Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?
In: The China quarterly, Heft 211, S. 624-648
ISSN: 1468-2648
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In: The China quarterly, Heft 211, S. 624-648
ISSN: 1468-2648
In: China: CIJ ; an international journal, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 69-83
ISSN: 0219-7472
This article addresses some of the most important mechanisms and instruments in the Communist Party of China's (CPC) management of key officials and administrative personnel: Party and state cadres in administrative organs and institutions. These mechanisms include control over the administrative layout in terms of organs and positions (bianzhi), the authority to appoint leading personnel (nomenklatura), as well as a sophisticated cadre transfer system - which also involves rotation between big business and the political world. The article not only emphasises the crucial importance of cadre management in understanding the fundamentals of the Chinese power system, but it also points to a number of challenges in studying this particular Chinese form of personnel management. It shows the elaborate nature of cadre and personnel management in China and argues that in recent years the Party has strengthened rather than weakened its role in managing the cadre corps. Finally, the article draws on theoretical insights provided by the existing body of literature on elites in general and in relation to China in particular. (China/GIGA)
World Affairs Online
In: The China quarterly: an international journal for the study of China, Heft 211, S. 624-648
ISSN: 0305-7410, 0009-4439
As a result of economic reform and administrative restructuring in China, a number of powerful state-owned business groups ("national champions") have emerged within sectors of strategic importance. They are headed by a new corporate elite which enjoys unprecedentedly high levels of remuneration and managerial independence from government agencies and which derives legitimacy from symbolizing China's economic rise. However, through the nomenklatura system, the Party controls the appointment of the CEOs and presidents of the most important of these enterprises and manages a cadre transfer system which makes it possible to transfer/rotate business leaders to take up positions in state and Party agencies. In order to conceptualize the coexistence of the contradicting forces for further enterprise autonomy and continued central control that characterizes the evolving relationship between business groups and the Party-state, this paper proposes the notion of integrated fragmentation. (China Q/GIGA)
World Affairs Online
In: Pacific affairs, Band 83, Heft 3, S. 568-570
ISSN: 0030-851X
In: Pacific affairs, Band 80, Heft 4, S. 654-655
ISSN: 0030-851X