Redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese twins
In: Discussion paper series 3099
In: Public policy
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In: Discussion paper series 3099
In: Public policy
In: Christen-democratische verkenningen: CDV, Heft 4, S. 97-105
ISSN: 0167-9155
In: Tijdschrift voor arbeidsvraagstukken, Band 21, Heft 3
ISSN: 2468-9424
In: Christen-democratische verkenningen: CDV, Heft 2, S. 181-186
ISSN: 0167-9155
This paper explores how EU countries can address various challenges (including the aging of the population) affecting their systems of old-age income support. It presents two scenarios illustrating the most important uncertainties surrounding the major developments that affect the pension systems of the EU. To diversify these risks, EU governments should act on several fronts. In addition to the formation of human capital (especially that of children), employment (especially that of older workers) should be boosted. This calls for social insurance reform with more emphasis on individual saving schemes. Pension schemes should be more explicit about how they share demographic and other risks. Countries that currently rely heavily on public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes should stimulate private pensions by gradually reducing PAYG benefits collected by high-income earners, by issuing new financial instruments, and by conducting intergenerational risk sharing through the tax system.
BASE
In: Natural Resource Management and Policy Ser. v.8
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 244-257
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: Annual Review of Economics, Band 6, S. 445-474
SSRN
In: Liberaal reveil, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 157-161
ISSN: 0167-0883
In: European journal of social security, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 325-346
ISSN: 2399-2948
As regards labour-market reform and employment policies, the European Union currently touts the concept of 'flexicurity', aiming at simultaneously enhancing both flexibility and security in the labour market in response to the globalisation of the economy and far-reaching demographic developments such as the ageing of the population. Each Member State is expected to map out its own distinct pathway towards more flexicurity and the European Commission has, for its part, suggested a set of four general pathways. Therefore a need exists for ideas and examples on how to elaborate a flexicurity pathway, looking for inspiration rather than imitation. In the Netherlands, a government-appointed Committee on Labour Market Participation (the so-called Bakker Committee) has recently published proposals and recommendations for further reform of the Dutch labour market. This paper discusses that part of these proposals involving a particular flexicurity pathway towards better transition security and higher labour-market mobility. This possible pathway, now being debated in the Netherlands, may also be of interest to other Member States.
In: Christen-democratische verkenningen: CDV, S. 111-122
ISSN: 0167-9155
The Dutch Parliament has passed legislation for a new income tax that abolishes the current tax on personal capital income and substitutes it by a presumptive capital income tax, which is in fact a net wealth tax. This paper contrasts this wealth tax with a conventional realization-based capital gains tax, a retrospective capital gains tax which attempts to charge interest on the deferred tax, and a capital accretion tax which taxes capital gains as they accrue. None of the approaches meets all criteria for a 'good' income tax, i.e., equity, efficiency, and administrative feasibility. We thus conclude that the effective and neutral taxation of capital income can best be ensured through a combination of (a) a capital accretion tax to capture the returns on easy-to-value financial products, (b) a capital gains tax with interest to tax the returns on hard-to-value real estate and small businesses, and (c) a broad presumptive capital income tax, i.e., a net wealth tax, to account for the utility of holding wealth. We favor uniform and moderate proportional tax rates in the context of a dual income tax under which capital income is taxed separately from labor income.
BASE
We argue in favor of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle about the ultimate goal of the company. Second, giving workers a claim on the surplus of the firm raises the cost of capital for investments in jobs. Third, making shareholders the ultimate owner of the firm provides the best possible diversification of firm-specific risks. Diversification of firm-specific risk on capital markets is an efficient form of social insurance. Hence, firms should bear the full cost of specific investment, while workers should be paid only their outside option. Empirical results for Denmark, Portugal and the United States show that Denmark is closest to the first-best outcome, while Portugal and the United States deviate in different ways. Coordination in wage bargaining and collective norms help reduce the claim of workers on the firm's surplus. Collective action, however, is a mixed blessing because politicians also face the temptation to please incumbent workers with short-run gains at the expense of exposing workers to firm-specific risks and reducing job creation. The transition from the Rhineland towards the shareholder model is fraught with difficulties. While society reaps long-run gains in efficiency, in the short run a generation of insiders has to give up their rights.
BASE
We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate goal of the company. In many cases, the vague Rhineland principles no longer offer much protection to workers. Second, giving workers a claim on the surplus of the firm raises the cost of capital for investments in jobs, which harms the position of job seekers, including new entrants to the labour market. Third, and most importantly, making shareholders the ultimate owner of the firm provides the best possible diversification of firm-specific risks. Whereas globalisation has increased firm-specific risk by intensifying competition, globalisation of capital markets has also greatly increased the scope for diversification of firm-specific risk. Diversification of this risk on the capital market is an efficient form of social insurance. Reducing the claims of workers on the surplus of the firm can be seen as the next step in the emancipation of workers. Workers derive their security not from the firm that employs them but from the value of their own human capital. In such a world, global trade in corporate control, global competition and creative destruction associated with these developments are more legitimate.Coordination in wage bargaining and collective norms on what is proper compensation play an important role in reducing the claim of workers on the firm's surplus, thereby protecting workers against firm-specific risks. Indeed, in Denmark, workers bear less firm-specific risk than workers in the United States do. Collective action thus has an important role to play. Politicians, however, also face the temptation to please voters and incumbent workers with short-run gains at the expense of exposing workers to firm-specific risks and reducing job creation. This is why corporate governance legislation that gives moral legitimacy to the claim of insiders on the surplus of the firm is damaging.The transition from the Rhineland model (in which management serves the interests of all stakeholders) towards the shareholder model is fraught with difficulties. While society reaps long-run gains in efficiency, in the short run a generation of insiders has to give up their rights without benefiting from increased job creation and higher starting wages. Whereas the claims of older workers on the surplus of a firm may thus have some legitimacy, younger cohorts should be denied such moral claims. These problems require extreme political skill to solve. In particular, they may require some grandfathering provisions or temporary explicit transfers from younger to older generations.
BASE
In: Christen-democratische verkenningen: CDV, S. 166-170
ISSN: 0167-9155