De Gangen van de Macht - De permanente verplaatsing van de politiek
In: S & D, Band 59, Heft 12, S. 14-21
ISSN: 0037-8135
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In: S & D, Band 59, Heft 12, S. 14-21
ISSN: 0037-8135
In: Journal of contingencies and crisis management, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 125-132
ISSN: 1468-5973
Corruption is back on the public agenda in many European countries. After years of neglect and diffidence, politicians, administrators and scholars have voiced serious concern about the moral integrity of the public sector. However, there is something peculiar about these debates in The Netherlands. As yet, there is no empirical data available that confirms this generally accepted picture of a public service tainted by corruption. This paper tries to explain this huge discrepancy between public concern and empirical data. The public concern, it is argued, is not just a matter of symbolics or bureau‐politics, it is also a case of institutional insecurity, caused by the transformation that the public sector is going through. Never before has government in The Netherlands, as in many other Western countries, engaged in commercial or market‐oriented activities as it has in the last decade. Step by step, the managerial state is replacing the administrative state. The present public debate about integrity in government is at least partially a reflection of the struggle in the public sector to cope with the issues that are raised by the managerial shift in Western governments. Some of the issues are probably transitional in character; they can be designed away. Some important parts of the managerial shift might cause permanent perplexities. The reason for this could be the institutional instability, both normatively and practically, of mixed arrangements.
In: International journal of public administration: IJPA, Band 19, Heft 11-12, S. 2195-2212
ISSN: 0190-0692
In: International journal of public administration, Band 19, Heft 11-12, S. 2195-2211
ISSN: 1532-4265
In: British journal of political science, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 91
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: British journal of political science, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 91-117
ISSN: 1469-2112
'The first and perhaps most compelling attribute of the modern social structure which we inhabit', according to James Coleman, 'is theasymmetryof a large portion of its relations'. What is striking about modern society, however, is not the asymmetry of relations as such. Western societies have often been, and to some extent still are, highly asymmetric; think, for example, of the relations between feudal lords and their serfs, between factory owners and workers, between men and women. What is striking about the modern asymmetry is that the parties involved are completely different classes of entities, natural persons and complex organizations. Our (great) grandparents had to rely for their income, housing and the supply of goods and services mostly on independent employers, landlords, shopkeepers and artisans. We, on the other hand, are dealing with corporations, welfare institutions, public services, housing associations, building societies, banks and department stores. These organizations are not just rational, person-like servants, waiting quietly in the corners of society to be called upon. They also, and predominantly, act on their own account. Complex organizations are a new and powerful breed of social actors; they arecorporate actorsalongside the traditional, human actors.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 23, Heft 3, S. 333
ISSN: 0001-6810
In: Journal of European integration: Revue d'intégration européenne, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 183-206
ISSN: 1477-2280
World Affairs Online
In: Bestuurskunde, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 62-69
In: Journal of European integration: Revue d'intégration européenne, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 183-206
ISSN: 1477-2280
In: Regulation & governance, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 856-876
ISSN: 1748-5991
AbstractIndependent oversight institutions are critical components of the accountability landscape in modern democracies. This paper presents a framework for assessing the accountability powers of these watchdogs. This watchdog accountability index is an empirical tool to assess the key accountability powers of accountability forums that operate in a democratic constitutional context. The aim is to provide a richer evidence base to assess evolving external accountability arrangements and their effectiveness. Our approach breaks down the concept of watchdog accountability power into three distinct, conceptually coherent dimensions. We apply the accountability index to assess the strength of one of the main watchdog institutions in the EU, the European Court of Auditors in 2017. Data were collected by means of a study of secondary sources and by an expert survey.
In: Policy & politics, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 187-206
ISSN: 1470-8442
For many public organisations, boards are the primary accountability mechanisms for management. Boards have a multipronged portfolio: strategic advice, employment, external linkage and critical scrutiny. The literature casts serious doubts about their capabilities. There is 'managerial dominance'. This article reviews existing studies on public sector boards and identifies important reasons why boards are likely to fail as accountability mechanisms. This sets the stage for a new research agenda. When are boards more effective on the micro-level? How to organise effective checks and balances around organisations? And why has the board-model become so popular: is this learning or blame-shifting?
The Netherlands has always been the odd case out regarding trust in public institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, contrary to international trends, trust in government remained high and even increased. Suddenly, from 2002 onwards, public trust in government declined dramatically. In this article we examine the plausibility of ten explanations, embedded in the international scholarly literature, and explore whether they are empirically supported or rebutted in case of the Dutch drop. We find that because most of the literature concentrates on the cross-national erosion of political support over a long period within Western democracies, explanations tend to focus on gradual, long-term demographic, social, and political trends. Sudden dips in trust levels, however, require different sets of explanatory factors; they are better explained by political or economic contingencies, such as sudden political or economic crises. In the case of the Dutch drop, the most plausible explanation is a combination of an economic decline, combined with high political instability and contestation during the first Balkenende cabinets. As of 2007, with a new cabinet in office, and an economic recovery in place, trust figures are on the rise again. Points for practitioners: Sudden dips in public trust in government are better explained by political or economic contingencies, such as political or economic crises, than by a deterioration in government performance or by long-term demographic, social, and political trends. In the case of the sudden drop in trust in The Netherlands, the most plausible explanation is a combination of an economic decline, combined with high political instability and contestation during the first Balkenende cabinets. As of 2007, with a new cabinet in office, and economic recovery in place, trust figures are on the rise again.
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