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Contemporary legal theory recognizes three primary methods of controling administrative discretion: confining through substantive standards, structuring through procedural requirements, and checking through bureaucratic review. It is sometimes assumed that these techniques operate independently and that their effects are additive. This article reports on a study of Federal Trade Commission policy‐making and concludes that in some instances there can be complex interactions among the legal techniques for controlling discretion, and between the legal techniques and political or bureaucratic forces shaping policy‐making discretion.

A common justification for the use of trial‐type procedures in administrative agency decisionmaking is the assertion that such procedures will help legitimize decisions or increase their acceptability. Writers who take this position often assume that members of affected interest groups have fixed attitudes toward decisionmaking procedures, that such attitudes are highly salient, and that perceptions of procedural acceptability will not be greatly influenced by the social setting. This article reports on the results of a survey administered to witnesses in federal agency rulemaking proceedings which indicate that procedural attitudes have low salience, are mobilizable rather than fixed, and are strongly influenced by the activities of intermediary organizations such as trade associations and public interest groups. These findings imply particular strategies for designing and implementing regulatory procedures.