Parsing the Commander in Chief Power: Three Distinctions
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 100, S. 331-332
ISSN: 2169-1118
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In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 100, S. 331-332
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 98, S. 341-343
ISSN: 2169-1118
Reviewing, Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (2000).
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In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 100, Heft 4, S. 882-888
ISSN: 2161-7953
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669.United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2006.In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and that U.S. states may apply their regular procedural default rules to bar claims brought under Article 36. The Court reached the latter conclusion despite contrary reasoning by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that when one party country arrests nationals of another party country, it shall inform the foreign nationals without delay that they have the right to have their consulate notified of the arrest, and to communicate with the consulate. Article 36(2) adds that these rights "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended." The United States ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969, along with a protocol to the Convention providing that disputes between nations arising under the treaty could be heard in the ICJ.
A recent debate about the Bush administration's use of presidential signing statements has raised questions about their function, legality, and value. We argue that presidential signing statements are legal and that they provide a useful way for the president to disclose his views about the meaning and constitutionality of legislation. In addition, basic tenets of positive political theory suggest that signing statements do not undermine the separation of powers or the legislative process and that, under certain circumstances, they can provide relevant evidence of statutory meaning. Although President Bush has raised many more constitutional challenges within his signing statements than prior presidents have, at least on their face these challenges are similar to challenges made by other recent presidents, such as President Clinton. Whether Bush's views of executive power are significantly different from Clinton's, and if so, whether they are inferior, remain open questions, but these issues are independent of whether signing statements are lawful.
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In: American journal of international law, Band 100, Heft 4, S. 911-917
ISSN: 0002-9300
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 80, Heft 2, S. 188
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: American journal of international law, Band 98, Heft 1, S. 200
ISSN: 0002-9300