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We experimentally study causal effects of competitive experience in markets with a short and a long side on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We find that market experience affects efficiency when traders previously competed in the same market on the same side. The effect is strong for market-loser pairs and also exists for market-winner pairs, albeit to a lesser extent. Cooperation efficiency is unaffected for pairs consisting of a market-winner and a market-loser. When traders did not interact on the same market before, efficiency of cooperation is higher for market-winner pairs, but only in the short run. The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support.

We use a game-theoretical model and results from laboratory experiments to study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favorable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a political process. This process involves two referenda, one at the level of the country as a whole and one at the level of the subordinated region. If the political process succeeds, then the new autonomy level is implemented. If this process fails, then both regions engage in a costly political conflict in which both sides can spend resources to win the upper hand. We show that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of our game the voting process leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts so that the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe frequent fighting involving high material losses.

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached. ; Financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (BEC 2003-00412), the Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (SEJ2005-01690), the Barcelona Economics program of CREA, the British Academy and the University of Nottingham is gratefully acknowledged.

Trabajo publicado como artículo en Economic Inquiry 43(3): 636-648 (2005).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi044 ; We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production. ; Financial support by the European Union through the TMR research network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238), the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (PB98-0465), and the University of Nottingham is gratefully acknowledged.

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in some public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment with strong punishment possibilities may lead to higher material payoffs but lower subjective well-being, in comparison with weaker punishment or no punishment possibilities at all. The more general motivation for our study stems from the notion that people's subjective well-being may be affected by the institutional environment they find themselves in. Our findings show that harsher punishment possibilities lead to significantly higher well-being, controlling for earnings and other relevant variables. These results complement the evidence on the neural basis of altruistic punishment reported in de Quervain et al. (2004).

We study how markets adjust to the entry of new firms under different conditions. Two incumbents face entry by three other firms. When firms' costs are equal, entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. With cost asymmetries, market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. Simultaneous entry is in the short run more favorable to consumers than sequential entry. A longer incumbency phase favors consumers after entry.

We study how financial incentives can be used to overcome a history of coordination failure using controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low, and play typically converges to an inefficient outcome. We then explore varying financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. An increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subjects have coordinated on a higher effort level, reductions in the incentives to coordinate have little effect on behavior.

Resumen del trabajo presentado en el 6th International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS), celebrado en Utrech (Países Bajos), del 2 al 4 de mayo de 2019 ; In a one-shot two-person lab experiment we study how behavior is affected by whether player 1 reads the message that player 2 has sent him/her. The issue of one's communication being considered is relevant in organizations, bargaining and in public decision-making. Our work is motivated by our general interest in how free-form communication affects economic behavior. We have data from three treatments: Optional Communication (N=220), Fixed Communication (N=110) and No Communication (N=110), with the two latter treatments acting as controls. The experiment has two stages. In stage 1 of Optional Communication, player 1 has to choose between two payoff distributions affecting both players 1 and 2. Before player 1 makes the decision, player 2 can send a free-form message to player 1. Before player 1 makes the decision he can choose to read the message or not. In stage 2, player 2 can reward or punish player 1. We study behavior in two different tasks, which differ in the two payoff distributions that are possible. In task 1 (task 2) player 1 has to choose between the following payoff distributions: A ($24, $6) and B ($18, $12) (A ($24, $6) B ($4, $26)). In task 1 player's 1 decision can be easily influenced by player 2's message, whereas in task 2 it seems less likely that player 1 can be influenced. The experiments were run at the MONLEE lab at Monash using z-tree. The results show that player 2's behavior is consistent with reacting differently to kind and unkind treatment and not by whether he/she is listened to or not. Player 1's behavior is consistent with curiosity or respect and not with the exploitation of moral wiggle room or self-image concerns. We relate our results to several models of social preferences.

Trabajo presentado en el European Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (EWEBE), organizado por la Universidad de Bologna los días 26 y 27 de mayo de 2017 con el título: The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavio.--Trabajo presentado en los Bilkent Microeconomics Seminars organizados por la Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey) el día 29 de noviembre de 2017 ; Inequalities in democracies are multi-faceted. They not only incorporate differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information and social influence. In a lab experiment, we study the interaction of these inequalities to provide a better understanding of socio-political tensions in modern societies. We identify the tragedy of the elite, the dilemma that privileged access to information about a fundamental state that mediates political conflict creates lying incentives for the better informed. In our experiment, an electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the world. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. We study four different communication protocols which vary the access to communication channels of the two groups and are meant to represent societies with different degrees of openness. We hypothesize that the deliberative structures affect group identities, preferences, and voting. Our observed outcomes largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis. ; The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair as well as from the Graduate School of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Universit¨at Hamburg. ; Peer reviewed