Suchergebnisse

Cet article étudie comment et pourquoi, pendant la deuxième moitié des années 1980, la France de François Mitterrand en est venue à faire de l'avancée de l'Europe monétaire une priorité absolue du projet européen. Il retrace le cheminement qui a permis aux dirigeants français d'obtenir qu'une RFA à l'origine réticente à cette perspective consente à cet objectif au Conseil européen de Strasbourg en décembre 1989, lors duquel Helmut Kohl donna son accord définitif. Trois moments sont discernables dans ce qui fut, avant tout, une dynamique franco-allemande : le temps de la relance européenne (1984-1986), occasion de remettre la dimension monétaire à l'agenda ; celui de l'accélération du dossier sur fond d'une nouvelle dynamique franco-allemande (1986-1988) ; celui enfin de son aboutissement, du Conseil européen de Hanovre à celui de Strasbourg (1988-1989).

This is the second of two articles exploring efforts at bridging the nuclear weapons gap between France and West Germany during the final decade of the Cold War. This gap existed in various ways: in the two countries' respective international standing, with the relationship between Paris and Bonn complicated by France's possession of nuclear weapons; in their alliance choices, with their differing approaches to NATO military integration and strategy; and in their tactical nuclear military options (inseparable from conventional options), with the two countries fundamentally at odds over desirable procedures. The first article, published in the previous issue of the JCWS, explores the period from 1981 to 1986. This follow-on article covers the years 1986 to 1990. Although ultimately the dilemmas of nuclear sharing proved impossible to resolve, progress was made in the final years of the Cold War in narrowing differences between the two countries, whose bilateral relationship has been crucial for Europe and the West as a whole in the post–Cold War era.

This article explores efforts at bridging the nuclear gap between France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) during the last decade of the Cold War. It does so by examining the various manifestations of this gap: the two sides' relative international standing in light of France's possession of nuclear weapons and the FRG's decision to forswear them; the two countries' different commitments to the military components of NATO; their shared but differing aspirations for a more autonomous Western Europe; and their differing outlooks on conventional and tactical nuclear military options, an issue on which they found it particularly hard to reconcile their views. Ultimately, they were not able to overcome the dilemmas of nuclear sharing, but progress was made during that crucial period in narrowing the differences between these two important countries whose bilateral relationship was essential for the West at large.

This article explores the interactions between French and Soviet leaders at the end of the Cold War when they were confronted by German reunification. This important dimension of the events of 1989–1990 has been largely neglected up to now. Although allegations of Franco-Soviet collusion against German reunification have long been widespread, the evidence presented here from declassified French, Soviet, and West German sources shows that the two countries in fact failed to cooperate to shape the modalities and outcome of these processes despite the close relationship that by then prevailed between French President François Mitterrand and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Although for decades Paris and Moscow had shared the objective of avoiding a disruptive settlement of the German question, and although both leaders were initially deeply troubled by the pace of events, they did not agree about the fundamental issue of German self-determination and did not share an understanding of the international conditions required for German reunification. Even more critically, they had different visions of the transformation of the European security system that should accompany it.