Suchergebnisse

In late January, Miguel Rocha de Rocha (a Nova SBE alumnus now running the economics department at Evora University) asked me for an updated publication list - just before faculty home pages were discontinued. After quickly selecting 292 entries from my website (266 academic titles and 26 policy documents) and pointing to popular writings and media appearances of similar magnitude, I could not resist the urge of double checking and wondered whether this could take the form of a Working Paper. Encouraged by the librarian to submit the result, I soon realized that the total came to four digits, even leaving out all most political documents and communications while I held elected office. The result is listed in two tables, the first one with the nine types he suggested (roughly books, journal articles and short writings), the second with print, radio and TV, fetched from often cryptic entries in diaries. It is prefaced by a curriculum vitae, minimally updating the one I had written and posted over ten years ago ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The virtuous cycle between development success and foreign policy in Cape Verde reflects a positive interaction between globalization and governance. Development success under globalization entails positive market perceptions regarding the orientation and predictability of policies as well as the accompanying institutional arrangements, thereby making foreign policy salient beyond the comparator group, or "aspirational". Even if there is no universally applicable development model, an aspirational foreign policy can be built on positive rankings with respect to comparator groups. In Macedo and Pereira (2010), macrolevel policy and institutional combinations underpinning trade diversification and income convergence in West and Southern Africa are used to establish development success for Cape Verde and Mozambique respectively. Here, the narrative of long-term development helps identify the following drivers: moving towards a market economy; opening up to regional and global trade; increasing economic and political freedom; pursuing macroeconomic stability and financial reputation; ensuring policy continuity (especially in trade and industrial sectors) and focusing on human development (especially poverty reduction and education). Looking at GDP per capita and indicators of financial reputation and good governance of sub-regional peers is not sufficient to conclude that Cape Verde's convergence will be sustained. Nevertheless, the positive interaction between trade and financial globalization, on the one hand, and democracy and good governance, on the other, have positive implications for the effectiveness of foreign policy across the region as well as in the Portuguese-speaking community.

Une vue comparative sur la complémentarité des réformes La soutenabilité d'un processus de réformes dépend da la complémentarité des poli- tiques une intéraction positive avec le taux de croissance se dégage de l'expérience des nouveaux membres de l'Union Européenne. L'architecture des réformes est égale- ment utile pour comprendre les effets du changement de régime suite à l'union monétaire, ce qui est illustré par l'expérience portugaise après la signature du traité de Maastricht

This study examines the role of monetary & fiscal policies in Portuguese economic regime change, which culminated in the entry of the escudo into the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) of the EMS (European Monetary System) in 1992. It measures trends in nominal & real convergence & attributes the current divergence to the resilience of the fiscal constitution. In addition, it discusses the structural changes achieved during the period of convergence & those still needed for Portugal to avoid suffering the "euro hold-up." It illustrates the limits of external pressure & the constraints imposed by the historical fiscal model. Indeed, the Portuguese experience shows that the euro, by itself, cannot change the fiscal constitution. Different policy areas need specific reform efforts; otherwise, they stall & affect each other in a negative way. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

Portugal joined the European Community in 1985, when the national economy was subject to an inflationary environment and recurrent political and financial crises. In April 1992, only a few months before the pound and the lira floated, the escudo pegged to the ECU. The timing of entry is now bearing fruit as the escudo is likely to be part of the euro with less than seven years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System (ERM). This was achieved without speculative attacks even though the change in regime towards stability-oriented macroeconomic policies was completed when the ERM parity grid experienced successive crises, Bringing the "stability culture" to the southwestern periphery in the early I 990s was politically controversial because economy and society were so used- to currency devaluation. Before joining the ERM, the exchange rate regime featured the successive imposition and relaxation of capital controls_ Wage increases and interest rates diverged in 1990/91, before converging to the average of the European Union. The deficit rose in 1991 and in 1993/94, due to electoral and business cycles, while a "double dip" in relative labour productivity growth confused firms and trade unions used to the high positive rates of the late 1980s. Tension between the treasury and the central bank accompanied the move to full currency convertibility in December 1992. The source of tension shifted then to the competence for banking supervision and lasted until June 1994 The proper response of the escudo to successive realignments of the peseta also caused strain until it became clear that the chosen policy did not generate expectations of further depreciation Indeed the covered interest differential against the dollar and the DMark declined steadily from a 1991 peak and volatility in the daily escudo-DMark rate is now lower than when the central bank controlled the currency and attempted to shadow the DMark. The understanding by the Portuguese authorities of the ERM code of conduct as they prepared to join after the 1991 general elections made it possible to acquire financial reputation very quickly. The multilateral surveillance procedures it implies enhanced national credibility abroad even before the policy was accepted at home. As the prime minister brought continuity to the gradual regime change, it was possible for his successive finance ministers to alternate in implementing structural reforms with high external visibility and holding the line domestically. The reconquest of stability implied disposing of the teams who carried out the reforms in the vicinity of local elections in 1989 and 1993 to stress the predominance of domestic objectives. The socialist government has fully accepted the new economic regime and now claims the euro as one its great achievements! Given the fact that there were no reforms before the reshuffle preceding the 1997 local elections, the pressure to step up structural reforms should increase in the run up to EMU. Otherwise the benefits of joining the euro might be "held up" by the inability to use the stability culture as a source of enhanced competitiveness for Portuguese business worldwide. ; N/A