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Ever since the Supreme Court's 1829 decision in Foster v. Neilson, it has been settled that some treaties ratified by the United States are "non-self-executing" and thus are not enforceable in U.S. courts unless implemented by Congress. Despite its pedigree, both the theory behind the self-execution doctrine and its mechanics have long befuddled courts and commentators. There is significant uncertainty, for example, concerning the materials that are relevant to the self-execution analysis, whose intent should count in determining self-executing status, the proper presumption that should be applied with respect to self-execution, and the domestic legal status of a non-self-executing treaty.

Under contemporary treaty practice, a nation's signature of a treaty typically does not make the nation a party to the treaty. Rather, nations become parties to treaties through an act of ratification or accession, which sometimes occurs long after signature. Nevertheless, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which many commentators regard as reflecting customary international law, provides that when a nation signs a treaty it is obligated to refrain from actions that would defeat the "object and purpose" of the treaty until such time as it makes clear its intent not to become a party to the treaty. Some commentators further claim that this object and purpose obligation means that a nation that has signed a treaty is prohibited either from violating the treaty altogether or from violating the treaty's "core" or "important" provisions. Attaching legal obligations to the signing of a treaty, however, poses a constitutional issue for the United States because the U.S. Constitution divides the treaty power between the President and Senate, whereas only the President and his agents are involved in the signing of treaties. This constitutional issue has broad significance because, for a variety of political and other reasons, the United States often signs but fails to ratify treaties. The constitutional issue is not eliminated by the president's authority to conclude "sole executive agreements," since both constitutional structure and historical practice suggest that this authority is significantly narrower than the power of the President and Senate to jointly conclude treaties. The drafting history of Article 18, however, offers a partial solution to this difficulty, since it indicates that the object and purpose obligation was intended to prohibit only actions that would substantially undermine the parties' ability to comply with or benefit from a treaty after ratification, an obligation that has little relevance to the treaties for which signing obligations would be most constitutionally problematic.

Many commentators argued that a central problem with the government's actions after the attacks of September 11, 2001, was executive unilateralism. For example, in criticizing President George W. Bush's initial effort to establish military commissions to try terrorists, Professors Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe argued that, "in the absence of an emergency that threatens truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution's text, structure, and logic demand approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly curtailed or abridged." These commentators therefore invited the courts to play a "democracy-forcing" role to prompt greater congressional participation, through, in particular, the application of "clear statement" requirements. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court accepted this invitation. In holding that the military commission system that President Bush had established to try terrorist detainees was invalid, the Court relied on what it believed to be restrictions in the Uniform Code of Militaryjustice (U.C.M.J.), a statute that is of course subject to amendment by Congress. Thus, as Justice Stephen Breyer and other Justices noted in a concurrence, "Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary."

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669.United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2006.In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and that U.S. states may apply their regular procedural default rules to bar claims brought under Article 36. The Court reached the latter conclusion despite contrary reasoning by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that when one party country arrests nationals of another party country, it shall inform the foreign nationals without delay that they have the right to have their consulate notified of the arrest, and to communicate with the consulate. Article 36(2) adds that these rights "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended." The United States ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969, along with a protocol to the Convention providing that disputes between nations arising under the treaty could be heard in the ICJ.

A recent debate about the Bush administration's use of presidential signing statements has raised questions about their function, legality, and value. We argue that presidential signing statements are legal and that they provide a useful way for the president to disclose his views about the meaning and constitutionality of legislation. In addition, basic tenets of positive political theory suggest that signing statements do not undermine the separation of powers or the legislative process and that, under certain circumstances, they can provide relevant evidence of statutory meaning. Although President Bush has raised many more constitutional challenges within his signing statements than prior presidents have, at least on their face these challenges are similar to challenges made by other recent presidents, such as President Clinton. Whether Bush's views of executive power are significantly different from Clinton's, and if so, whether they are inferior, remain open questions, but these issues are independent of whether signing statements are lawful.