theory and practice in SSR can be a source of much irritation and disappointment at failures to implement SSR norms as well as in response to concepts and strategies that seem unhelpfully far removed from local realities. This paper compares ideal-case SSR environments with real-life conditions of implementing SSR. Through offering suggestions for better practice in SSR implementation, it shows that the art of applied SSR can be learned.

The persistent gap between theory and practice in SSR can be a source of much irritation and disappointment at failures to implement SSR norms as well as in response to concepts and strategies that seem unhelpfully far removed from local realities. This paper compares ideal-case SSR environments with real-life conditions of implementing SSR. Through offering suggestions for better practice in SSR implementation, it shows that the art of applied SSR can be learned.

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA and the invasion of Iraq, much attention has focused on the professional adequacy of the Western world's intelligence services, the risk of their role and findings being distorted by political measures, and alleged human rights abuses. This has led to public and parliamentary special investigations into claims of failings or misconduct by intelligence services in a number of countries-examples include the 9/11 Commission in the USA; the Hutton Inquiry in the United Kingdom; the Arar Commission in Canada; the German special parliamentary inquest; and the Dutch Parliament's request for an investigation into the alleged torture practices of the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service in Iraq. Concerns about the external accountability of intelligence services are clearly high on the public policy agenda. Concern about democratic oversight of the intelligence services is, however, not just a phenomenon of the past five years. Comparative research on intelligence accountability reveals that, over the past 30 years, several states have moved towards greater accountability. Although executive oversight of intelligence is well established, the introduction of parliamentary and independent oversight mechanisms is comparatively recent, having come into existence only between the 1970s and 1990s in different states. The states compared are all democracies whose legislatures have adopted laws that put the functioning of their intelligence services on a legal footing and to provide for oversight of intelligence. They include Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the UK and the USA. Intelligence oversight systems in these countries are confronted with several recurring challenges and problems: (1) balancing the legitimate need for transparency with the operational need for secrecy of operations, sources and methods; (2) the danger of politicization and executive misuse of the intelligence services; (3) the challenge of establishing democratic oversight of intelligence services in post-authoritarian and post-communist states; and (4) the challenge for national oversight institutions of keeping track of international intelligence cooperation. The extent to which the relatively young oversight systems in existence are capable of fully addressing these challenges in the post-11 September climate remains to be seen. Adapted from the source document.

Can intelligence services really be controlled -- if yes, how & by whom? In the war against terror, some countries as well as international organisations scrutinised the work of the intelligence services in parliamentary & judicial investigations. Based on the DCAF research-study "Making Intelligence Accountable," the authors identify useful practices of parliamentary oversight, observance of human rights by intelligence services & their political neutrality. References. Adapted from the source document.