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This book analyses public sector reform comprehensively in all parts of China's public sector - government bureaucracy, public service units and state-owned enterprises. It argues that reform of the public sector has become an issue of great concern to the Chinese leaders, who realize that efficient public administration is key to securing the regime's governing capacity and its future survival. The book shows how thinking about public sector reform has shifted in recent decades from a quantitative emphasis on 'small government', which involved the reduction in size of what was perceived as a.

AbstractAs a result of economic reform and administrative restructuring in China, a number of powerful state-owned business groups ("national champions") have emerged within sectors of strategic importance. They are headed by a new corporate elite which enjoys unprecedentedly high levels of remuneration and managerial independence from government agencies and which derives legitimacy from symbolizing China's economic rise. However, through thenomenklaturasystem, the Party controls the appointment of the CEOs and presidents of the most important of these enterprises and manages a cadre transfer system which makes it possible to transfer/rotate business leaders to take up positions in state and Party agencies. In order to conceptualize the coexistence of the contradicting forces for further enterprise autonomy and continued central control that characterizes the evolving relationship between business groups and the Party-state, this paper proposes the notion of integrated fragmentation.

The recent Bo Xilai affair has created strains in the Chinese political system and has intensified the power struggle concerning the new leadership appointments due to take place at the 18th Party Congress. The pressure on the political system is intensified by a number of social phenomena such as increased fragmentation, vested interests, corruption, social unrest, increased income and social inequalities and a de facto reform stop since 2009. Some scholars believe that we now see the end of 'resilient authoritarianism' and that China either will experience a political and social collapse or move towards a democratic system. However, developments since 1989 show the regime's amazing ability to revitalize its organizational capabilities and regain its Mandate of Heaven. It may be too early to declare the Party over.

It is the object of considerable debate in Western scholarship whether an authoritarian political order dominated by a strong communist party can continue to exist in China given the many challenges stemming from internal reform and the impact of globalization. Will China eventually turn democratic and will the communist party become obsolete and disappear, just as has happened in many other former communist countries. There seems to be a general consensus that Chinese political system is bound to change, but there is no agreement as to the direction and form of change.

Denmark was among the first countries in the world to recognize the People's Republic of China. The created a good foundation for the development of a special relationship between China and Denmark, culminating in Prime Minister, Poul Hartling's meeting with Mao in October 1974 and characterized by further intensification of political, economic and cultural relations from the beginning of the 1980s. The recent agreement to establish a joint Sino-Danish University Centre in Beijing constitutes yet another high point. However, there have also been incidents of tension and conflict. This paper will especially address three of these incidents: the "cartoon crisis" of August 1967, the Danish criticism of China's human rights record in the spring of 1997, and the controversy relating to the Dalai Lama's visit to Denmark in May 2009. It is argued that the costs of pursuing a policy towards China based on normative considerations have become too high and is difficult to harmonize with a new Danish foreign policy of active internationalism.

At the Third Plenum held in November 2013, the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a comprehensive reform programme containing no less than 300 reform proposals. It is potentially the most important reform document to have been passed by the CPC since the landmark Third Plenum in December 1978. Entitled 'The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Important Questions Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform', the programme upgrades the role of the market in the general economic system from 'basic' to 'decisive'. It also stipulates a number of reform measures within finance, banking, tax, real estate, hukou, urbanisation, government administration, family planning, etc., and establishes two new important leading bodies. One is The Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform and the other is the National Security Council. Xi Jinping is named chairman of both of these new powerful institutions. This indicates his increasingly dominant role in Chinese politics. The reform programme aims to create a more open and market-regulated Chinese economy by 2020, although without dismantling the guiding role of the state-owned economy. The article argues that implementation of the new ambitious goals will be met by resistance from entrenched vested interests. In the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector powerful actors and interests will try to preserve the status quo. Some private investment will be allowed in publicly-owned entities in order to create enterprises characterised by mixed ownership. However, in key sectors of the economy SOEs will still enjoy a monopoly and will not be exposed to free market competition.