Reason, emotion and information processing in the brain
In: Discussion paper series 6535
In: Public policy
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In: Discussion paper series 6535
In: Public policy
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 283-304
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Topics in economic analysis & policy, Band 6, Heft 1
ISSN: 1538-0653
Abstract
We study an R&D game in which a research unit undertakes a (non-observable) research effort and, if an innovation is obtained, auctions licenses to a pool of producers. Each producer has a private valuation for the license and suffers a negative externality when a competitor becomes a licensee. We compare the optimal rule for the allocation of licenses and the level of research effort implemented by the innovator in two scenarios: free licensing by the innovator vs. optimal regulation. As long as the cost of public intervention is sufficiently low, free licensing induces two different types of inefficiencies: an excessively high price for licenses and a suboptimal dissemination of knowledge, and an excessively low research effort. This indicates that public intervention should combine the following measures: (i) an antitrust agency which limits the royalties that innovators can ask for a license, and (ii) a direct subsidy to research activity.
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 113, Heft 1, S. 125-148
ISSN: 2105-2883
Cette analyse s'intéresse à déterminer les enjeux de la réglementation de la recherche et développement. Nous observons dans un premier temps l'environnement dans lequel cette activité a lieu et tentons de mettre en évidence les éléments fondamentaux qui doivent être pris en compte par le régulateur afin de donner les meilleures incitations aux innovateurs. Dans un second temps, nous étudions la performance des politiques mises en œuvre en nous appuyant sur les analyses théoriques et empiriques développées dans la littérature économique.
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 113, Heft 1, S. 125-148
ISSN: 0373-2630
In: Journal of political economy, S. 000-000
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16683
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12253
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Working paper
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1312-1346
ISSN: 1944-7981
Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we model the brain as a dual-system organization subject to three conflicts: asymmetric information, temporal horizon, and incentive salience. Under the first and second conflicts, we show that the uninformed system imposes a positive link between consumption and labor at every period. Furthermore, decreasing impatience endogenously emerges as a consequence of these two conflicts. Under the first and third conflicts, it becomes optimal to set a consumption cap. Finally, we discuss the behavioral implications of these rules for choice bracketing and expense tracking, and for consumption over the life cycle. (JEL D11, D74, D82, D87, D91)
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 175-180
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 931-947
ISSN: 1756-2171
An individual (the leader) with free access to information decides how much public evidence to collect. Conditional on this information, another individual with conflicting preferences (the follower) undertakes an action that affects the payoff of both players. In this game of incomplete but symmetric information, we characterize the rents obtained by the leader as a result of his control of the generation of public information. These rents capture the degree of influence exerted by a chairman on a committee from his capacity to keep discussions alive or call a vote. Similar insights are obtained if the leader decides first how much private information he collects, and then how much verifiable information he transmits to the follower.
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Working paper
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Working paper
In: The psychology of economic decisions Vol. 2
In: American economic review, Band 96, Heft 2, S. 62-66
ISSN: 1944-7981