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Urban sociologist Ray Oldenburg defines a third place as a place of refuge other than the home or workplace where people can regularly visit and commune with friends, neighbors, coworkers, and even strangers. Because little is known about the place-based physical qualities of third places that support sociability and place attachment, this article examines how four urban design characteristics distinguish third-place businesses from other businesses on the Main Street. The article discusses a study conducted at Main Streets in two cities and one town in Massachusetts. As part of the study, visual surveys measured urban design qualities of businesses on the Main Streets, and interviews helped determine user perceptions. The findings suggest that third places are relatively high in both personalization (distinctiveness, recognizability) and permeability to the street, but seating and shelter provisions are perhaps the most crucial urban design characteristics that contribute to sociability on the Main Street.

AbstractIn this study, we explored the relation between romantic involvement status, actual/Ideal self‐discrepancy, and psychological well‐being. We hypothesized that romantically involved individuals would report being closer to their ideal selves than would romantically uninvolved individuals. We also hypothesized that the reduced self‐discrepancy reported by romantically involved individuals would be related to their experiencing higher levels of psychological well‐being in comparison to romantically uninvolved individuals. Romantically involved and romantically uninvolved subjects rated their actual selves, closeness to their ideal selves, and psychological well‐being. Results were consistent with both hypotheses. Although romantically involved and romantically uninvolved subjects did not differ in ratings of their actual selves, romantically involved subjects reported being significantly closer to their ideal selves. Furthermore, romantically involved subjects tended to report higher psychological well‐being.

Two studies explored gender‐relevant expectations and consequences of seeking flexible work arrangements. Study 1 examined preferences and expectations of students nearing the job market. While men and women valued work flexibility and work–life balance equally, women reported greater intentions to seek flexibility in their careers. Intentions were predicted by projected perceptions on gender‐relevant traits. In Study 2, participants evaluated hypothetical targets who sought a flexible work arrangement after the birth of a child. Flexibility seekers were given lower job evaluations than targets with traditional work arrangements; however, they were also seen as warmer and more moral. Men may be particularly penalized at the character level, as flexibility seekers were seen as less masculine and rated lower on masculine prescriptive traits and higher on feminine prescriptive traits. Together these studies suggest that while men value work flexibility they may be reluctant to seek it because of (potentially well‐founded) fears of stigmatization.

We surveyed Americans regarding their beliefs about gender discrimination over the past several decades. Men and women agreed that women faced much more discrimination than men in the past, and they agreed that the discrimination gap between men and women has narrowed in recent years. However, men perceived the gap as narrower than women did at all time periods, and reported that there is little difference today in the amount of gender discrimination women and men face. Political ideology moderated these beliefs such that conservative men were most likely to report that anti-Man bias now equals or exceeds anti-Woman bias. Similar to recent research on beliefs about racism, these findings suggest that groups which differ historically in status and power exhibit perceptual differences regarding the changing nature of discrimination.

We surveyed Americans regarding their beliefs about gender discrimination over the past several decades. Men and women agreed that women faced much more discrimination than men in the past, and they agreed that the discrimination gap between men and women has narrowed in recent years. However, men perceived the gap as narrower than women did at all time periods, and reported that there is little difference today in the amount of gender discrimination women and men face. Political ideology moderated these beliefs such that conservative men were most likely to report that anti-Man bias now equals or exceeds anti-Woman bias. Similar to recent research on beliefs about racism, these findings suggest that groups which differ historically in status and power exhibit perceptual differences regarding the changing nature of discrimination.

We surveyed Americans regarding their beliefs about gender discrimination over the past several decades. Men and women agreed that women faced much more discrimination than men in the past, and they agreed that the discrimination gap between men and women has narrowed in recent years. However, men perceived the gap as narrower than women did at all time periods, and reported that there is little difference today in the amount of gender discrimination women and men face. Political ideology moderated these beliefs such that conservative men were most likely to report that anti-Man bias now equals or exceeds anti-Woman bias. Similar to recent research on beliefs about racism, these findings suggest that groups which differ historically in status and power exhibit perceptual differences regarding the changing nature of discrimination. ; Hemos realizado encuestas a personas americanas sobre sus creencias respecto a la discriminación de género durante las últimas décadas. Tanto hombres como mujeres estaban de acuerdo en que en el pasado las mujeres han sufrido mucha más discriminación que los hombres, y también en que esta diferencia se ha ido estrechando en los últimos años. Sin embargo, a los hombres esta diferencia siempre les ha parecido más estrecha que a las mujeres durante todos los periodos, y perciben que ahora hay pocas diferencias entre la discriminación que afrontan hombres y mujeres. Las ideologías políticas moderan estas creencias, de manera que los hombres conservadores son más propensos a afirmar que el sesgo anti masculino es igual o mayor al sesgo anti femenino. Al igual que algunas investigaciones recientes sobre las creencias respecto al racismo, nuestros hallazgos sugieren que grupos que difieren históricamente en estatus y poder perciben de forma diferente la naturaleza cambiante de la discriminación.

We surveyed Americans regarding their beliefs about gender discrimination over the past several decades. Men and women agreed that women faced much more discrimination than men in the past, and they agreed that the discrimination gap between men and women has narrowed in recent years. However, men perceived the gap as narrower than women did at all time periods, and reported that there is little difference today in the amount of gender discrimination women and men face. Political ideology moderated these beliefs such that conservative men were most likely to report that anti-Man bias now equals or exceeds anti-Woman bias. Similar to recent research on beliefs about racism, these findings suggest that groups which differ historically in status and power exhibit perceptual differences regarding the changing nature of discrimination.

Whereas recent work on gender role violations suggests that asserting their heterosexuality may diminish the harmful effects of gender threats (versus gender affirmations) on men's antigay reactions, predictions derived from social identity theory suggest that asserting heterosexuality can exacerbate the negative effects of a gender threat on antigay reactions. Two studies tested these competing hypotheses. In Study 1, gender threatened versus affirmed men sent more intense noise blasts at a gay partner, but only if they asserted their heterosexuality. In Study 2, men high in sexual prejudice who underwent a gender threat sat farther from a gay confederate than gender affirmed men, but only if they asserted heterosexuality. Discussion considers the theoretical and practical implications of these findings, and highlights directions for future research.

AbstractWe propose that sharing a negative—as compared to a positive—attitude about a third party is particularly effective in promoting closeness between people. Findings from two survey studies and an experiment support this idea. In Studies 1 and 2, participants' open‐ended responses revealed a tendency to recall sharing with their closest friends more negative than positive attitudes about other people. Study 3 established that discovering a shared negative attitude about a target person predicted liking for a stranger more strongly than discovering a shared positive attitude (but only when attitudes were weak). Presumably, sharing negative attitudes is alluring because it establishes in‐group/out‐group boundaries, boosts self‐esteem, and conveys highly diagnostic information about attitude holders. Despite the apparent ubiquity of this effect, participants seemed unaware of it. Instead, they asserted that sharing positive attitudes about others would be particularly effective in promoting closeness.

The current studies examined the experiences of undergraduate political partisans who cross party lines to support a preferred, out-of-party candidate, and thus open themselves to the possibility of being misclassified as a member of a rival political party. Strongly identified partisans who endorsed an out-of-party candidate, and thus expected others to misclassify them, reported heightened threats to belonging and coherence (Study 1), unless they disclaimed rival party status by asserting their political affiliation. In Study 2, strongly identified partisans who could be misclassified were less confident in their choice of an out-of-party candidate compared to partisans who asserted their political affiliation. These results highlight the impact of identity misclassification concerns on strongly identified partisans whose personal preferences are inconsistent with party norms.

Despite global commitments and efforts, a gender‐based division of paid and unpaid work persists. To identify how psychological factors, national policies, and the broader sociocultural context contribute to this inequality, we assessed parental‐leave intentions in young adults (18–30 years old) planning to have children (N = 13,942; 8,880 identified as women; 5,062 identified as men) across 37 countries that varied in parental‐leave policies and societal gender equality. In all countries, women intended to take longer leave than men. National parental‐leave policies and women's political representation partially explained cross‐national variations in the gender gap. Gender gaps in leave intentions were paradoxically larger in countries with more gender‐egalitarian parental‐leave policies (i.e., longer leave available to both fathers and mothers). Interestingly, this cross‐national variation in the gender gap was driven by cross‐national variations in women's (rather than men's) leave intentions. Financially generous leave and gender‐egalitarian policies (linked to men's higher uptake in prior research) were not associated with leave intentions in men. Rather, men's leave intentions were related to their individual gender attitudes. Leave intentions were inversely related to career ambitions. The potential for existing policies to foster gender equality in paid and unpaid work is discussed.

Men sometimes withdraw support for gender equality movements when their higher gender status is threatened. Here, we expand the focus of this phenomenon by examining it cross-culturally, to test if both individual- and country-level variables predict men's collective action intentions to support gender equality. We tested a model in which men's zero-sum beliefs about gender predict reduced collective action intentions via an increase in hostile sexism. Because country-level gender equality may threaten men's higher gender status, we also examined whether the path from zero-sum beliefs to collective action intentions was stronger in countries higher in gender equality. Multilevel modeling on 6,734 men from 42 countries supported the individual-level mediation model, but found no evidence of moderation by country-level gender equality. Both country-level gender equality and individual-level zero-sum thinking independently predicted reductions in men's willingness to act collectively for gender equality.

Men sometimes withdraw support for gender equality movements when their higher gender status is threatened. Here, we expand the focus of this phenomenon by examining it cross-culturally, to test if both individual- and country-level variables predict men's collective action intentions to support gender equality. We tested a model in which men's zero-sum beliefs about gender predict reduced collective action intentions via an increase in hostile sexism. Because country-level gender equality may threaten men's higher gender status, we also examined whether the path from zero-sum beliefs to collective action intentions was stronger in countries higher in gender equality. Multilevel modeling on 6,734 men from 42 countries supported the individual-level mediation model, but found no evidence of moderation by country-level gender equality. Both country-level gender equality and individual-level zero-sum thinking independently predicted reductions in men's willingness to act collectively for gender equality.