Suchergebnisse

In July 2019, world-renowned biological researchers Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng were quietly walked out of the Canadian government's National Microbiology Lab (NML). The original allegation against them was that Qiu had authorised a shipment ...

The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance—comprising the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia—has traditionally cooperated behind the scenes. But a recent public meeting of the group's intelligence chiefs in Silicon Valley was ...

The second anniversary of the unveiling of AUKUS is fast approaching. Most coverage of AUKUS has focused on its first pillar, which will see Australia join the 'nuclear club' by receiving 11 nuclear-powered, conventionally armed ...

Abstract
The military has often been used as a proving ground for advances in technology. With the advent of machine learning, algorithms and artificial intelligence, there has been a slew of scholarship around the legal and ethical challenges of applying those technologies to the military. Nowhere has the debate been fiercer than in examining whether international law is resilient enough to impose individual and State responsibility for the misuse of these autonomous weapon systems (AWSs). However, by introducing increasing levels of electronic and digital components into weapon systems, States are also introducing opportunities for adversaries to hack, suborn or take over AWSs in a manner unthinkable compared to conventional weaponry. Yet, no academic discussion has considered how the law of prize and war booty might apply to AWSs that are captured in such a way. This article seeks to address this gap.

The recent development of the next generation of 'drones' featuring some form of artificial intelligence or machine learning – the autonomous military system or AMS – has fuelled speculation about who the law ought to hold responsible for any negligence or malfeasance in their use. In a scenario recently posted by the Australian War College, an Air Force pilot relies on sensor information and artificial intelligence assessments provided by AMS which led to an (ultimately unlawful) order to attack a target. If that story played out in real life, what disciplinary liability should that ADF member face for their actions: do AMS fundamentally challenge the circumstances in which Defence Force members should disobey unlawful orders? Would disciplinary liability be assigned differently if the pilot was from another host jurisdiction? This article comparatively examines the superior orders defence in the domestic law, with a view to identifying the application of the duty to disobey in relation to orders involving AMS.