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This new study revisits the work of the late Ernst Haas, assessing his relevance for contemporary European integration and its disparities. With his seminal book, The Uniting of Europe Haas laid the foundations for one of the most prominent paradigms of European integration - neofunctionalism. He engaged in inductive reasoning to theorize the dynamics of the European integration process that led from the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The Treaty of Rome set the constitutional framework for a Common Market. Today, a second Treaty of Rome may lay the foundation for a Euro

Most students of the EU agree by now that it is best described as a governance system. There is far less consensus on what kind of governance the EU actually features: modern, postmodern, network, cooperative, innovative or simply new? Sabel and Zeitlin have advanced yet another concept. This paper discusses the added value of their "experimentalist governance" (EG), as presented in an edited volume published in 2010, for understanding and explaining the nature of EU policymaking, addressing four questions: First, to what extent is EG distinct from existing concepts of governance? Second, how pervasive is EG in the EU when compared to alternative forms of governance? Third, what is the effect of EG on EU policy outcomes, on the one hand, and the overall architecture of the EU, on the other? Finally, does EG solve or exacerbate the EU's democratic deficit? Adapted from the source document.

With the borders of the European Union (EU) moved eastwards, students of Europeanization have been awarded yet another real-world experiment. This article explores to what extent existing Europeanization approaches travel beyond the EU's border to its South Eastern and Eastern neighbours, which are marked by 'bad governance' with regard to both the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of their domestic institutions. The first part outlines key insights of the literature on 'Europeanization West' regarding the outcomes and the mechanism of the domestic impact of the EU. Then, I summarize the main findings of research on 'Europeanization East' focusing on factors that have limited or at least qualified the domestic impact of the EU in the 10 Central and Eastern European countries in comparison to the EU 15. This article discusses to what extent the concepts and causal mechanisms need even further qualification when applied to countries, such as the European Neighbourhood Countries, that are neither willing nor necessarily capable of adapting to Europe and that do not even have the incentive of EU membership to cope with the costs. I will argue that the EU is unlikely to deploy any transformative power in its neighbourhood as long as it does not adjust its 'accession tool box' to countries the EU does not want to take on as members. The article concludes with some considerations on the policy implications of the EU's approach of 'move closer but don't touch', which has started to creep into its relations with the Western Balkans and Turkey. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that the 'nature of the EU beast' is neither unique nor captured by a particular type of governance. Like its Member States, the EU features a combination of different forms of governance that cover the entire range between market and hierarchy. The analysis of this governance mix reveals several characteristics of the EU that have been largely overlooked in the literature. First, the EU relies heavily on hierarchy in the making of its policies. Its supranational institutions allow for the adoption and enforcement of legally binding decisions without the consent of (individual) Member States. Second, network governance, which systematically involves private actors, is hard to find. EU policies are largely formulated and implemented by public actors. Third, political competition has gained importance in European governance. Member States increasingly resort to mutual recognition and the open method of co-ordination where their heterogeneity renders harmonization difficult. The article shows that the EU mainly governs through inter- and transgovernmental negotiations and political competition between states and regions. Both forms of public-actor-based governance operate in the shadow of hierarchy cast by supranational institutions. This governance mix does not render the EU unique but still distinguishes it from both international institutions and national states. Adapted from the source document.

This article provides a comparative framework for understanding processes of decentralized law enforcement in the European Union (EU). In particular, the analysis proposes how decentralized EU law enforcement mechanisms can increase opportunities for participation of citizens & firms, but only if they possess domestic courts access & sufficient resources to use it. The article undertakes a systematic analysis of noncompliance with EU environmental law to examine this dynamic. The findings reveal a major paradox for the enforcement of EU law: the empowerment of the already powerful. This paradox has major implications for the potential of expanding judicial power in the EU & at the international level to bring more democracy to international politics. Tables, Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2006.]

The article uses insights from comparative federalism to reflect upon the structure & functioning of the European Union. The analysis shows that the EU corresponds rather closely to the model of cooperative federalism. The EU's structural deficiencies are revealed by comparison with German federal experience, which helps explain why the EU has maneuvered itself into a double legitimacy trap in which declining problem-solving capacity (output legitimacy) can no longer compensate for the lack of democratic participation & accountability (input legitimacy). The article then assesses whether the Constitutional Treaty will be able to provide an escape route from the double legitimacy trap. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Explaining the "task expansion" of the European Community has been at the heart of neofunctionalism. While previous studies have focused on the transfer of competencies from the national to the European level, this paper also looks at the procedures according to which policy decisions are taken at the European level (scope). Distinguishing between scope & level reveals an interesting puzzle. It is common wisdom that the integration of external & internal security has seriously lagged behind. Since the Maastricht Treaty we have witnessed a significant task expansion of the EU into these two last bastions of national sovereignty. But while the achieved level of integration is rather similar, the scope of integration differs significantly. Justice & home affairs have subsequently been brought under the supranational framework of the first pillar. Common foreign & security policy & European defence policy, by contrast, are still firmly confined to the realm of intergovernmentalism. This disparity between level & scope of European integration poses a serious theoretical challenge -- not only to neofunctionalism. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that we have simply no evidence that the EU suffers from a serious compliance deficit, a problem claimed by the European Commission & academics alike. First, there are no data that measure the actual level of noncompliance in the EU member states. Second, the statistics published by the European Commission, which allow us to compare noncompliance between the different member states, are often not properly interpreted. If we control for changes in the Commission's enforcement strategy, on the one hand, & the rising items of legislation to be complied with as well as member states that have to comply, on the other hand, the level of noncompliance in the EU has not significantly increased over time. Moreover, noncompliance varies significantly & is focused on four particular member states that account for up to 66% of all violations of Community law. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 4 Charts, 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

The authors identify conditions under which firms seek higher rather than lower regulation in a context of weak regulatory capacities by engaging in self-regulation or partnering up with the government and/or NGOs. They analyse how firms in the automotive, food, textile, and mining sectors fight environmental pollution and HIV/AIDS. Under which conditions do companies engage in the provision of collective goods and services if the state lacks the capacity to do so? To what extent do multinational firms engage in a 'race to the top' fostering rather than undermining regulation? The empirical analyses in the individual chapters look at business responses to some of South Africa's most pertinent governance challenges, HIV/AIDS and environmental pollution. The contributors look at firms in four industry sectors: the automotive industry, the mining industry, the food and beverage industry and the textile industry. These four sectors comprise a significant number of foreign as well as local companies, with or without brand name, which cater to different market segments within South Africa, differ in size and are exposed to varying pressure from NGOs and foreign competitors.

This article asks under which conditions the state-building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites 'from below.'. Adapted from the source document.