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"In two canonical decisions of the 1920s--Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters--the Supreme Court announced that family (including certain relations within it) was an institution falling under the Constitution's protective umbrella. Since then, proponents of "family values" have claimed that a timeless form of family--nuclear and biological--is crucial to the constitutional order. Mark Brandon's new book, however, challenges these claims. Brandon addresses debates currently roiling America--the regulation of procreation, the roles of women, the education of children, divorce, sexuality, and the meanings of marriage. He also takes on claims of scholars who attribute modern change in family law to mid-twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions upholding privacy. He shows that the "constitutional" law of family has much deeper roots. Offering glimpses into American households across time, Brandon looks at the legal and constitutional norms that have aimed to govern those households and the lives within them. He argues that, well prior to the 1960s, the nature of families in America had been continually changing--especially during western expansion, but also in the founding era. He further contends that the monogamous nuclear family was codified only at the end of the nineteenth century as a response to Mormon polygamy, communal experiments, and Native American households. Brandon discusses the evolution of familial jurisprudence as applied to disputes over property, inheritance, work, reproduction, the status of women and children, the regulation of sex, and the legal limits to and constitutional significance of marriage.

In their introduction to a fine new edition of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop claim that "[i]f the twentieth century has been an American century, it is because the work of America. has been to keep democracy strong where it is alive and to promote it where it is weak or nonexistent." By "democracy" they doubtless intend something akin to "constitutional democracy," "liberal democracy," or "republican government." I take each of these to be a rough proxy for a constitutionalist system that includes (1) institutions authorized by and accountable to the people (both in the making of the order and in the regular operation of government); (2) some notion of limited government (whether by the designation of purposes for governmental action, the specification of rights, or the allocation of authority among institutions); and (3) rule of law (which connotes the regularization of processes by which public norms are made and applied). Whatever the precise contours of the concept, the claim that the success and strength of the United States derive from a commitment to democracy (or, as I shall use it here, constitutionalism), has an almost intuitive appeal. It is my sense, however, that even a cursory look at the United States' record of diplomatic, military, and covert initiatives- the regimes it has supported, opposed, or toppled, and how and why it has done so-would raise doubts about that commitment. In this essay, I give voice to those doubts. I first observe that much of the history of American prominence-even pre-eminence-in the world is a story as much of military conflict as of constitutionalism. Second, I argue that the nation's persistent engagement in military conflict is constitutionally significant. By "significant" I have in mind two measures, although I do not attempt to specify them precisely in this essay. One is that the persistent use of force has altered consequentially the norms and institutions that constitute the United States. The other is ...

The many questions that surround movements for secession and self-determination are both practically urgent and theoretically perplexing. The United States settled its secession crisis in the 1860s. But the trauma and unfinished business of those events are still with us. Around the world secession and self-determination are the key issues that cause strife and instability. This volume provides an unusually comprehensive consideration of the many challenges of law and political philosophy that accompany them, and offers theoretical insights that provide guidance for policy. Among the questions considered are: should the international community recognize a right to secede and, if so, what conditions must be satisfied before the right can be asserted? Should secession and its conditions be recognized within domestic constitutions? Secession is the most extreme form of political separation and there are modes of self-determination short of it, including indigenous peoples' self-government and minority language rights. To what degree can these intrastate autonomy arrangements help ameliorate the injustices faced by indigenous groups?

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I -- War and the American Constitutional Order -- Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism -- Accommodating Emergencies -- Part II -- Counter-Stories: Maintaining and Expanding Civil Liberties in Wartime -- Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime -- Part III -- The War Powers outside the Courts -- Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during Wartime -- Realizing Constitutional and International Norms in the Wake of September 11 -- Part IV -- The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights -- War, Crisis, and the Constitution -- Afterword: The Supreme Court's 2004 Decisions -- About the Contributors -- Index

What does it mean to have a constitution? Scholars and students associated with Walter Murphy at Princeton University have long asked this question in their exploration of constitutional politics and judicial behavior. These scholars, concerned with the making, maintenance, and deliberate change of the Constitution, have made unique and significant contributions to our understanding of American constitutional law by going against the norm of court-centered and litigation-minded research. Beginning in the late 1970s, this new wave of academics explored questions ranging from the nature of creating the U.S. Constitution to the philosophy behind amending it. In this collection, Sotirios A. Barber and Robert P. George bring together fourteen essays by members of this Princeton group--some of the most distinguished scholars in the field. These works consider the meaning of having a constitution, the implications of particular choices in the design of constitutions, and the meaning of judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution. The overarching ambition of this collection is to awaken a constitutionalist consciousness in its readers--to view themselves as potential makers and changers of constitutions, as opposed to mere subjects of existing arrangements. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Walter F. Murphy, John E. Finn, Christopher L. Eisgruber, James E. Fleming, Jeffrey K. Tulis, Suzette Hemberger, Stephen Macedo, Sanford Levinson, H. N. Hirsch, Wayne D. Moore, Keith E. Whittington, and Mark E. Brandon