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Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the loss or impairment of ecological goods and services (EG&S) around the globe as well as in our own backyard. EG&S include features such as wildlife habitat, biodiversity, soil renewal, or nutrient cycling. The loss of such features has become a sobering reality for Manitobans in the face of the eutrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices contributing to nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to Manitobans, efforts are being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their provision. In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in Manitoba, there has been discussion on the usefulness of Market Based Instruments (MBIs). In the past, a number of programs focused on the environment in agriculture have been put forward and administered, however these have not been overly successful in incenting producers or providing significant levels of EG&S. This report will provide a summary of a series of workshops developed to bring awareness to stakeholders on an MBI known as a conservation auction (which may also be referred to as reverse auction, procurement auction, or tender). The purpose of this series of workshops was to create awareness of the conservation auction process and how it applies to the provision of EG&S by producers in Manitoba; moreover it was an opportunity to receive feedback on the applicability of auctions in Manitoba. The objectives for this series of workshops are as follows: 1) Determine the opinions of relevant stakeholders in regards to the relevance of auctions in Manitoba 2) Investigate auction design features such as payment type, competition, and communication 3) Conduct an economic analysis of the results of the auction simulations provided in the workshops for educational purposes. EG&S are the positive environmental benefits arising from healthy ecosystems. They are fundamentally complex and have no associated market value, which makes it difficult to develop relevant policy. Environmental programs typically use fixed payment or cost sharing agreements to procure EG&S but they have been found to be unsuccessful partly because of inadequate levels of compensation. An alternative approach is to use MBIs to deliver EG&S programs. MBIs are policy instruments that use market forces, prices, or other economic variables to change behaviour. They can eithe create a market, where no market is currently operating, or improve a market if there is market failure. These tools utilize trading mechanisms, direct payments, price signals, or auctions to capture value that may have been overlooked under the present policy scheme. This is a key feature that makes MBIs appropriate to use in the context of EG&S since their value is unknown. Therefore, through the use of MBIs we can gain more knowledge and understanding of the costs and benefits of EG&S. In the case of EG&S procurement, conservation auctions are a viable option as a method to purchase EG&S from producers in a cost effective way. Auction mechanisms use market forces in the face of information asymmetry (where two parties both hold private information that is not known to the other party, in this case the parties are government and producers) and act as a price discovery system for EG&S. With competition as the driving force, participants are induced to reveal their compliance costs through the bidding process (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). This is because participants must face tradeoff related to the probability are revealing some of their own cost information while receiving a payment adequate to cover their costs. Conservation auctions are a unique type of procurement auction where participants place bids for providing EG&S. Like a conventional procurement auction, participants submit bids indicating the price they are willing to accept/willing to sell their good or service for. The bids are then ordered from lowest to highest (can be either $/unit or whole price). Unlike conventional procurement auctions, typically, multiple winners are selected from lowest to highest until either a budget is exhausted or a unit target is met. Auction design is an important factor in maintaining economic efficiency in conservation auctions. Since conventional auction theory cannot be used to guide design, auction experiments in an economic laboratory have been utilized to test different designs to understand their efficiency capability as well as their ability to act as a cost discovery tool (Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). Important design measures to consider are: the method of payment; use of target versus budget constraints; is information revealed or hidden; the use of a reservation price or target; and bid evaluation systems. In total 13 workshops were completed between the dates of March 8, 2010 and March 19, 2010. Originally 15 sessions were scheduled; however due to limited attendance participants from two sessions were scheduled; however due to limited attendance participants from two sessions were rescheduled to other sessions. Four treatments were used during the series of workshops; two payment structures (discriminatory (D) and uniform(U)) and two bid ranking structures (maximize coverage (MC) (or acres) and maximize kg phosphorous abatement (MP)): 4 MCU, 3 MCD, 3 MPU, and 3 MPD. Light economic analysis of the auction simulation results was conducted. As these workshops were being used more as an information tool to stakeholders, the results of the auctions most likely do not reflect real behaviour; therefore caution and scrutiny should be used when interpreting the results. Despite discrepancies, lessons may still be learned from the results. Profit maximizing, or rent seeking, behaviour was apparent in almost all auction simulations. This is mostly attributed to the low rate of competition in some rounds. Where there was low competition the cost effectiveness of the auction would ultimately decrease and could not be used as a cost discovery mechanism. It was difficult to see any major differences between the two payment methods, however on two occasions the uniform payment yielded negative rent, in other words people were bidding below their costs on average. At the conclusion of each auction simulation, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire asking for their opinions on the workshop itself, as well as more detailed questions pertaining to environmental programming in Manitoba and opinions about the conservation auction mechanism. Overall, there was a positive response to the mechanism. There was a distinct divide between producers and other groups (e.g. government, NGOs, and academia) according to the recorded responses. In the discussion that followed each workshop, similar concerns were brought to the table regardless of demographics. These encompassed how the auction would be implemented down to details about administration and monitoring; producer concerns related to the estimation of costs, fairness to the producer, the competitive nature of the auction, and contract lengths; as well as discussions about environmental programming in general that were not specifically related to the conservation auction process. Taking time to think through auction design will also be necessary in order to have an auction that caters to the public and producers, and will be cost effective. While it may be too soon to be discussing details surrounding the implementation or design of an auction in Manitoba, more thought may be required on related issues such as development of an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) and associated extension program. These workshops were developed to allow stakeholders to become aware of the conservation auction, and learn more about the process and why they are implemented around the world. It was also a platform of discussion amongst stakeholders to gauge how acceptable an auction would be in Manitoba to procure EG&S from producers: a lot of information and ideas were shared from all sides of the story. Overall, it was a very positive experience for those involved and a positive reaction to the auction process was encountered. However, some still remain apprehensive and skeptical of the mechanism in terms of its application in Manitoba.

Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the loss or impairment of ecological goods and services (EG&S) around the globe as well as in our own backyard. EG&S include features such as wildlife habitat, biodiversity, soil renewal, or nutrient cycling. The loss of such features has become a sobering reality for Manitobans in the face of the eutrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices contributing to nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to Manitobans, efforts are being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their provision. In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in Manitoba, there has been discussion on the usefulness of Market Based Instruments (MBIs). In the past, a number of programs focused on the environment in agriculture have been put forward and administered, however these have not been overly successful in incenting producers or providing significant levels of EG&S. This report will provide a summary of a series of workshops developed to bring awareness to stakeholders on an MBI known as a conservation auction (which may also be referred to as reverse auction, procurement auction, or tender). The purpose of this series of workshops was to create awareness of the conservation auction process and how it applies to the provision of EG&S by producers in Manitoba; moreover it was an opportunity to receive feedback on the applicability of auctions in Manitoba. The objectives for this series of workshops are as follows: 1) Determine the opinions of relevant stakeholders in regards to the relevance of auctions in Manitoba 2) Investigate auction design features such as payment type, competition, and communication 3) Conduct an economic analysis of the results of the auction simulations provided in the workshops for educational purposes. EG&S are the positive environmental benefits arising from healthy ecosystems. They are fundamentally complex and have no associated market value, which makes it difficult to develop relevant policy. Environmental programs typically use fixed payment or cost sharing agreements to procure EG&S but they have been found to be unsuccessful partly because of inadequate levels of compensation. An alternative approach is to use MBIs to deliver EG&S programs. MBIs are policy instruments that use market forces, prices, or other economic variables to change behaviour. They can eithe create a market, where no market is currently operating, or improve a market if there is market failure. These tools utilize trading mechanisms, direct payments, price signals, or auctions to capture value that may have been overlooked under the present policy scheme. This is a key feature that makes MBIs appropriate to use in the context of EG&S since their value is unknown. Therefore, through the use of MBIs we can gain more knowledge and understanding of the costs and benefits of EG&S. In the case of EG&S procurement, conservation auctions are a viable option as a method to purchase EG&S from producers in a cost effective way. Auction mechanisms use market forces in the face of information asymmetry (where two parties both hold private information that is not known to the other party, in this case the parties are government and producers) and act as a price discovery system for EG&S. With competition as the driving force, participants are induced to reveal their compliance costs through the bidding process (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). This is because participants must face tradeoff related to the probability are revealing some of their own cost information while receiving a payment adequate to cover their costs. Conservation auctions are a unique type of procurement auction where participants place bids for providing EG&S. Like a conventional procurement auction, participants submit bids indicating the price they are willing to accept/willing to sell their good or service for. The bids are then ordered from lowest to highest (can be either $/unit or whole price). Unlike conventional procurement auctions, typically, multiple winners are selected from lowest to highest until either a budget is exhausted or a unit target is met. Auction design is an important factor in maintaining economic efficiency in conservation auctions. Since conventional auction theory cannot be used to guide design, auction experiments in an economic laboratory have been utilized to test different designs to understand their efficiency capability as well as their ability to act as a cost discovery tool (Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). Important design measures to consider are: the method of payment; use of target versus budget constraints; is information revealed or hidden; the use of a reservation price or target; and bid evaluation systems. In total 13 workshops were completed between the dates of March 8, 2010 and March 19, 2010. Originally 15 sessions were scheduled; however due to limited attendance participants from two sessions were scheduled; however due to limited attendance participants from two sessions were rescheduled to other sessions. Four treatments were used during the series of workshops; two payment structures (discriminatory (D) and uniform(U)) and two bid ranking structures (maximize coverage (MC) (or acres) and maximize kg phosphorous abatement (MP)): 4 MCU, 3 MCD, 3 MPU, and 3 MPD. Light economic analysis of the auction simulation results was conducted. As these workshops were being used more as an information tool to stakeholders, the results of the auctions most likely do not reflect real behaviour; therefore caution and scrutiny should be used when interpreting the results. Despite discrepancies, lessons may still be learned from the results. Profit maximizing, or rent seeking, behaviour was apparent in almost all auction simulations. This is mostly attributed to the low rate of competition in some rounds. Where there was low competition the cost effectiveness of the auction would ultimately decrease and could not be used as a cost discovery mechanism. It was difficult to see any major differences between the two payment methods, however on two occasions the uniform payment yielded negative rent, in other words people were bidding below their costs on average. At the conclusion of each auction simulation, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire asking for their opinions on the workshop itself, as well as more detailed questions pertaining to environmental programming in Manitoba and opinions about the conservation auction mechanism. Overall, there was a positive response to the mechanism. There was a distinct divide between producers and other groups (e.g. government, NGOs, and academia) according to the recorded responses. In the discussion that followed each workshop, similar concerns were brought to the table regardless of demographics. These encompassed how the auction would be implemented down to details about administration and monitoring; producer concerns related to the estimation of costs, fairness to the producer, the competitive nature of the auction, and contract lengths; as well as discussions about environmental programming in general that were not specifically related to the conservation auction process. Taking time to think through auction design will also be necessary in order to have an auction that caters to the public and producers, and will be cost effective. While it may be too soon to be discussing details surrounding the implementation or design of an auction in Manitoba, more thought may be required on related issues such as development of an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) and associated extension program. These workshops were developed to allow stakeholders to become aware of the conservation auction, and learn more about the process and why they are implemented around the world. It was also a platform of discussion amongst stakeholders to gauge how acceptable an auction would be in Manitoba to procure EG&S from producers: a lot of information and ideas were shared from all sides of the story. Overall, it was a very positive experience for those involved and a positive reaction to the auction process was encountered. However, some still remain apprehensive and skeptical of the mechanism in terms of its application in Manitoba.

This study uses experimental economic methods to examine the efficacy of reverse auctions to generate efficient nutrient abatement from livestock operations. The experimental parameters were benchmarked to a specific beneficial management practice in a Manitoba watershed and were used to examine three bid-selection rules and two pricing rules. The results suggest that targeting livestock with the practice performed almost as well as targeting specific abatement levels at the farm level. Auctions that maximized participation of producers fared poorly on both environmental and economic outcome measures. The uniform-price rule was found to be superior to the discriminative-pricing rule.

A Discrete Choice Travel Cost model, based on data collected from a survey of recreational anglers, was used to estimate changes in recreational fishing benefits in the Upper Oldman River region of Alberta resulting from the construction of a dam. The results show that this model is useful for measuring the impact of public works projects on non-market economic benefits. Predictions of the distribution of trips to each fishing site before and after placement of the dam are also identified by the model. The model is sensitive to the variables chosen and the measurement of quality attributes. The quality attributes which affect the choice of site include the potential to catch fish (catch rate and size of fish), access, and the size of the water body. Including the value of travel time in the travel costs causes an increase in the welfare estimates, but does not affect the variables used. Construction of the dam and creation of the reservoir reduces recreational fishing benefits of the area. The welfare impacts of the decline of recreational fishing quality range from an annual loss of $96,239.10 to a loss of $30,545.20 depending on the model specification, and whether the value of time is included. The government efforts at mitigating the dam's effect by construction of fish habitat in remaining reaches may improve the welfare of users to levels equal to or greater than the original benefits. The mitigation effort, assuming a success rate that is considered most probable, results in an annual gain in welfare of from $209,499.80 to $22,971.60 depending on the model specification, and whether the value of time is included.

A Discrete Choice Travel Cost model, based on data collected from a survey of recreational anglers, was used to estimate changes in recreational fishing benefits in the Upper Oldman River region of Alberta resulting from the construction of a dam. The results show that this model is useful for measuring the impact of public works projects on non-market economic benefits. Predictions of the distribution of trips to each fishing site before and after placement of the dam are also identified by the model. The model is sensitive to the variables chosen and the measurement of quality attributes. The quality attributes which affect the choice of site include the potential to catch fish (catch rate and size of fish), access, and the size of the water body. Including the value of travel time in the travel costs causes an increase in the welfare estimates, but does not affect the variables used. Construction of the dam and creation of the reservoir reduces recreational fishing benefits of the area. The welfare impacts of the decline of recreational fishing quality range from an annual loss of $96,239.10 to a loss of $30,545.20 depending on the model specification, and whether the value of time is included. The government efforts at mitigating the dam's effect by construction of fish habitat in remaining reaches may improve the welfare of users to levels equal to or greater than the original benefits. The mitigation effort, assuming a success rate that is considered most probable, results in an annual gain in welfare of from $209,499.80 to $22,971.60 depending on the model specification, and whether the value of time is included.

Funding for the protection of the environment has traditionally come from general tax revenues. Fish and wildlife habitat enhancement and endangered species protection are prominent examples of this phenomenon. In the past few years, however, several aspects of this situation have changed. First, as provincial governments have trimmed budgets, fewer funds are available for environmental conservation programs. Second, many jurisdictions have adopted a model by which private interests and/or users of the resource base help to fund these projects. Examples include the North American Waterfowl Management Program, land purchases by the Nature Conservancy, the Buck-for Wildlife project (in Alberta), and various other public-private joint ventures (Porter and van Kooten 1993). In many of these programs the private funding component is based on memberships or donations to private organizations (e.g. Nature Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited). Thus, funding for conservation is relying more heavily on donations to environmental causes either through direct giving of funds or through memberships in organizations. For wildlife habitat management, a major environmental initiative, a third element of change is that traditional supporters - recreational hunters and anglers - are decreasing in number, particularly in Canada (e.g. Boxall et al. 1991). Traditionally, these supporters were responsible for much of the funding of wildlife conservation programs either through license sales, special 'check-offs' that accompany license sales, or through membership fees and donations to fishing and hunting related organizations. For example, Ducks Unlimited and Trout Unlimited began as hunting and angling organizations respectively and much of their funding has been based on contributions from hunters and anglers. With the numbers of hunters declining 17% over the last 10 years (Filion et al, 1993), and anglers also declining over the same period (e.g. 26% in Alberta), will this traditional funding base remain? This paper explores some determinants of private contributions to environmental conservation activities through an econometric analysis of donations and memberships relating to wildlife habitat protection and enhancement. We are interested in the factors affecting donations in part because we wish to determine if continuing declines in the numbers of hunters and anglers will affect the level of donations to conservation activities. We are also interested in understanding the relationships between income, marginal tax rates (the price of donations) and other variables on the propensity to donate. Given the increasing importance of private funding of wildlife programs, knowledge of these relationships will be important for public and private agencies involved in wildlife conservation.

Funding for the protection of the environment has traditionally come from general tax revenues. Fish and wildlife habitat enhancement and endangered species protection are prominent examples of this phenomenon. In the past few years, however, several aspects of this situation have changed. First, as provincial governments have trimmed budgets, fewer funds are available for environmental conservation programs. Second, many jurisdictions have adopted a model by which private interests and/or users of the resource base help to fund these projects. Examples include the North American Waterfowl Management Program, land purchases by the Nature Conservancy, the Buck-for Wildlife project (in Alberta), and various other public-private joint ventures (Porter and van Kooten 1993). In many of these programs the private funding component is based on memberships or donations to private organizations (e.g. Nature Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited). Thus, funding for conservation is relying more heavily on donations to environmental causes either through direct giving of funds or through memberships in organizations. For wildlife habitat management, a major environmental initiative, a third element of change is that traditional supporters - recreational hunters and anglers - are decreasing in number, particularly in Canada (e.g. Boxall et al. 1991). Traditionally, these supporters were responsible for much of the funding of wildlife conservation programs either through license sales, special 'check-offs' that accompany license sales, or through membership fees and donations to fishing and hunting related organizations. For example, Ducks Unlimited and Trout Unlimited began as hunting and angling organizations respectively and much of their funding has been based on contributions from hunters and anglers. With the numbers of hunters declining 17% over the last 10 years (Filion et al, 1993), and anglers also declining over the same period (e.g. 26% in Alberta), will this traditional funding base remain? This paper explores some determinants of private contributions to environmental conservation activities through an econometric analysis of donations and memberships relating to wildlife habitat protection and enhancement. We are interested in the factors affecting donations in part because we wish to determine if continuing declines in the numbers of hunters and anglers will affect the level of donations to conservation activities. We are also interested in understanding the relationships between income, marginal tax rates (the price of donations) and other variables on the propensity to donate. Given the increasing importance of private funding of wildlife programs, knowledge of these relationships will be important for public and private agencies involved in wildlife conservation.

Human resource management is central to management teaching & research. Presenting the trends & developments, this handbook is divided into: foundations & frameworks; core processes & functions; patterns & dynamics; & measurement & outcomes

This report summarizes preliminary results from the Farm Behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek Integrated Modeling Project (STC Project) which is being undertaken as part of the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) Program. WEBS is a partnership between Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to evaluate the economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the watershed scale. Water draining from South Tobacco Creek eventually enters to Lake Winnipeg which is degraded from the cumulative effects of nutrient loading, particularly phosphorous. Many jurisdictions across the world, including Canada, use payments programs to encourage land owners to change land management practices in order to reduce non-point source pollution. BMP incentive programs in Canada, such as Greencover, rely on fixed payment schemes which pay producers a set amount for BMPs, regardless of costs or benefits. In order to improve the performance of the Farm Behavior component of the STC project is to examine the performance of various types of payment programs for BMPs relative to reducing phosphorous loads from STC. Theoretical and empirical evidence from conservation auctions suggest that the performance of auctions depends on several factors which affects the bidding behavior of producers during the auction, and therefore the cost-effectiveness of auctions over other types of payment programs. In particular, some producers actually benefit from BMPs, however under certain auction rules these producers would be paid the same amount as high cost producers; alternatively, producers with low costs of adopting BMPs may not always provide the greatest benefits in terms of pollution abatement depending on their location in the watershed, and physical features of their land. We assessed the relative performance of different payment programs by developing producer response functions for adoption of Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs). Producer adoption responses under different incentive schemes were tested using experiments with student subjects and limited trials with producers. We examined four BMPs: construction of holding ponds, riparian management, forage conversation, and conservation till. The results of the adoption response experiments conducted under WEBs were used to draw preliminary observations on BMP policy design and form the basis for recommendations for further research. The farm behavior project focuses on addressing the following two questions: 1. Does BMP adoption at a given farm make the individual farm household better or worse off from an economic perspective? 2. How much will it cost the government to get farms to adopt BMPs under different payment programs? Since producer heterogeneity is key to understanding the performance of conservation auctions, we examined the costs and benefits of BMPs at the individual farm level and developed on-farm costs for each BMP for each producer in the watershed. The basic components of the model are described below, however the details including underlying assumptions regarding baseline farm behavior, are outlined within the body of the report. We used the on-farm cost model to generate aggregate cost functions for BMPs for the watershed and to parameterize the policy experiments related to conservation auctions. Preliminary estimates of environmental benefits of individual BMP adoption were provided by Dr. Wanhong Yang using results from a SWAT model developed under a separate component of the South Tobacco Creek WEBS project. Based on this information, we were able to evaluate the performance of various auction formats in terms of cost effectiveness, distribution of payments amongst producers, and environmental benefit. The results from the Farm behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek project are preliminary, and are currently being refined. Therefore it is difficult to draw generalized conclusions at this point. Further experiments are being conducted to complete the data collection during FY 08-09 through Interim WEBS funding. Nonetheless main findings to date are summarized below: 1. The four BMPs assessed differ in terms of their cost as well as their ability to deliver environmental benefits. Unfortunately, there is no BMP that dominates across farms at all abatement levels. Farms have heterogeneous costs in terms of BMPs, and some farms are cost effective at supplying abatement using one BMP, but not another. 2. This suggests that if water quality benefits (e.g. phosphorous reduction) can be qualified through modeling by BMP and by farm, then water quality should be the contracting unit for the auction rather than the BMP. This would allow producers to select the most effective BMP for supplying water quality benefits, and then decision makers could allocate contracts based on ranking the costs of abatement. 3. At the next stage of the research we will test for synergies between farms -- ie, whether the joint production function for water quality between farms differs from the sum of individual production functions. This will have implications for how the payment scheme should be designed. 4. Incorporating 'fairness' types of allocation rules for conservation dollars, such as maximum participation in conservation programs is inefficient in terms of cost and environmental benefits. If fairness, or using conservation payments as a form of extension to learn about on farm costs of BMPs is the goal of the auction, then fixed payment programs which are open to everyone may be more desirable. 5. The performance of the auction depends on the shape of the cost function for BMPs and/or pollution abatement, as well as whether uniform (pay everyone the highest bid) or discriminatory pricing (pay everyone their own bid) rules are applied. In future research we will be investigating to what extent we can generalize results about the performance of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules in this context. In conclusion, this research has allowed us to investigate individually the performance of incentive payments for individual BMPs. The results of the analysis provide us with a baseline of information by which we can begin to assess more complex conservation program issues, such as how to optimally select multiple BMPs within the watershed, and whether/how to spatially target BMPs.