Suchergebnisse

Departmental select committees are now the principal mechanism through which the House of Commons holds the executive to account. Ten years ago the Hansard Society's Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny (the Newton Commission) recommended a series of reforms to select committees including the introduction of core tasks. A decade on, however, many new demands have since been placed on committees, public expectation of them has been heightened, and yet resources are finite and will come under increasing pressure in the future as a result of budget cuts. As recommended at the end of the last Parliament by the Commons Liaison Committee, the time has therefore come to review the core tasks and the role and operation of select committees. This article outlines issues that such a review should explore in order to ensure further development of systematic departmental scrutiny and to make the most effective use of committee time and resources. It argues that select committees themselves need to be more accountable to MPs and the public and to be more self critical about what they do and how they do it. Adapted from the source document.

Private Members Bills (PMBs) should provide an important opportunity for backbench MPs to initiate legislative proposals as well as policy debate, to check the executive, and to respond to issues of public interest and concern. In recent decades, however, the number of PMBs receiving Royal Assent has steeply declined. Executive control of the timetable has strangled many, and procedural vulnerability has thwarted others, including many that enjoyed broad parliamentary support and commanded public interest. Despite many recent reforms in other areas of the legislative process, the executive and key parliamentary committees have proven impervious to calls for reform of the PMB process. But there are signs that this may be about to change in light of the parliamentary expenses scandal and the renewed interest in the role and function of MPs and the issue of trust and confidence in parliamentarians that this crisis has generated. This article outlines the current procedural problems with the system, explores what the benefits of an effective PMBs system are, analyses what the options for reform might be and how in light of changing political circumstances at Westminster, we might be on the cusp of much needed and potentially far reaching reform in this area. Adapted from the source document.