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For those who subscribe to the theory of ldquo;responsible parties," party platforms should offer voters a basis for choosing between the parties and give politicians the basis for a mandate. As Krehbiel points out, U.S. platforms are routinely dismissed as "amorphous" and "hardly ever … (serving) effectively as constraints during the campaign or after the election." Yet, for better or worse, party platforms are the only authoritative statement of national party positions available, so political scientists have frequently used them as a basis for studies of party policymaking. Contrary to expectations based on the stereotype of "irresponsible" U.S. parties, studies by Gerald Pomper, Jeff Fishel, and others show that U.S. parties make fairly specific policy promises and are able to carry most of them out, even under the adverse condition of divided government. Cross-national studies show that although U.S. parties are not as successful as parties in parliamentary regimes, they look surprisingly good in international comparisons.

Objectives. Our purpose was to develop and test several hypotheses concerning the impact of poll‐question wording on aggregate public support for war. We drew on general insights from framing theory and specific insights from various theories of public support for war.Methods. Our database consisted of two collections of aggregate poll results drawn from the prewar and major combat phases of the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Second War with Iraq (2002–2003). For each data set, we used multivariate OLS regression to gauge the impact of specific question‐wording variations on the percentage of respondents expressing support for war, controlling for systematic time and pollster effects.Results. Most of the hypothesized wording effects were significant in the expected direction. Mentioning WMDs, terrorism, Saddam, hostages, and international support for war boosted aggregate war support in one or both wars; mentioning the president, oil or gasoline, international opposition to war, and U.S. or Iraqi casualties depressed support.Conclusions. Various theories emphasizing different "rational" aspects of public attitudes toward war are supported. However, the significance of mentioning Saddam by name in the Second War with Iraq, and mentioning the president in both wars, would seem to imply framing effects based more on emotion and/or symbolism.

To test the hypothesis that variations in question wording would affect public support for President Reagan's policy regarding aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, data from 18 polls conducted 1983-1986 were analyzed. Findings demonstrate that question wording can change the results of polls significantly. 1 Table, 3 Appendixes, 11 References. M. Malas

Different methodological approaches sometimes lead to different substantive conclusions. Nowhere is this more evident than in studies relating assessments of presidential skill to legislative success. Scholars of the historical, traditionalist school of presidency research argue that presidents who are perceived to be adept at getting what they want are more likely to achieve their legislative goals than are those perceived as less adept. Neustadt identifies perceived skill, or what he calls 'professional reputation', as one of the three resources that are the essence of presidential power. Yet students of the presidency who employ quantitative methods have found little or no systematic relationship between variations in skill evaluations and variations in success. George Edwards reports thai similarly situated Congressmen are not especially more likely to support highly esteemed presidents than lowly esteemed presidents. Fleisher and Bond similarly find that once contextual variables have been controlled for, there is no pattern suggesting that presidents thought to be highly skilled do better with Congress.

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross-national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross-national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990. We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958-1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct-tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post-1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post-1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)