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"This volume bridges contemporary philosophical conceptions of risk and responsibility and offers an extensive examination of the topic. It shows that risk and responsibility combine in ways that give rise to new philosophical questions and problems. Philosophical interest in the relationship between risk and responsibility continues to rise, due in no small part due to environmental crises, emerging technologies, legal developments, and new medical advances. Despite such interest, scholars are just now working out how to conceive of the links between risk and responsibility, the implications that risks may have to conceptions of responsibility (and vice versa), as well as how such theorizing might play out in applied cases. With contributions from leading scholars, this volume brings together new work examining the interplay between risk and responsibility, exploring its varied philosophical aspects and applications to contemporary issues in law, bioethics, technology, and environmental ethics. Risk and Responsibility in Context will be of interest to philosophers working in ethics, bioethics, philosophy of law, and philosophy of technology, as well as scholars and practitioners in law, health and science management, public policy, and environmental studies"--

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint of the two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator's interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state. ; Intuitivno se čini prikladnim tvrditi da žrtvama dugujemo kažnjavanje onih koji su im naštetili. Čini se također plauzibilnim tvrditi da dugujemo društvu kaznu za one koji narušavaju njegove norme. Međutim, dugujemo li kaznu i samim počiniteljima? Drugim riječima, imaju li oni koji čine zločine moralnu dužnost biti kažnjeni? Ovaj rad istražuje održivost prava na kaznu iz točke gledišta dviju teorija prava—koncepcije volje i interesa. Pokazuje se da je pravo na kaznu uvelike neobranjivo prema obje teorije: prema teoriji volje, pravo na kaznu je u konfliktu s autonomijom te ga se ne može niti tražiti niti ga se odreći; prema teoriji interesa, interes počinitelja da bude kažnjen, ukoliko postoji, nije dovoljan da utvrdi dužnost države.