Previous research has highlighted the disadvantaged position immigrants often face in the economy, particularly when it comes to labor market outcomes such as employment or earnings. Extending this literature, the present study evaluates the economic exclusion of immigrants, conceptualized not as labor market outcomes but as relative poverty. This study examines the relationship between welfare generosity and immigrant poverty across rich western democracies and compares this relationship with that of native poverty. One publicly held belief is that immigrants disproportionately benefit from welfare generosity, while the literature on welfare chauvinism suggests greater social spending may not necessarily benefit immigrants. Furthermore, the effects may vary by spending and immigrant type. This study uses the Luxembourg Income Study to consider differences in the effects of welfare generosity on the odds an immigrant or native household is poor, how this effect varies by the type of spending, and how the effect changes depending on factors such as region of origin or citizenship status. Using four waves of data circa 2004 to 2014 across 24 upper- and middle-income democracies, the results show some support for welfare chauvinism and advantages to being an intra-EU immigrant and citizen immigrant.
Korpi and Palme's (1998) classic "The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality" claims that universal social policy better reduces poverty than social policies targeted at the poor. This article revisits Korpi and Palme's classic, and in the process, explores and informs a set of enduring questions about social policy, politics, and social equality. Specifically, we investigate the relationships between three dimensions of welfare transfers—transfer share (the average share of household income from welfare transfers), low-income targeting, and universalism—and poverty and preferences for redistribution. We analyze rich democracies like Korpi and Palme, but we also generalize to a broader sample of developed and developing countries. Consistent with Korpi and Palme, we show (1) poverty is negatively associated with transfer share and universalism; (2) redistribution preferences are negatively associated with low-income targeting; and (3) universalism is positively associated with transfer share. Contrary to Korpi and Palme, redistribution preferences are not related to transfer share or universalism; and low-income targeting is neither positively associated with poverty nor negatively associated with transfer share. Therefore, instead of the "paradox of redistribution" we propose two new paradoxes of social policy: non-complementarity and undermining. The non-complementarity paradox entails a mismatch between the dimensions that matter to poverty and the dimension that matters to redistribution preferences. The undermining paradox emphasizes that the dimension (transfer share) that most reduces poverty tends to increase with the one dimension (low-income targeting) that reduces support for redistribution. ; Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively. ; En el texto clásico de Korpi y Palme (1998) sobre la paradoja de la redistribución y las estrategias de la igualdad se sostiene que la política social universal reduce mejor la pobreza que las políticas sociales que están destinadas específicamente a los pobres. En este artículo examinamos esta teoría clásica y, en este proceso, estudiamos y fundamentamos un conjunto de preguntas permanentes sobre política social, política e igualdad social. En concreto, investigamos las relaciones entre tres dimensiones de las transferencias de ayuda social –la participación en la transferencia (la participación promedio en los hogares de ingresos que provienen de transferencias de ayuda social), el hecho de que estén destinadas a personas de bajos ingresos y el universalismo– así como la pobreza y las preferencias de la redistribución. Analizamos democracias ricas, como lo hicieron Korpi y Palme, pero también generalizamos a una muestra más amplia de países desarrollados y en desarrollo. De acuerdo con Korpi y Palme, mostramos 1) que la pobreza se asocia negativamente a la participación en la transferencia y el universalismo; 2) que las preferencias en la redistribución se asocian negativamente al hecho de que las transferencias estén destinadas a personas de bajos ingresos y 3) que el universalismo se asocia positivamente a la participación en las transferencias. Contrariamente a Korpi y Palme, las preferencias de la redistribución no se relacionan con la participación en las transferencias o el universalismo y el hecho de que estén destinadas a personas de bajos ingresos no se asocia positivamente a la pobreza ni negativamente a la participación en la transferencia conexa. Por consiguiente, en lugar de la "paradoja de la redistribución", proponemos dos nuevas paradojas de la política social: la no complementariedad y el socavamiento. La paradoja de la no complementariedad implica una falta de correspondencia entre las dimensiones pertinentes para la pobreza y las dimensiones pertinentes para las preferencias de la redistribución. La paradoja del socavamiento hace hincapié en que la dimensión (participación en las transferencias) que más reduce la pobreza tiende a aumentar justamente con aquella dimensión (transferencias destinadas a personas de bajos ingresos) que reduce el apoyo a la redistribución.
Korpi and Palme's (1998) classic "The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality" claims that universal social policy better reduces poverty than social policies targeted at the poor. This article revisits Korpi and Palme's classic, and in the process, explores and informs a set of enduring questions about social policy, politics, and social equality. Specifically, we investigate the relationships between three dimensions of welfare transfers - "transfer share" (the average share of household income from welfare transfers), low-income targeting, and universalism - and poverty and preferences for redistribution. We analyze rich democracies like Korpi and Palme, but also generalize to a broader sample of developed and developing countries. Consistent with Korpi and Palme, we show: a) poverty is negatively associated with the transfer share and universalism; b) redistribution preferences are negatively associated with low-income targeting; and c) universalism is positively associated with the transfer share. Contrary to Korpi and Palme, redistribution preferences are not related to transfer share or universalism; and low-income targeting is not positively associated with poverty and not negatively associated with transfer share. Therefore, instead of the "paradox of redistribution" we propose two new paradoxes of social policy: noncomplementarity and undermining. The non-complementarity paradox is that there is a mismatch between the dimensions that matter to poverty and the dimension that matters to redistribution preferences. The undermining paradox emphasizes that the dimension (transfer share) that most reduces poverty tends to increase with the one dimension (low-income targeting) that reduces support for redistribution.
Researchers have investigated the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on a range of socioeconomic and political outcomes. However, approaches to measuring ethnic diversity vary not only across fields of study but even within subfields. In this review, we systematically dissect the computational approaches of prominent measures of diversity, including polarization, and discuss where and how differences emerge in their relationships with outcomes of interest to sociologists (social capital and trust, economic growth and redistribution, conflict, and crime). There are substantial similarities across computations, which are often generalizations or specializations of one another. Differences in how racial and ethnic groupings are constructed and in level of geographic analysis explain many divergences in empirical findings. We conclude by summarizing the type of measurement technique preferred by outcome, when relevant, and provide considerations for future researchers contemplating how best to operationalize diversity. Finally, we highlight two less widely used yet promising measures of diversity.
This study explores how researchers' analytical choices affect the reliability of scientific findings. Most discussions of reliability problems in science focus on systematic biases. We broaden the lens to emphasize the idiosyncrasy of conscious and unconscious decisions that researchers make during data analysis. We coordinated 161 researchers in 73 research teams and observed their research decisions as they used the same data to independently test the same prominent social science hypothesis: that greater immigration reduces support for social policies among the public. In this typical case of social science research, research teams reported both widely diverging numerical findings and substantive conclusions despite identical start conditions. Researchers' expertise, prior beliefs, and expectations barely predict the wide variation in research outcomes. More than 95% of the total variance in numerical results remains unexplained even after qualitative coding of all identifiable decisions in each team's workflow. This reveals a universe of uncertainty that remains hidden when considering a single study in isolation. The idiosyncratic nature of how researchers' results and conclusions varied is a previously underappreciated explanation for why many scientific hypotheses remain contested. These results call for greater epistemic humility and clarity in reporting scientific findings.