Suchergebnisse

Until the 1980s, Israel had a rather stable and quite effective parliamentary system with a powerful executive, headed by a prime minister formally regarded as first among equals but actually enjoying a powerful position in leading the government. In the late 1980s, when the stalemate created by small and medium-sized parties led to a situation of immobilization, the proposal of direct election of the prime minister was adopted, out of many reforms proposed since the establishment of the state. In this article, the causes for the establishment of a premier-parliamentary system and its impact on the stability and effective functioning of the political system are discussed. An alternative model, based on the principles of the German Kanzler system, is proposed.

Discusses the old parliamentary system, the reasons for the 1996 Basic Law changing the role and election process of the prime minister, and its impact on the stability and effective functioning of the government. Proposes an alternative model based on the principles of the German Kanzler system.

Nach einer kurzen Charakterisierung des israelischen Wahlsystems werden die Hauptargumente der Gegner und Befürworter einer Reform referiert. Obgleich die Debatte um eine Änderung des Wahlsystems in der israelischen Öffentlichkeit schon seit der Staatsgründung geführt wird, sind bisher alle Ansätze fehlgeschlagen. Überblick über die Ursachen. (DÜI-Hns)

The distinction between purposively motivated "amateurs" and more self-interested "professionals" as contrasting types of political activists is investigated (following Soule and Clarke's methods) in the Israeli context, where there are grounds for expecting the parties to appeal to different types: Labor, to professionals, DMC to amateurs, Herut to a mixture of both. More than 600 party activists from these three parties were surveyed, confirming the parties' different appeal to different activists. Israeli amateurs share with Israeli professionals a pragmatic willingness to compromise, unlike their American counterparts. On three counts—stress on program goals, de-emphasis on merely win ning elections, and advocacy of intra-party democracy—Israeli and American amateurs are similar. Socialization factors are examined to suggest explanations for these findings.

In this article, we explain the puzzling continuous success of the far right-wing parties in Europe by using micro-organizational factors such as charismatic leadership and cohesive party organization, contributing to the process of party institutionalization and demonstrating the success of the extreme right-wing parties. We attempt to solve what appears to be a paradox of the institutionalization of far right charismatic parties on the basis of theories of party leadership and party institutionalization. In this endeavour we first define the concept of charismatic parties, and then outline our argument regarding the paradox of charismatic institutionalization and present criteria for measuring institutionalization of charismatic parties. Finally, we outline a proposed theory of `hard charismatic parties' institutionalization. The French FN (Front National) and the Austrian FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) serve as case studies to test our proposed model.

Applicability of the American or French presidential system to the Israeli circumstances.