Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Who controls the IMF? -- Domestic interests and IMF programs -- The impact of the shareholders on IMF programs -- Testing the argument -- IMF lending -- IMF lending and the crisis in Europe -- IMF conditionality -- IMF conditionality and the Asian crisis -- Theory, evidence and reform

As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.

There is substantial evidence that International Monetary Fund policies are driven by the powerful states which intervene to align policy with their preferences. In particular, many have argued that the United States uses its position as the Fund's largest shareholder to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As a result, a substantial volume of literature argues and presents evidence to support the claim that International Monetary Fund decisions faithfully reflect US interests. My findings extend these claims. Using a new dataset on the presence in International Monetary Fund agreements of binding conditions, which cause the agreement to be suspended or terminated if they are not met, I demonstrate that International Monetary Fund agreements contain fewer binding conditions when a suspension of International Monetary Fund lending plausibly would impose greater hardship on creditor country banks and exporters. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

There is substantial evidence that International Monetary Fund policies are driven by the powerful states which intervene to align policy with their preferences. In particular, many have argued that the United States uses its position as the Fund's largest shareholder to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As a result, a substantial volume of literature argues and presents evidence to support the claim that International Monetary Fund decisions faithfully reflect US interests. My findings extend these claims. Using a new dataset on the presence in International Monetary Fund agreements of binding conditions, which cause the agreement to be suspended or terminated if they are not met, I demonstrate that International Monetary Fund agreements contain fewer binding conditions when a suspension of International Monetary Fund lending plausibly would impose greater hardship on creditor country banks and exporters.

In 2010, Ireland's financial crisis threatened the stability of the global financial system, precipitating an international rescue package of 85 billion euro. This article analyses the bailout from an international relations perspective in order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of the political pressures that forced the negotiators to compromise over the design and content of Ireland's programme of financial support. It does so by drawing on recent academic research on the politics of IMF decision-making. The lessons from this literature can help to shed light on one of the most important events in post-Independence Ireland.

The demise of the Celtic Tiger economy is one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in recent economic history. The catastrophic failure of the banking system and the deterioration of the domestic economy have left an indelible mark on society and precipitated a remarkable general election in 2011 (O'Leary, 2012, Irish Political Studies, 27(2), pp. 326–340). It has also raised many important questions. Why was it not anticipated? Why was Ireland so badly affected? And what political and economic reforms are necessary to prevent it from happening again? This research note contributes to the debate over the first question, namely the failure to anticipate the crisis, by analysing the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) annual surveillance reports of the Irish economy. The findings indicate that the IMF correctly identified many of the threats that were often ignored domestically, but that the quality of its consultations deteriorated in later years.