Estimating policy positions of political actors across countries and time
In: Working paper Nr. 153
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In: Working paper Nr. 153
In: Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen: ZIB, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 85-101
ISSN: 0946-7165
In: Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen: ZIB, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 85-102
ISSN: 0946-7165
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 173-191
ISSN: 1460-3667
Spatial models of simple majority rule voting suggest that stable decisions are not likely to exist under normal circumstances. Yet this instability result stands in contrast to the stability observed in experiments. This article examines the effect of relaxing the assumption that voting is costless by requiring a proposal to be a finite distance closer to a member's ideal point than the pending proposal before it is regarded as attractive. Using the concept of the epsilon-core the article estimates the minimal decision costs that guarantee stable outcomes. It shows that the minimal costs are equal to the minimal finagle radius (Wuffle et al., 1989) and that the epsilon-core contains the finagle point which is close to the center of the yolk. While the analytical model establishes that the minimal costs are smaller than the yolk radius, computational simulations of majority voting by committees of size 3 to 101 suggest that this is a weak upper bound, only, as the ratio of minimal costs to the yolk radius usually is small and decreases as committee size approaches infinity.
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 173-192
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 3-4, S. 409-429
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie: KZfSS, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 175-176
ISSN: 1861-891X
In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie: KZfSS, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 175-176
ISSN: 0023-2653
In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 3, S. 409-430
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: British journal of political science, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 681-703
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article analyses the origins and consequences of multicameral representation and voting in international organizations. It is argued that the existence of visible and durable conflicts in an issue area can make standard procedures such as unicameral majority voting ineffective with respect to the functioning of the regime. Applying spatial models of strategic decision making, it is asserted that multicameralism is more likely to be effective than unicameralism if chambers consist of key groups with distinct interests. Empirical evidence is provided by studying the multicameral voting rule in the Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). I compare likely decision-making outcomes under unicameral and multicameral voting rules from 1996 to 2002 and find that multicameral outcomes are more likely to be stable and supported by those actors critical for the effective functioning of the regime.
In: European political science: EPS, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 19-24
ISSN: 1682-0983
In: British journal of political science, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 681-703
ISSN: 0007-1234
This article analyses the origins and consequences of multicameral representation and voting in international organizations. It is argued that the existence of visible and durable conflicts in an issue area can make standard procedures such as unicameral majority voting ineffective with respect to the functioning of the regime. Applying spatial models of strategic decision making, it is asserted that multicameralism is more likely to be effective than unicameralism if chambers consist of key groups with distinct interests. Empirical evidence is provided by studying the multicameral voting rule in the Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). I compare likely decision-making outcomes under unicameral and multicameral voting rules from 1996 to 2002 and find that multicameral outcomes are more likely to be stable and supported by those actors critical for the effective functioning of the regime. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: European political science: EPS ; serving the political science community ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research
ISSN: 1680-4333
In: Mannheimer Beiträge zur politischen Soziologie und positiven politischen Theorie 2