Suchergebnisse

Belief system structure can be investigated by estimating belief systems as networks of interacting political attitudes, but we do not know if these estimates are replicable. In a sample of 31 countries from the World Values Survey (N = 52,826), I find that countries' belief system networks are relatively replicable in terms of connectivity, proportion of positive edges, some centrality measures (e.g., expected influence), and the estimates of individual edges. Betweenness, closeness, and strength centrality estimates are more unstable. Belief system networks estimated with smaller samples or in countries with more unstable political systems tend to be less replicable than networks estimated with larger samples in stable political systems. Although these analyses are restricted to the items available in the World Values Survey, they show that belief system networks can be replicable, but that this replicability is related to features of the study design and the political system.

An examination of the debate surrounding foreclosure assistance suggests that arguments vary in the extent that they suggest people facing foreclosure deserve assistance and whether the cause of the foreclosure is at the onset or offset of the foreclosure situation. Results from an experiment using a nationally representative sample suggest that people use the attributional evidence provided by onset- and offset-deservingness scenarios to determine their support for governmental and personal foreclosure assistance. Consistent with attribution theory, path analysis suggested that attributions of controllability and the associated emotions of anger and sympathy mediated the relationship between deservingness arguments and support for foreclosure assistance. Additionally, people who endorse conservatism were more likely to oppose foreclosure assistance. Ideological differences in perceived controllability, anger, and sympathy mediated the relationship between ideology and personal assistance and partially mediated the relationship between ideology and government assistance. Adapted from the source document.

In two questionnaire studies, participants rated whether disagreement about 95 attitude pairs or 190 individual attitudes were characterized by threat, complexity, morality, politics, and harm. The attitudes cover a range of different topics, from abstract concepts to social groups and political figures and are the same attitudes in the Attitudes, Identities, and Individual Differences Study (Hussey et al., 2018). The data sets include ratings of each attitude, as well as basic demographic information about the participants. Data can be combined with the Attitudes, Identities, and Individual Differences Study and can also be used to understand how some attitudes are perceived, which may be useful when planning studies.

We propose that individual differences in the resistance to social change and the acceptance of inequality can have divergent effects on legitimacy depending on the context. This possibility was tested in a sample of 27 European countries (N = 144 367) and across four experiments (total N = 475). Individual differences in the resistance to social change were related to higher levels of perceived legitimacy no matter the level of inequality of the society. Conversely, individual differences in the acceptance of inequality were related to higher levels of perceived legitimacy in unequal societies, but either a relationship near zero or the opposite relationship was found in more equal societies. These studies highlight the importance of distinguishing between individual differences that make up political ideology, especially when making predictions in diverse settings. © 2017 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology

Fundamentalism is consistently related to racial prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), yet the mechanisms for this relationship are unclear. We identify two core values of fundamentalism, authoritarianism and traditionalism, that independently contribute to the fundamentalism-racial prejudice relationship. We also contextualize the fundamentalism-racial prejudice relationship by suggesting that fundamentalists may show prejudice based on conceptions of African Americans as violating values but show tolerance when prejudice is less justifiable. These ideas are tested and confirmed using three data sets from the American National Election Studies. Across all three samples, fundamentalism is related to increases in symbolic racism but decreases in negative affect towards African Americans, and these relationships are mediated by both authoritarianism and traditionalism. Adapted from the source document.

Fundamentalism is consistently related to racial prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), yet the mechanisms for this relationship are unclear. We identify two core values of fundamentalism, authoritarianism and traditionalism, that independently contribute to the fundamentalism‐racial prejudice relationship. We also contextualize the fundamentalism‐racial prejudice relationship by suggesting that fundamentalists may show prejudice based on conceptions of African Americans as violating values but show tolerance when prejudice is less justifiable. These ideas are tested and confirmed using three data sets from the American National Election Studies. Across all three samples, fundamentalism is related to increases in symbolic racism but decreases in negative affect towards African Americans, and these relationships are mediated by both authoritarianism and traditionalism.

Research suggests that liberals and conservatives use different moral foundations to reason about moral issues (moral divide hypothesis). An alternative prediction is that observed ideological differences in moral foundations are instead driven by ingroup-versus-outgroup categorizations of competing political groups (political group conflict hypothesis). In two preregistered experiments (total N = 958), using experimentally manipulated measures of moral foundations, we test strong versions of both hypotheses and find partial support for both. Supporting the moral divide hypothesis, conservatives endorsed the binding foundations more strongly than liberals even when a moderate target group was explicitly specified. Supporting the political group conflict hypothesis, both conservatives and liberals endorsed moral foundations more when moral acts targeted ingroup versus outgroup members. These results have implications for improving measures of moral values and judgments and point to ways to enhance the effectiveness of strategies aimed at building bridges between people from different political camps.

People with different ideological identities differ in their values, personality, affect, and psychological motivations. These differences are observed on measures of practical and clinical importance and these differences are the central node tying together theories about the psychology of political ideology; however, they rest on a critical untested assumption: The measures are invariant across ideological groups. Here, we test this assumption across 28 constructs in data from the United States and the Netherlands. Measures are not invariant across ideological divisions. At the same time, estimates of ideological similarities and differences are largely similar before and after correcting for measurement noninvariance. This may give us increased confidence in the results from this research area, while simultaneously highlighting that some instance of noninvariance did change conclusions and that individual items are not always comparable across political groups.