Suchergebnisse

The so-called "problem of personal identity" can be viewed
as either a metaphysical or an epistemological issue. Metaphysicians want
to know what it is for one individual to be the same person as
another. Epistemologists want to know how to decide if an
individual is the same person as someone else. These two problems converge
around evidence from mediumship and apparent reincarnation cases,
suggesting personal survival of bodily death and dissolution. These cases
make us wonder how it might be possible for a person to survive death and
either temporarily or permanently animate another body. And they make us
wonder how we could decide if such postmortem survival has actually
occurred. In this essay I argue, first, that metaphysical worries about
postmortem survival are less important than many have supposed. Next,
I'll consider briefly why cases suggesting postmortem survival can be
so intriguing and compelling, and I'll survey our principal
explanatory options and challenges. Then, I'll consider why we need
to be circumspect in our appraisal of evidence for mind-body correlations.
And finally, I'll try to draw a few tentative and provocative
conclusions.