Ever since the Supreme Court's 1829 decision in Foster v. Neilson, it has been settled that some treaties ratified by the United States are "non-self-executing" and thus are not enforceable in U.S. courts unless implemented by Congress. Despite its pedigree, both the theory behind the self-execution doctrine and its mechanics have long befuddled courts and commentators. There is significant uncertainty, for example, concerning the materials that are relevant to the self-execution analysis, whose intent should count in determining self-executing status, the proper presumption that should be applied with respect to self-execution, and the domestic legal status of a non-self-executing treaty.
Many commentators argued that a central problem with the government's actions after the attacks of September 11, 2001, was executive unilateralism. For example, in criticizing President George W. Bush's initial effort to establish military commissions to try terrorists, Professors Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe argued that, "in the absence of an emergency that threatens truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution's text, structure, and logic demand approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly curtailed or abridged." These commentators therefore invited the courts to play a "democracy-forcing" role to prompt greater congressional participation, through, in particular, the application of "clear statement" requirements. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court accepted this invitation. In holding that the military commission system that President Bush had established to try terrorist detainees was invalid, the Court relied on what it believed to be restrictions in the Uniform Code of Militaryjustice (U.C.M.J.), a statute that is of course subject to amendment by Congress. Thus, as Justice Stephen Breyer and other Justices noted in a concurrence, "Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary."