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How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, political theorist Corey Brettschneider proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action--expressive and coercive--Brettschneider contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. Brettschneider extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and he shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.
In: Law, culture & the humanities, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 7-9
ISSN: 1743-9752
In: Law & ethics of human rights, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 119-146
ISSN: 1938-2545
Abstract
The right to private property is among the most fundamental in liberal theory. For many liberals the idea of the state is grounded in its role as a protector of private property. If the liberal state is justified by its ability to protect property, the modern welfare state is often justified by its ability to meet needs. According to a view commonly referred to as "welfarism," the very fact that needs exist implies there is a moral obligation to meet them. In this Article I appeal to Rawlsian contractualist justification, including the "criterion of reciprocity," in developing a third manner of thinking about the relationship between property and welfare. I argue that welfare rights are necessary conditions for justifying a role for the state in enforcing the "right to exclude," a fundamental element of private ownership. My Article thus aims to use Rawls' account of justification, outlined in his later works, to theorize the notion of property-owning democracy from Theory of Justice.
In: Property-Owning Democracy, S. 53-74
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 39, Heft 6, S. 785-792
ISSN: 1552-7476
In: Representation, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 73-83
ISSN: 1749-4001
In: Getting to the Rule of Law, S. 52-63
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 39, Heft 6, S. 785-793
ISSN: 0090-5917
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 8, Heft 4, S. 1005-1019
ISSN: 1541-0986
Hate groups are often thought to reveal a paradox in liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and freedom. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of expression may be thought to be undermining the values on which its legitimacy rests. In this paper, I suggest how this apparent paradox might be resolved. I argue that the state should protect the expression of illiberal beliefs, but that the state (along with its citizens) is also obligated to criticize publicly those beliefs. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—coercive and expressive—I contend that such criticism should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities in its roles as speaker, educator, and spender. Here I extend the familiar idea that law, to be legitimate, must be widely publicized; I contend that a proper theory of the freedom of expression obligates the legitimate state to publicize the reasons that underlie rights, in particular reasons that appeal to the entitlement of each citizen subject to coercion to be treated as free and equal. My theory of freedom of expression is thus "expressive" in two senses: it protects the entitlement of citizens to express any political viewpoint, and it emphasizes a role for the state in explaining these free-speech protections and persuading its citizens of the value of the entitlements that underlie them.
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 187-213
ISSN: 1552-7476
Religious freedom is often thought to protect, not only religious practices, but also the underlying religious beliefs of citizens. But what should be said about religious beliefs that oppose religious freedom itself or that deny the concept of equal citizenship? The author argues here that such beliefs, while protected against coercive sanction, are rightly subject to attempts at transformation by the state in its expressive capacities. Transformation is entailed by a commitment to publicizing the reasons and principles that justify the basic rights of citizens.
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 8, Heft 4, S. 1005-1020
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 71, Heft 4, S. 1593-1594
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The Good Society: a PEGS journal, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 35-40
ISSN: 1538-9731
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 71, Heft 4, S. 1596-1597
ISSN: 1468-2508