Trust, Communication, and Information after The Democratic Dilemma
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 638-641
ISSN: 1537-5935
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In: PS: political science & politics, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 638-641
ISSN: 1537-5935
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 48, Heft S1, S. 51-54
ISSN: 1537-5935
In: Political communication: an international journal, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 193-212
ISSN: 1091-7675
In: Political communication, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 193-212
ISSN: 1058-4609
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 90-109
Many scholars show that institutions help citizens with their political decisions. However, real-world contexts contain multiple institutions that are imposed together. Thus, I develop a theory and experimental test of the conditions under which combinations of two institutions induce citizens to trust a speaker's statements and make better decisions than when only one institution is present. The theoretical model demonstrates that a second institution typically should not alter a speaker's propensity to make truthful statements, nor subjects' decisions to trust those statements. The experimental results reveal important departures from such rational behavior. Specifically, a second institution makes subjects more willing to trust the already mostly truthful statements they receive, which enables them to make better decisions than when only one institution is imposed upon the speaker. These findings suggest lessons about the conditions under which institutions can increase trust and improve decision making in political, legal, and economic contexts. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 90-110
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 90-109
ISSN: 1460-3667
Many scholars show that institutions help citizens with their political decisions. However, real-world contexts contain multiple institutions that are imposed together. Thus, I develop a theory and experimental test of the conditions under which combinations of two institutions induce citizens to trust a speaker's statements and make better decisions than when only one institution is present. The theoretical model demonstrates that a second institution typically should not alter a speaker's propensity to make truthful statements, nor subjects' decisions to trust those statements. The experimental results reveal important departures from such rational behavior. Specifically, a second institution makes subjects more willing to trust the already mostly truthful statements they receive, which enables them to make better decisions than when only one institution is imposed upon the speaker. These findings suggest lessons about the conditions under which institutions can increase trust and improve decision making in political, legal, and economic contexts.
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Forthcoming
SSRN
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 71, Heft 3, S. 964-976
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Journal of Politics, Band 71, Heft 3
SSRN
In: Political behavior, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 287
ISSN: 0190-9320
In: Political Behavior, Band 31, Heft 2
SSRN
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 71, Heft 3, S. 964-976
ISSN: 0022-3816