Delayed participation of developing countries to climate agreements: should action in the EU and US be postponed?
In: Discussion paper series 6967
In: International trade and regional economics
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In: Discussion paper series 6967
In: International trade and regional economics
In: Discussion paper series 6652
In: International trade and regional economics
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
We investigate the ambiguity preferences of a unique sample of real-life policymakers at the Paris UN climate conference (COP21). We find that policymakers are generally ambiguity averse. Using a simple design, we are moreover able to show that these preferences are not necessarily due to an irrational behavior, but rather to intrinsic preferences over unknown probabilities. Exploring the heterogeneity within our sample, we also show that the country of origin and the degree of quantitative sophistication affect policymakers' attitudes towards compound risk, but not towards ambiguity. Robustness results are obtained in a lab experiment with a sample of university students.
In: CESifo economic studies: a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, Volume 63, Issue 4, p. 500-528
ISSN: 1612-7501
In: Environmental and resource economics, Volume 66, Issue 3, p. 497-536
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: FEEM Working Paper No. 63.2016
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Volume 61, Issue 4, p. 497-516
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: FEEM Working Paper No. 72.2013
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In: FEEM Working Paper No. 43.2913
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In: FEEM Working Paper No. 11.2012
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We offer a framework to assign quantitative allocations of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), across countries, one budget period at a time. Under the two-part plan: (i) China, India, and other developing countries accept targets at Business as Usual (BAU) in the coming budget period, the same period in which the US first agrees to cuts below BAU; and (ii) all countries are asked in the future to make further cuts in accordance with a common numerical formula to all. The formula is expressed as the sum of a Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor. This paper builds on our previous work in many ways. First we update targets to reflect pledges made by governments after the Copenhagen Accord of December 2010 and confirmed at the Cancun meeting of December 2011. Second, the WITCH model, which we use to project economic and environmental effects of any given set of emission targets, has been refined and updated to reflect economic and technological developments. We include the possibility of emissions reduction from bio energy (BE), carbon capture and storage (CCS), and avoided deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) which is an important component of pledges in several developing countries. Third, we use a Nash criterion for evaluating whether a country's costs are too high to sustain cooperation.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w17669
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In: FEEM Working Paper No. 66.2011
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In: UNDP-HDRO Occasional Papers No. 2011/7
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w15516
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