Suchergebnisse

Thanks to research conducted in the past few years, our understanding has been significantly expanded concerning democracy and authoritarian regimes, as well as the means of both destroying and rebuilding democratic institutions. While there is a clear link between a developed economy and democracy, the relationship is not self-evident in all cases. Also, economic growth is not conducive to the development of democracy under all circumstances, especially when the distribution of wealth is not considered fair by all citizens. In and of itself an election, even a competitive one-long considered a democratic minimum-does not guarantee the survival of a democracy, as strongmen have learned how to run an authoritarian system behind an electoral veil. The majority of autocratic leaders use the concept of democracy as a screen for building a political regime antithetical to the spirit and practice of a real democracy. Autocrats adopt a number of democratic institutions only to subvert their original purposes. While they pose as democrats, instead of a liberal democracy they initially organize a majoritarian democracy, followed by an illiberal democracy that ignores human rights. This is but one step away from an autocratic turning point, the rejection of all democratic principles. 'Potemkin democracies' may even hold (limited) open elections organized so that the outcome will not threaten the foundations of the existing regime. Adapted from the source document.

Populist rhetoric always promises a new, more inclusive political community but very often this only achieves new ways of exclusion. Populism is one of the most flexible terms in the history of ideas and in political science therefore it can often co-exist with different regimes and ideologies. In the case of Hungary, populism appeared first as a reaction to Western capitalism and to the lost World War I, and offered a dream-like "garden country" against major international regimes, totalitarian or democratic. However, populism changed its character from time to time: it revived nationalism in the communist period, it expressed reservations to the elite-driven regime change, it featured anti-liberalism, and finally it presented itself as a renewed rhetoric of "nationalist neoliberalism". Among the several understandings of populism, Edward Shils' definition is accepted – this states that in populist discourse the will of the people enjoys top priority in the face of any other principle, right or institutional standard. Populism identifies the people with justice and morality. The discourse analytic approach to populism is broad enough to discuss different historical epochs with regard to populism without inflating the concept.

"Seit ihrem Amtsantritt im April 2010 baut die Regierung unter Viktor Orbán das politische System Ungarns um. Sie rückt von den Prinzipien des liberalen Rechtstaats ab. Im Namen der 'Mehrheitsdemokratie' hat sie die Gewaltenteilung geschwächt, den Staat zentralisiert und die Macht des Ministerpräsidenten ausgeweitet. Die tieferen Ursachen dieser Wende liegen in den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Strukturdefiziten Ungarns. Entstanden ist nun eine illiberale Demokratie. Es besteht die Gefahr, dass diese sich in ein hybrides Regime verwandelt, in dem Elemente der Demokratie mit Elementen autoritärer Herrschaft verschmelzen. Das wäre in der EU ein Präzedenzfall." (Autorenreferat)

Since taking office in April 2010, the government under Viktor Orban has been restructuring Hungary's political system. It is moving away from the principles of a liberal constitutional state. In the name of "majority democracy", the government has weakened the separation of powers, centralized the state, and expanded the prime minister's powers. The root causes of this change lie in the Hungary's political and social structural deficiencies. An illiberal democracy has now come into being. There is a risk that this will turn into a hybrid regime in which elements of democracy merge with elements of authoritarian rule. This would set a precedent in the European Union. Adapted from the source document.

The political turn of 1998 in post-transition Hungary marked the beginning of a new era: the rise of the New Right. Fidesz, which used to be a liberal party during the regime change of 1989, later changed its political stance. Under the presidency of Viktor Orban, Fidesz became a centre-right party by adopting a mixed ideology that contained contradictory elements. The reason for Fidesz's electoral success in 1998 was that it responded to the social need for order and democratic consolidation after the turbulent years of political and economic transformation. However, the years when Fidesz governed Hungary (1998-2002) could be characterized by both conservative consolidation and populist mass mobilization. Voters could not fully understand why the rhetoric of 'second revolution' would lead to the consolidation of democracy. This sort of contradictory agenda-setting from above alienated the majority of voters in the 2002 elections so Fidesz was replaced by the returning MSZP-SZDSZ left-liberal coalition government. Despite two electoral losses (2002 and 2006), Fidesz created a second political culture, an alternative polity that established itself as the Hungarian version of the New Right, a mixture of populism, conservatism, and plebeian, redistributionist, economic nationalism. The emergence of the Hungarian New Right reinterpreted social conflicts, and sharpened political division in the society. Adapted from the source document.

The political turn of 1998 in post-transition Hungary marked the beginning of a new era: the rise of the New Right. Fidesz, which used to be a liberal party during the regime change of 1989, later changed its political stance. Under the presidency of Viktor Orban, Fidesz became a centre-right party by adopting a mixed ideology that contained contradictory elements. The reason for Fidesz's electoral success in 1998 was that it responded to the social need for order and democratic consolidation after the turbulent years of political and economic transformation. However, the years when Fidesz governed Hungary (1998-2002) could be characterized by both conservative consolidation and populist mass mobilization. Voters could not fully understand why the rhetoric of 'second revolution' would lead to the consolidation of democracy. This sort of contradictory agenda-setting from above alienated the majority of voters in the 2002 elections so Fidesz was replaced by the returning MSZP-SZDSZ left-liberal coalition government. Despite two electoral losses (2002 and 2006), Fidesz created a second political culture, an alternative polity that established itself as the Hungarian version of the New Right, a mixture of populism, conservatism, and plebeian, redistributionist, economic nationalism. The emergence of the Hungarian New Right reinterpreted social conflicts, and sharpened political division in the society. Adapted from the source document.

In his paper, the author intends to explore the problems arising from this consolidation of democracy, with special attention to the New Right that ruled Hungary between 1998 and 2002. The New Right coalition government attempted to consolidate by means of a "second revolution", which, however, led to its election defeat. According to the author, one of the lessons to be learned from the 1998-2002 electoral period is that in democracy, political and cultural communities are two different things. The New Right government, however, wanted to restructure the cultural community according to a right-wing cultural value-system, and by doing so it suggested that whoever failed to agree with that could not be a member of the political community. Adapted from the source document.

"Die Herausforderungen für Ungarn und für die anderen mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Beitrittsländer in den letzten zehn Jahren waren gewaltig. Es ging um die vollständige Transformation eines gesellschaftlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Regimes und die Rückkehr nach Europa. Dieser Wandel in einer derart kurzen Zeitspanne ist ohne historisches Beispiel. Der EU-Beitritt stellt Ungarn und die anderen Beitrittsländer erneut vor die Herausforderung einer Mitgliedschaft ohne (innere) Zugehörigkeit." (Autorenreferat)

In East Central European research, elite theory was revived in the late 1990s when it appeared that political transition & elite transformation were parallel processes & social science research shifted from focus on structure to actor. The most important theories on elite transformation are described & analyzed. Scholars like Elemer Hankiss saw the privatization system as the vehicle by which top Communist elites could retain power. Later scholars, like G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi, & E. Townsley, introduced the theory of post-communist managerialism in which a new class of elites existed. Jucek Wasilewski (2001) identified three phases of social & political changes in East Central Eruope -- transition, transformation, & consolidation -- & the elites accompanying these phases. Most of the elite research was produced by Poland & Hungary. Elite research may be supplanted soon with class analysis as these countries join the European Union. Tables, References. M. Pflum