Suchergebnisse

This analysis attempts to offer a counter strategy to the idea of anti-globalization and de-growth that had flared up again since the COVID-19 crisis. All international forecasts expect for the year 2020 the deepest recession since the Great Depression. Countries which can afford it, run a super-Keynesian fiscal policy to fight the crisis, accompanied by an extremely expansionary monetary policy in the USA (Fed) and in the euro area (ECB). As a third policy instrument besides fiscal and monetary policy, an aggressive pro-globalization trade policy could relieve and strengthen the crisis macro policy. To demonstrate which options are available we analyze nine mega free trade agreements, some of them are already in effect, others will be enacted soon. Overall, not the big players in world trade, the EU and the USA win by a simultaneous implementation of the nine FTAs. Japan would be the winner because it participates in four combinations (overlaps) of FTAs: EU-Japan, USA-Japan, CPTPP and RCEP. The USA hardly gain from further globalization. Similarly, the EU 27 cannot profit much from further globalization.

Aus ökonomischer Sicht werden hier 100 Jahre Österreich beleuchtet und Schlussfolgerungen für die Zukunft gezogen. Die Republik Österreich besteht nicht durchgehend seit 100 Jahren; sie ging zwischen 1938 und 1945 unter. Im Gegensatz zur Sicht eines Historikers, der chronologisch und sehr detailliert die Ereignisse von 100 Jahren Österreich in der Ersten und Zweiten Republik beschreibt, möchte ich als Ökonom nur gewisse Muster herausarbeiten. Zum einen werde ich die Charakteristika der Wirtschaftsentwicklung nach den beiden Weltkriegen (Inflation, Arbeitslosigkeit, Staatshaushalt, Geldpolitik und die Auswirkungen auf das Wirtschaftswachstum) aufzeigen. Zum anderen werden die Auswirkungen der verschiedenen Regimewechsel auf die wirtschaftliche Souveränität und damit auf die Wirtschaftsentwicklung des Staates Österreich behandelt. In der Ersten Republik und am Beginn der Zweiten Republik gab es eher eine zwangsweise Abgabe an Souveränität (Völkerbunddiktat, Anschluss, Besatzung). Dann folgte mit dem Staatsvertrag und der Neutralität die volle Souveränität. Später kam es im Zuge der stufenweisen Teilnahme an der europäischen Integration (EFTA, EWR, EU, WWU) zu einer freiwilligen Abgabe an Souveränität in der Hoffnung, als Gegenleistung einen barrierefreien Zugang zu einem größeren Markt zu erhalten. Zum Abschluss werden die Vorzüge der EU-Mitgliedschaft beleuchtet und abschließend die Frage diskutiert, ob Österreich besser mit oder ohne EU in die Zukunft schreiten sollte. ; From an economic point of view, 100 years of Austria are analysed, and conclusions drawn for the future. The Republic of Austria has not consistently existed for 100 years; she disappeared between 1938 and 1945. In contrast to the view of a historian who chronologically and in great detail describes the events of 100 years of Austria in the First and Second Republic, as an economist I would like to work out only certain patterns. On the one hand, the characteristics of economic development after the two world wars (inflation, unemployment, state budget, monetary policy and the impact on economic growth) are shown. On the other hand, the effects of the various regime changes on the economic sovereignty and thus on the economic development of the state of Austria are discussed. In the First Republic and at the beginning of the Second Republic, there was rather a compulsory surrender of sovereignty (the dictate of the League of Nations, Anschluss, occupation). Then, with the State Treaty and neutrality, full sovereignty followed. Later, as part of the gradual participation in European integration (EFTA, EEA, EU, EMU), Austria voluntarily ceded part of its sovereignty, hoping to get in return a barrier-free access to a larger market. Finally, the benefits of EU membership will be highlighted and the question of whether Austria should move into the future better with or without the EU.

Ten years ago, the global financial crisis started to unwind in the USA and triggered the greatest recession since World War II. Although the crisis of 2007-08 was caused in the USA, their economy was not hit so hard in the Great Recession of 2009 as in Europe, and in particular in the Euro area. The USA also recovered more rapidly and sustained from the crisis than the Euro area. Additionally, the specific Euro (debt) crisis of 2010 led to a double-dip recession in the Euro area, not joined by the USA. This divergent post-crisis development since then accumulated to a considerable growth gap between the USA and the Euro area. What are the factors behind this different performance? Would a more aggressive fiscal and/or monetary policy in the Euro area have closed the growth gap? As our simulation exercises show: the answer is no. However, the unconventional monetary policy by the ECB since 2014-15 contributed to the most recent recovery in the Euro area. We identify the pivotal reason of Euro areas growth lagging behind the USA in the different experiences in the crises management. The USA has a long-lasting experience in handling financial crises. In historical comparison, the Euro area - the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the EU - is still a "teenager". The crises revealed, that the legal basis of the institutional set-up of EMU and hence of the Euro area was not enough crises-proven. Rescue instruments had newly to be implemented. The global financial crisis was the first great shock which was badly absorbed by the still quite heterogeneous Euro countries. The Euro area, shattered by a succession of external (global financial crisis, Great Recession) and internal (Euro crisis) shocks, could therefore not unfold its growth potential in the last decade. If - hypothetically - the Euro area would have profited from the faster-growing production inputs (capital and labour) as in the USA, the growth gap could have been closed.

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada is the most ambitious (new generation) free trade agreement the EU has ever negotiated. It is a "mixed" agreement with EU and member countries competences. Most elements of the agreement for which the EU has "exclusive competence", including the chapter on tariffs and non-tariff barriers (the dismantling of all barriers to trade in goods and services and market access to foreign direct investment) can - after the European Parliament gave its consent on 15 February 2017 - be applied provisionally in spring 2017. With a specifically constructed macroeconomic trade and growth model for Austria, we simulate the impact of CETA on Austria. CETA will add 0.3 percent to Austria's real GDP in the medium run and will stimulate bilateral trade and FDI. Our model is a small prototype model and can easily be applied to other foreign trade agreements the EU is planning. A comparison shows that TTIP - which is "politically" dead now - would have the biggest impact (real GDP +1.7 percent).The almost finished negotiated EU-Japan foreign trade agreement would result in an increase of Austria's real GDP by 0.4 percent in the medium run.

A sequence of crises - the global financial crisis in 2008, the "Great Recession" in 2009 and the subsequent Euro crisis - constituted a major challenge for policy makers. After the fiscal policy had used up its powder in fighting the 2009 recession, monetary policy remained the only expansionary player in the policy arena. The ECB reacted to the crises with applying conventional (interest rate) and unconventional (qualitative easing) measures, however, with a considerable delay to the US Fed. The interest (main refinancing operation) rate was set to zero in September 2014 (the Fed already in December 2008) and the proper QE programme started not until March 2015 (the Fed shortly after the Lehman brothers crash). In evaluating the crisis management of the ECB one must state a clear failure in reaching its own medium term inflation target of 2 percent. However, it was successful in bringing down interest rates for government bonds after Draghi's famous "whatever it takes" speech in July 2012 and the following announcement of the outright monetary transactions programme. Whether ECB's QE programme 2015-2017 will be successful in reaching its primary goal, namely regaining the inflation target of 2 percent is an open question. Simulations with the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics indicate that it will be able to reach the inflation goal but only with a considerable lag. The impact on the real economy will not be as large as QE experiments in the USA. Other unintended effects - e.g., the creation of bubbles on the stock markets - are larger than the intended effects. In contrast to the usual dynamic stochastic general equilibrium exercises our simulations of ECB's QE with the global economic model can not only quantify the effects for the Euro area as a whole but also for its member countries and it can identify the possible spillovers to countries outside the Euro area.

The euro area has - in contrast to the USA - still not recovered from the "Great Recession" 2009 and the following euro crisis. Some fear that Europe could embark into a decade of "secular stagnation" like Japan in the recent past. The US success can be attributed to the application of the strategy of the "three arrows": a co-ordinated expansionary fiscal and monetary policy cum permanent structural reforms. In contrast, the euro area has its hands tied by a self-imposed restriction in fiscal policy (new fiscal rules). Thus, the euro area remains as a growth-stimulating strategy only an expansionary monetary policy by the ECB plus "structural reforms" at the member country level. Austria - after the expiring of the hitherto "EU growth bonus" - has also to look for new strategies to stimulate growth by its own. In simulations with a macro-growth model for Austria alternative growth scenarios are analysed: structural reforms to improve efficiency in product und labour markets, investment in knowledge and innovation (R&D), more globalisation, and traditional demand policies (monetary and fiscal). The most promising strategies are more globalisation and structural reforms plus R&D investments. Most of these strategies would stimulate growth without impairing fiscal sustainability.

Mit einem umfassenden und in der Öffentlichkeit höchst umstrittenen Handels- und Investitionsabkommen (TTIP) wollen die EU und die USA die größte Freihandelszone der Welt errichten und damit Wachstum und Beschäftigung stimulieren. Zwar prognostizieren alle bisherigen TTIP-Studien positive Handels-, Wohlfahrts- und Beschäftigungseffekte für beide Vertragsparteien (allerdings in ungleichem Ausmaß), doch treten diese nicht sofort ein, sondern erst sehr langfristig. Die TTIP ist daher zur Überwindung der gegenwärtigen Krise nicht geeignet. Die geschätzten Liberalisierungseffekte divergieren erheblich je nach Methode: Während allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle (CGE-Modelle) sehr geringe Wohlfahrtseffekte ermitteln (½% bis 1% des BIP), versprechen Schätzungen mit Gravitationsmodellen außerordentlich hohe Gewinne (Steigerung der Realeinkommen in der EU um 5% und in den USA um 13,4%). Allerdings dürfte es zu starken (und politisch brisanten) Verlusten an Handel und Wohlfahrt in Drittstaaten (Handelsumlenkungen) kommen. Für Österreich wird eine langfristig realisierbare BIP-bzw. Wohlfahrtszunahme um 1,7% (CGE-Modell) bis 2,7% bzw. 2.9% (Gravitationsmodell) geschätzt. Das Inkrafttreten eines TTIP-Abkommens dürfte sich wegen vieler parlamentarischer Hürden (es handelt sich um ein gemischtes Abkommen) verzögern.

With a comprehensive Trade and Investment Agreement, called Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) the European Union and the USA aim at creating the world's largest free trade area. It should help to stimulate growth and create new jobs. All TTIP studies so far forecast positive trade, welfare and employment effects on both sides of the Atlantic (in various sizes). However, these foreseen gains are not realised now but only after a long period of adjustment. The TTIP hence is not able to overcome the current economic crisis. The estimated welfare gains vary strongly according to the method applied: CGE models come up with modest welfare gains between ½ and 1 percent of GDP; estimations with gravity equations, however, predict great gains (5 percent increase of real GDP per capita in the EU and 13.4 percent in the USA). The results for Austria (1.7 percent GDP growth in CGE models to 2.7 percent in gravity approaches) are somewhat in between these extremes. The results concerning the effects of third countries are politically explosive. Gravity studies indicate extraordinarily large losses in trade (trade diversion) and welfare. This could challenge the acceptance of TTIP at the WTO. Above all, NGOs and the interested public are increasingly sceptical about the seemingly lack of transparency of the TTIP negotiations. Therefore, the European Commission in spring 2014 paused the negotiations and launched public online consultation on investor protection in TTIP.

Europe (and in particular the European Union) is a regional economic area and thus an embedded feature of globalisation. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect on 1 December 2009, the EU has grown from a "political midget" to a notable political "global player". Although Europe has gradually lost its top position in global trade it continues to be a "world trade superpower". Since its introduction in 2002, the euro has become the world's second most important reserve currency. With the WTO's Doha Round still stuck, the EU runs a large network of bilateral free trade agreements ("spaghetti bowl"), and is pursuing several strategies to ward off the dangers of globalisation: For one, its constant enlargement makes for an ever larger internal market, which implicitly raises borders against third countries. This immunisation effect is further strengthened by the enlargement of the euro area. Secondly, the EU's competition and anti-dumping policy efficiently ensures fair competition within the EU's internal market. The losers in the globalisation process are helped by the globalisation fund set up by the EU.

Das Kernelement der Europäischen Integration, der "Binnenmarkt", feiert heuer das 20-jährige Bestehen. Österreich hat seit dem Beitritt zur EU im Jahr 1995 an allen vertiefenden Schritten der EU-Integration teilgenommen. Nicht nur politisch ist Österreich durch die EU-Mitgliedschaft moderner, europäischer geworden, es hat auch ökonomisch auf allen Stufen der Integration profitiert: Ostöffnung (zusätzliches BIP-Wachstum +0,2 Prozentpunkte pro Jahr), EU-Mitgliedschaft (Teilnahme am EU-Binnenmarkt: +0,6 Prozentpunkte), WWU-Teilnahme (+0,4 Prozentpunkte) und EU-Erweiterung (+0,4 Prozentpunkte). Die aus Modellsimulationen abgeleiteten Integrationseffekte durch die Teilnahme an allen Integrationsstufen verstärkten das Wachstum des österreichischen BIP insgesamt um ½ bis 1 Prozentpunkt pro Jahr. Die Plausibilität dieser Modellergebnisse wird durch den Vergleich der Wirtschaftsentwicklung Österreichs mit anderen EU-Ländern und Drittländern unterstrichen. So entsprach der Wachstumsvorsprung Österreichs vor Deutschland und der Schweiz den genannten Integrationseffekten. Dieser "Wachstumsbonus" ist ohne die Integrationswirkungen der Teilnahme Österreichs an allen EU-Projekten schwer bis gar nicht erklärbar.

In the early 1970s, E.F. Schumacher criticised western industrial countries in the face of emerging globalisation by using a term generated by Leopold Kohr: "Small is beautiful." Seen against the progressing enlargement of the EU we need to ask whether and to what extent small is still beautiful. The internal market promises the greatest integration benefits from utilising economies of scale. In line with the integration theory, large economies (and their large-scale businesses) should profit more from a deeper European integration than would smaller ones. But is the size of an economy within the EU really of importance? While the original EU 6 was made up of equally sized countries, today's EU 28 is highly unequal: seven large and medium-sized countries face 21 small ones. While politics is still dominated by the major countries (including in the Council), especially along the historical Berlin-Paris axis, the situation is mixed when we look at the economic side, corresponding widely to Rose's (2006) estimate in searching for a "national scale effect". The adage that size does not matter applies to the EU countries as well. Smaller economies are more open to foreign trade than large ones (and should thus profit more from free access to the internal market), but otherwise do not differ in a systematic manner. Size does not make them rich. Their growth performance does not depend on a country's size, but rather on the period of investigation and the phase of integration.