Suchergebnisse

In recent years the ZIB has succeeded in becoming a leading international publication within the field of international relations, in part due to the democratization & professionalization resulting from the institution of anonymous peer review. While the degree of coverage of Europe-related research has increased over the last decade, such rigorous selection mechanisms can also lead to higher consideration of theoretical works with respect to practice or problem-oriented works, resulting in a degree of uniformity & one-sidedness. The ZIB tends to exclude foreign policy analyses & European-policy-oriented research, an increasingly important element of European governance. This is not only problematic from the perspective of pluralistic scientific understanding, but it hinders further theoretical development. 1 Figure, 1 Diagram, 46 References. L. Kehl

Europeanization is a two-way process that involves the evolution of European institutions that impact on political structures & processes of the member states. This article develops an approach to link conceptually the two dimensions of Europeanization by focusing on the ways in which member state governments both shape European policy outcomes & adapt to them. Member states have an incentive to "upload" their policies to the European level to minimize the costs in "downloading" them at the domestic level. But they differ in both their policy preferences & their action capacities. Accordingly, member states have pursued different strategies in responding to Europeanization. The article draws on evidence from the field of EU environmental policy making to illustrate when member states are likely to engage in pace-setting, foot-dragging, or fence-sitting. It concludes with some considerations on whether pace-setting, foot-dragging, & fence-sitting give rise to interest coalitions that pit member states of diverse levels of economic development against each other. 1 Figure, 56 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that we have simply no evidence that the EU suffers from a serious compliance deficit, a problem claimed by the European Commission & academics alike. First, there are no data that measure the actual level of noncompliance in the EU member states. Second, the statistics published by the European Commission, which allow us to compare noncompliance between the different member states, are often not properly interpreted. If we control for changes in the Commission's enforcement strategy, on the one hand, & the rising items of legislation to be complied with as well as member states that have to comply, on the other hand, the level of noncompliance in the EU has not significantly increased over time. Moreover, noncompliance varies significantly & is focused on four particular member states that account for up to 66% of all violations of Community law. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 4 Charts, 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

Intergovernmental relations in Spain have undergone a significant transformation during the past 22 years. With the transition to democracy, Spain has developed from a unitary-centralist into a quasi-federal polity in which the 17 autonomous communities enjoy significant political autonomy. However, Spain is not only moving toward federal democracy, it is also approaching a cooperative model of federalism in which multilateral intergovernmental cooperation & joint decision-making supersede the bilateral negotiations & regional competition that traditionally characterized intergovernmental relations. The shift from competitive regionalism to cooperative federalism is the result of the progressive Europeanization of the Spanish state & its autonomous communities, which has encouraged consultation & cooperation between the national government & the regions. As traditional forms of intergovernmental relations proved ineffective for necessary coordination & cooperation, the Spanish government & the autonomous communities established a new procedure for cooperating in European affairs -- the first institutional framework to provide for the joint participation of all 17 autonomous communities in central-state decision-making. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

A number of studies suggest that European integration impacts the domestic institutions of the member states by changing the distribution of resources among domestic actors. This paper argues that resource dependency needs to be embedded in an institutionalist understanding of Europeanization in order to explain when & how Europe affects the domestic institutions of the member states. First, domestic institutions determine the distribution of resources among the domestic actors in a given member-state. Second, the compatibility of European & domestic institutions determines the degree to which Europeanization changes this distribution of resources &, hence, the degree of pressure for institutional adaptation. Third, the domestic institutional culture determines the dominant strategies through which actors respond to such a redistribution of resources, facilitating or prohibiting institutional adaptation. This argument is empirically tested by comparing the impact of Europeanization on the territorial institutions of the five most decentralized member states, with special reference to Germany & Spain as representatives of opposite institutional cultures. The study shows that the regions succeeded in balancing the territorial centralization caused by Europeanization. However, the compensation of regional losses of competencies through the intrastate participation of the regions in the formulation & representation of the national bargaining position in European affairs reinforces executive dominance in European decision making, contributing to the tendencies of deparliamentarization in the member states. 1 Figure, 47 References. Adapted from the source document.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

Explores the conditions under which European policy making may change the domestic structures of member states. It is hypothesized that European policies are likely to trigger domestic change if (1) they do not fit corresponding national policies & (2) they provoke sufficient pressure for adaptation "from below & from above" to induce public authorities to make the necessary legal & administrative changes to effectively implement them. Such changes may lead to a redistribution of political resources among domestic actors, producing, in turn, new forms of relationship between different levels of government as well as between public & societal actors. The implementation of five European Union environmental policies in Spain is considered as a test case for this model of domestic structural change. 1 Figure, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.